































a! renewed! emphasis! on! whether,! and! under! what! circumstances,! aid! is! effective! in! achieving!
development! outcomes.! There! is! significant! policy! consensus! that! aid! is! most! effective! in!
environments!with! “good”!governance,!which! the!United!Nations!defines!as!processes!of!decision!
making! and! implementation! that! are! effective! and! efficient,! equitable! and! inclusive,! and!
accountable! and! transparent.! Aid! donors! fund! numerous! projects! aimed! at! strengthening! good!
governance! in! recipient! countries,! often! through! reforms! of! political! institutions.! Yet! many! aid!
donors!fail!to!theorize!about!the!process!or!mechanism!through!which!good!governance!aid!drives!
institutional!change,!and!in!doing!so!often!ignore!the!impact!that!other!drivers!of!change!may!have!
on! the! implicitly! assumed! direct! causal! relationship! between! aid! and! improved! governance! in!
political!institutions.!!
This! thesis! explores! the! role! of! aid! in! shifting! institutions! toward! the! ideal! of! good!
governance!through!an!analysis!that!embeds!this!aid!within!a!larger!context!that!takes!into!account!
the! role! of! other! drivers! of! change.! It! compares! good! governanceHrelated! changes! within! Peru’s!
judicial! institutions! and! Comptroller! (Auditor)! General! over! a! 30Hyear! period,! from! 1980H2010,!
examining! the! main! actors! and! factors! that! drove! or! influenced! changes! in! institutional!
accountability,!transparency,!effectiveness!and!efficiency,!asking!how!they!drove!these!changes!and!
overcame!resistance! to! reforms.!Building!upon!this!withinHcase!analysis,! this! thesis! then!compares!
across! cases! to!develop!conclusions!about! the!necessary!and! sufficient! conditions! that! resulted! in!















don't!know"! is! largely!an! inward!one,!but!many!of! the!other!aspects!of! completing!a!Ph.D.!—!
from! exploring! ideas! to! correcting! one's! writing! to! navigating! the! financial! and! emotional!
insecurities!of!student!life!—!would!be!unmanageable!without!a!strong!support!network.!!
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enduring!multiple! discussions! on! institutional! theory! and! causality,! as!well! as! frustrated! rants!
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In! 1997,! the!World! Bank! was! poised! to! provide! a! $22.5! million! loan! to! Peru! to! support!
reforms!aimed!at!reducing!corruption!in,!and!improving!the!transparency!and!independence!of,!the!
Judiciary.!The!proposed!reforms!built!upon!sweeping!changes!made!in!the!judicial!sector!since!1992,!
when!democratically!elected!Peruvian!President!Alberto!Fujimori! initiated!a! selfHcoup,1! justified! in!
part!by!asserting!that!exceptional!powers!were!needed!to!reform!a!Judiciary!that!Peruvians!saw!as!
inept,! corrupt,! and! untrustworthy.! Fujimori,! with! the! initial! support! of! a! variety! of! political!
stakeholders!and! the!approval!of! the!majority!of!Peru’s!citizens,!purged!most!of! the! Judiciary!and!
embarked!on!a!series!of!reforms!aimed!at!rebuilding!the!judicial!sector.!The!World!Bank!loan!fit!into!
this!reform!framework,!and!included!a!series!of!projects!to!be!implemented!by!two!judicial!branch!




Yet! less! than! three! months! after! approving! it,! the! Bank! postponed! the! start! of! loan!
disbursements! for! six! months,! citing! concerns! over! project! effectiveness.! By! the! end! of! that! sixH
month!period,! the!Peruvian!government!requested!to!withdraw!from!the! loan,!at!which!point! the!
Bank! terminated! the! projects.2! Had! the! loan! been! disbursed! and! the! projects! implemented,! they!
almost! certainly! would! have! failed! in! their! aim! of!making! Peru’s! judicial! system! less! corrupt! and!











resigned! the! presidency! via! fax.! One! of! the! many! institutions! caught! up! in! the! scandal! was! the!
Judiciary,! as!evidence!emerged! that! judges!had! little! space! to!act! independently!of! the!Executive,!
and!that!endemic!corruption!extended!from!judges!to!lawyers!to!police!investigators.!!
Eight! years! after! the! cancellation! of! the! 1997! loan,! the! World! Bank! made! the! first!
disbursement!of!a!$12!million!loan!aimed!at!improving!justice!services!in!Peru.!An!assessment!of!the!
performance!of!that!loan,!conducted!in!2010,!rated!both!the!Bank’s!and!Peru’s!performance!in!the!
implementation! of! the! loan! as! “Highly! Satisfactory,”! showing! tangible! improvements! in!
transparency,!professional!human!resources!management,!and!judicial!training.3!A!second,!fiveHyear!
loan! for! $30! million! loan! was! approved! in! 2010.! Among! its! objectives! were! improving! service!
delivery! to! users! by! providing! technical! assistance! for! more! efficient! case! processing;! improving!
institutional! capacity! of! judicial! personnel! by! implementing! of! a! performanceHbased!management!
system!of!personnel!selection,!evaluation,!promotion,!and!sanctioning;!and!improving!transparency!
through!training!of!judges!and!personnel!within!the!Judiciary’s!antiHcorruption!office!(OCMA).4!
That! there! could! be! such! disparate! outcomes! of! two! similar! good! governance! projects!—!
aimed! at! the! same! institution! in! the! same! country! by! the! same! international! aid! donor! —!
underscores!why!there!has!been!such!a!fierce!debate!during!the!last!two!decades!over!the!role!of!
foreign! aid! as! a! driver! of! change.5! In! terms! of! good! governance! aid! specifically,! which! is! largely!
aimed! at! changing! political! institutions,! it! is! unclear! whether! projects! like! those! covered! by! the!
World!Bank!judicial!reform!loans!help!drive!change,!whether!they!are!the!key!driver!of!change,!and!
what!impact!other!key!drivers!of!change!have!on!the!ability!of!good!governance!aid!itself!to!act!as!a!
driver! of! change.! The! dilemma! for! good! governance! aid,! within! the! larger! debate! on! whether!












“sticky”! –! that! is,! resistant! to! change! –! while! change! usually! occurs! within! a! specific! window! of!
opportunity!precipitated!by!a!critical!juncture.!Aid!donors!are!not!well!positioned!to!recognize!these!
critical!junctures!and!windows!of!opportunity!due!to!aid!agencies’!dominant!modus!operandi,!which!
privileges! a! logic! of! implementation! and! disbursement! over! a! logic! of! strategic! intervention.! In!
addition,! there! is! a! significant! tension! between! the! donor! approaches! utilized! to! incentivize!





aid! donor! interventions.6! As! a! result,! there! is! little! cumulative! evidence! on! whether! technical!
assistance! projects! focused! on! building,! strengthening,! and! changing! institutions! to! make! them!
better! equipped! to! provide! services! to! citizens,! as!most! good! governance! aid! projects! do,! play! a!
significant!role!in!achieving!these!aims.!This!leads!to!a!widely!held!perception!among!both!critics!and!
some!aid!practitioners!that!technical!assistance!aid,!and!by!association!good!governance!aid,!does!
not!act!as!a!driver!of! institutional! change.7!This! stands! in! contrast! to! the! implicit! assumption! that!





















institutional! change! and! good! governanceHrelated! institutional! changes! by! analyzing! the!
mechanisms! through!which!different!drivers!of! change!affect! institutional!outcomes.! It! challenges!
both! the! implicit! assumption! of! good! governance! aid! implementers! that! aid! is! the!main! driver! of!
institutional!change,!and!the!critique!of!aid!detractors!who!suggest!that!aid!plays!no!role!in!driving!
positive!institutional!changes.!It!will!show!that!aid!is!one!of!many!drivers!of!change,!and!analyze!the!
interaction! effects! between! and! among! these! drivers! of! change! that! muddies! the! direct! causal!
relationship! between! good! governance! aid! and! institutional! outcomes.! This! thesis! therefore!
proceeds!from!an!interest!in!aid!as!a!determinant!or!driver!of!institutional!change,!at!the!same!time!
acknowledging! that! aid! is! not! the! only! driver! of! institutional! change.! As! such,! the!main! question!
guiding! this! research! focuses!on!good!governance!aid,!but! there!are! two!equally! relevant,! related!
questions!this!thesis!aims!to!answer!as!part!of!this!inquiry:!!
1)! What! has! influenced! or! driven! good! governanceHrelated! shifts! in! Peru’s! political!
institutions?!!
2)! What! role! has! good! governance! aid! specifically! played! in! driving! or! influencing! good!
governance!reforms!in!Peru’s!political!institutions?!!

































aid! as! a! driver! of! institutional! change! embedded!within! the! larger! political! context! that! includes!
multiple!drivers!of!change.!As!mentioned!previously,!foreign!aid!advocates!and!detractors!alike!have!
been!able!to!agree!that!aid!can!work!in!certain!circumstances,!such!as!when!the!demand!for!aid!is!
driven! by! the! recipient,! resulting! in! strong! ownership! of! the! reform!agenda,! and!when! aid! donor!
projects!align!with!the!reform!strategies!of!recipient!organizations.!Clearly!aid!is!not!the!only!driver!
of! institutional! change;! different! actors! and! organizations! within! the! recipient! country! also! drive!
change.!!









definitions! that! need! to! be! clarified! prior! to! presenting! the! hypothesis.! The! first! is! political!
institutions.!This!thesis!will!use!definitions!consistent!with!the!literature!on!“new!institutionalism,”!
in! which! political! institutions! are! the! rules! and! norms! governing! public! life,! and! consist! of!









viewpoint,! institutions! are! more! than! just! the! aggregation! of! individual! actors’! interests;! they!
operate! based! on! a! logic! of! political! survival,! whether! by! attempt! to! secure! resources! or! by!
cultivating! legitimacy.10! For! this! reason,! political! institutions! can! act! as! drivers! of! institutional!
change,!taking!actions!that!shift!rules,!policies,!procedures,!cultures,!norms,!or!practices.!This!aspect!
of! institutions! is!the!focus!of!Chapter!2.! Institutions!can!also!shape! individual!behavior! in!different!
ways,!and!this!aspect!of!institutions!is!the!focus!of!Chapter!3.!
The!second!phenomenon!is!good!governance.!There!is!a!rich!literature!that!focuses!on!the!
appropriateness! of! the! way! in! which! aid! donors! conceptualize! good! governance,! and! the!
implications! that! contested! concepts! of! good! governance! might! have! for! the! donorHrecipient!
relationship.11! This! is! a! point! taken! up! in! Chapter! 2! in! reference! to! factors! that!might! affect! the!
ability!of!good!governance!aid!to!drive!change.!However,!as!the!focus!of!this!thesis!is!not!to!question!
the!appropriateness!of!these!definitions,!but!rather!to!understand!the!role!of!good!governance!aid,!
it! is! important! to! understand! how! donors! define! good! governance,! and! what! the! scope! of! good!
governance!aid!encompasses.!This!is!important!for!understanding!the!kinds!of!measures!donors!look!


















Bank! report!on!governance!stated! that!“good!governance! is!epitomized!by!predictable,!open,!and!




“participatory,! transparent,!and!accountable…,!effective!and!equitable,! [and]!promotes! the!rule!of!
law.”14! The! United! States! Agency! for! International! Development! (USAID)! also! frames! good!
governance! as! democratic! governance,! noting! that! it! includes! a! focus! on! transparency,!
accountability,! and! antiHcorruption.15! A! fourth! dimension! that! is! highlighted! by! some,! but! not! all,!
donors! is! efficiency.! The! efficiency! dimension! is! captured! in! the! indicators! of! sound! public!
management!that!the!World!Bank!uses! in! its!Country!Policy! Institutional!Assessment!(CPIA),!which!
include! the! efficiency! of! revenue! mobilization! and! public! expenditures,! as! well! as! transparency,!
accountability,!and!corruption.16!!
When! applied! to! government! institutions,! such! as! the! Judiciary! and! the! Comptroller!
General’s!office,!these!four!dimensions!of!good!governance!are!valued!as!the!means!through!which!
these!institutions!can!provide!better!services!to!citizens.!As!is!evident!by!the!way!in!which!the!UNDP!
and! USAID! frame! good! governance! as! democratic! governance,! democracy! is! often! linked! with!
governance!as! if! the! two!are! inseparable.!But! they!are!not:! It! is!possible! to!have!an!authoritarian!

















governance,! such! as! effectiveness! and! efficiency.! This! is! particularly! true! when! applying! the!




new! and! efficient! administrative! agencies.! State! capacity! to! enforce! order! was!
improved,! as! the!military,! police,! and! civil! society! organizations! all! contributed! to!
the! defeat! of! [terrorist! organizations! like! the! Shining! Path].! Many! of! these! gains!
were!explicitly!made!at!the!expense!of!democratic!process!and!the!rule!of!law.!From!
the!outset,!Fujimori!offered!a!sort!of!tradeHoff!between!efficiency!and!competition,!
touting!his! “direct!democracy”!and! strict!majority! rule!as!an!antidote! to! the!party!
infighting!that!was!blamed!for!most!of!the!country’s!ills.17!
!
That! said,! there! is! a! close! correlation! between! democracy! and! good! governance! in! terms! of! the!
dimension!of!accountability,18!which!can!be!seen!in!the!types!of!projects!and!activities!that!donors!
like!USAID!implement!within!the!programmatic!sector!of!good!governance!aid.!!
On!a! functional! level,! aid!donors!also!pair! the! term!good!governance! (or! just!governance)!
with! the! terms! rule! of! law!or! antiHcorruption! to! define! a! sector! of! development! aid! distinct! from!
other! sectors! such! as! agriculture,! economic! growth,! environment,! education,! or! health.19! The!
programs!that!are!implemented!under!the!rubric!of!good!governance!can!therefore!be!diverse.!For!

























decentralization! efforts,! which! included! financial! and! technical! assistance! to! the! nationalHlevel!
Secretaría! Nacional! de! Descentralización.21! The! UK! Department! for! International! Development’s!
(Dfid)!“proHpoor”!economic!growth!focus!led!to!programs!designed!to!improve!the!participation!of!
poor!people!as! informed!voters,!which!“involved!working!with!a!coalition!of!state!and!civil!society!
organisations”22! and! the! World! Bank’s! support! has! focused! on! reforming! state! institutions,! in!
particular! the! Judiciary,! through! loans! supporting! the! Justice! Services! Improvement! Project.23! The!
InterHAmerican!Development!Bank’s! (IADB)!projects! focused!on!modernizing!procurement!systems!




! In! its! focus!on! the! role!of!good!governance!aid! in! reforming!political! institutions,! this! thesis!




The! literature! on! governance! referenced! above! shapes! how! donors! conceptualize! good!
governance,! and! therefore! helps! define! the! types! of! changes! donors! wish! to! observe! in! the!
























to! answering! not! just! who! or! what! drives! change,! but! how! that! change! occurs.! In! particular,!
sociological! institutionalism! focuses! on! institutions! as! arenas! of! norm! contestation! and! peer!
emulation!effects.!Policy!adoption!and!change!therefore!occur!as!a!result!of!certain!norms!spreading!
to!enough!peers!to!be!naturally! incorporated! into! institutions,!with!domestic!political!mobilization!
given!as!a!key!example.!Thus,!adoption!of!new!institutional!policies!and!practices!is!due!to!the!fact!
that! this! adoption! “enhances! the! social! legitimacy! of! the! organization! or! its! participants….!
Organizations!embrace!specific!institutional!forms!or!practices!because!the!latter!are!widely!valued!
within! a! broader! cultural! environment.”27! In! other! words,! who! spreads! norms?! Does! good!
governance!aid!spread!norms?!Does!this!lead!to!policy!adoption!and!institutional!change?!
Rational! choice! institutionalism! focuses!on! the!need!of! institutions! to! “capture!gains! from!




















the! longHterm!benefits! of! cooperation! and! regulating! inherent! nonHcooperation! that! derives! from!
individuals’! shortHterm! utilityHmaximization.! Institutions! therefore! change! either! because! the!
incentives! for! cooperation! change! or! the! institution! no! longer! fulfills! the! needs! for! which! it! was!
created.!Two!key!questions!here!are!who!has!the! influence!or!power!to!change!good!governanceH
related!incentives!and!whether!aid!donors!can!influence!this.!
Traditionally,! historical! institutionalism!has! looked! to! structures,!or!path!dependence,! and!
events,!or!critical! junctures,! to!explain! institutional!change!or!stasis.!Path!dependence,!which!Paul!
Pierson! and! Theda! Skocpol! define! as! “the! dynamics! of! selfHreinforcing! or! positive! feedback!
processes!in!a!political!system,”!explains!why!the!status!quo!may!be!entrenched,!hard!to!change,!or!
“sticky.”29!Path!dependence!can!exacerbate!or!embed!power!inequalities!in!a!relationship,!making!it!
difficult! to! reverse! course!once!actors! are!on! that!path.!Historical! institutionalism!also! focuses!on!
critical! junctures,! which! are! significant! events! and! actions! that! shift! key! institutional! dynamics,!
leading!to!institutional!change!that!is!often!dramatic!and!sudden,!such!as!the!institutional!shifts!that!




change,! in! which! exogenous! is! defined! as! processes! or! actions! taken! by! actors! emanating! from!
outside!the!organizations!being!studied,!while!endogenous!refers!to!processes!or!actions!taken!by!
actors! emanating! from! within! the! organization! being! studied.30! More! recent! work! has! expanded!
historical!institutionalism’s!explanatory!power!by!developing!models!in!which!institutional!change!is!
slow,!and!comes!from!incremental!changes!within!the!institution.31!This!focus!is!compatible!with!the!














This! thesis! proposes! three! very! general! deductive! hypotheses! to! explain! the! role! of!
governance!aid!and!how!it!might!act!as!a!driver!of!change,!setting!the!stage!for!a!deeper!explanation!
taken! up! in! Chapter! 3.! These! hypotheses! are! derived! from! the! literature! on! institutional! change!
referenced! above,! and! attempt! to!make! explicit! the! implicit! assumptions! donors!make! about! the!
relationship! between! good! governance! aid! and! institutional! change.! Figure! 2! shows! an! expanded!



































































an! equilibrium! point,! will! stay! in! equilibrium.! Drivers! of! change,! including! good! governance! aid!
interventions,! act! as! an! exogenous! shock,! prompting! changes! in! actors’! preferences.! Institutional!
change! depends! upon! how! these! aid! programs! affect! the! incentives! or! preferences! of! actors! to!
implement!governance!rules!and!practices.!
The! second! hypothesis! focuses! on! norm! diffusion! and! adoption! as! the! main! driver! of!
change.!Institutional!change!occurs!because!actors!strive!to!do!what!makes!sense!according!to!their!




The! third! hypothesis! focuses! on! power! dynamics! and! other! structures! embedded! in!
institutions!that!drive!change.!Institutional!change!is!pathHdependent,!and!thus!prior!configurations!
of!norms,!practices,!and!power!balances!become!recurring!patterns!of!behavior.!Drivers!of!change,!
including! good! governance! aid! interventions,! prompt! junctures! that! can! disrupt! such! reinforcing!
patterns!and!create!new!ones.!Institutional!change!depends!on!how!contextHspecific!trajectories!in!
an!institution!will!shape!the!adoption!of!new!rules!and!patterns!of!behavior.!!
These! theories! suggest! the!mechanisms!by!which! drivers! of! change! influence! institutional!
change,! but! do! not! explain! how! these! drivers! of! change! may! affect! one! another! or! work! in!
conjunction.! As! noted! earlier,! the! relationship! between! good! governance! aid! and! institutional!
change!is!affected!by!the!actions!of!the!four!other!drivers!of!change!in!Peru:!the!Executive!branch;!
other! government! organizations,! such! as! Congress;! civil! society! actors;! and! the! leaders! of! the!
organizations! at! which! aid! is! targeted.! Identifying! that! these! variables! are! relevant! in! the!




join! together! all! of! the! interactions! of! the! drivers! of! changes! at! different! steps! in! the! process! of!
institutional! change,! and! second,! there! are! simply! too!many!potential! causal! combinations!within!
these!interactions!to!specify!a!cohesive!deductive!hypothesis.!Instead,!this!thesis!will!inductively!link!
these! drivers! of! change! in! a! crossHcase! comparison,! presented! in! Chapter! 7,! that! builds! upon! the!
withinHcases! analyses! developed! in! Chapters! 5! and! 6.! This! inductive! bent! is! consistent! with! the!
approach! in! historical! institutionalism! of! taking! contextual! factors! very! seriously! in! researching!
institutional! change,! which! helps! avoid! the! fallacies! that! often! occur! when! researchers! and!
practitioners!assume!that!a!set!of!universal!factors!or!features!are!at!work!—!a!particularly!salient!
point! in! critiques! of! foreign! aid.! This! does! not! indicate! that! such! investigations! are! atheoretical;!




on!good!governance!aid,! is! the! fact! that!aid! can!be!viewed! from! the!macro! level!of!analysis! (as!a!




terms! of! the! micro! or! meso! levels,! as! in! Figure! 1.! In! a! scenario! in! which! drivers! of! change! are!
considered!potential! intervening!and!concomitant!variables,! the!number!of!variables!at!each! level!
that! can! muddy! the! direct! causal! pathway! between! good! governance! interventions! and! positive!
institutional! outcomes! become! exceedingly! complex.! In! part,! this! is!why! it! is! difficult! to! specify! a!
deductive! theory! on! how! these! work! in! conjunction.! For! example,! the! manner! in! which! aid! is!
delivered!and!managed!may!vary!at!the!institutional!and!project! levels,!as!might!the!nature!of!the!

















takes! into! account! other! drivers! of! change.! However,! a! projectHlevel! analysis! that! begins! with!
comparing,! for!example,!World!Bank,!USAID,!Dfid,!UNDP!and!GTZ!projects!within! the! Judiciary,!as!
well!as!within! the!Comptroller!General,!was!not!possible!due! to!a! significant! lack!of!access! to! the!
requisite! projectHlevel! data.! However,! the! interviews! I! conducted! in! Peru! with! major! aid! donors!
suggested!that!there!may!not!be!significant!variation!across!donors!in!terms!of!the!mechanisms!by!
which! their! individual! projects! drive! institutional! change.! Therefore,! I! am! comfortable! treating!










level! variables! constant! across! institutions! to! limit! the! number! of! factors! for! consideration,! the!
choice! was! made! to! conduct! this! research! in! a! single! country! and! compare! different! political!
institutions! within! that! country.33! Of! key! importance! to! this! strategy! is! awareness! that! these!
organizations!differ!on!the!dependent!variable,!which!Alexander!George!and!Andrew!Bennett!note!is!
appropriate! in! some! cases! because! it! can! help! identify! which! variables! are! not! necessary! or!
sufficient! conditions! for! the! selected! outcomes.34! The! process! by! which! Peru! was! chosen! as! the!
country!thus!entailed!two!steps:!first,! limiting!the!possible!candidate!countries!through!an!analysis!
of!scope!conditions,!and!second,!investigating!differences!in!how!institutional!quality!changed!over!
time!at! the! subHnational! level.! In! terms!of! the!macroHlevel! conditions,! the! first! scope! condition! to!
establish!its!inclusion!in!the!population!of!cases!was!that!the!country!needed!to!receive!a!significant!
amount! of! funding! for! good! governance! projects.! The! second! condition!was! that! the! country! fell!
within!a!middleHrange!on!control!of!corruption,!to!avoid!countries!where!endemic!corruption!would!
likely!produce!no!variation!across!institutions!in!changes!on!good!governance!measures.!Finally,!the!
list!was!narrowed!to!countries! in!which! I! could!conduct! research! in! the! local! language,!which!was!
limited!to!English!and!SpanishHspeaking!countries.!These!criteria!resulted!in!a!short!list!of!countries!















of! the! Comptroller!General,!which! has! experienced! significantly!more! progress.! As! this! thesis!will!
show,! the!different!critical! junctures! in!Peru’s!political!history!allow!these! two!cases! to!be!broken!
down! into! further! subHcases,! and! the! resulting! observations! in! each! case!make! up! the! crossHcase!
comparison.! These! cases! are! analyzed! in! Chapters! 5! and! 6,! while! the! crossHcase! comparison! is!
outlined!in!Chapter!7.!
Methods!of!Data!Collection!
The!main!data! sources! include! secondary! source!qualitative!and!quantitative!data,!and!32!
semiHstructured! key! informant! interviews!with! international! aid! donors,! those!working!within! the!
institution! (i.e.! Peruvian! policymakers! and! civil! servants),! and! independent! observers! of! good!
governance! process! in! Peru,! such! as!NGO! representatives,! conducted! in! Peru! between!May! 2011!
and! October! 2012! (see! Table! 5! in! Chapter! 4! for! a! list! of! interviewees).! The! secondary! source!
quantitative! data! is! mostly! useful! for! observing! perceived! changes! to! the! dependent! variables!
associated! with! institutional! change! in! the! public! sector,! such! as! changes! in! the! perception! of!
corruption! and! transparency! in! the! Judiciary.! The! qualitative! data! and! key! informant! interviews!
clarify!the!role!of!the!drivers!of!change!and!identify!causal!process!mechanisms!that!link!the!actions!
of!these!drivers!of!change!(as!well!as!other!sociopolitical!factors,!such!as!economic!changes)!to!the!
observed! institutional! changes.! Specific! sources! of! qualitative! data! include! reports! produced! by!
NGOs! and! international! bodies,! newspaper! stories,! evaluations! and! reports! of! specific! good!
governance!projects!collected!from!aid!donor!agencies,!and!institutional!documents,!such!as!codes!
of!conduct,!policies,!and!operational!manuals!collected!from!the!institutions.!Quantitative!data!was!
collected! from! the! Web! sites! of! the! Judiciary! and! the! Comptroller! General,! as! well! as! from!




In! order! to! unpack! assumptions! about! the! role! of! aid! in! institutional! change,!we! need! to!
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refer! back! to! the! narrow! framing! of! institutional! changes! laid! out! in! Figure! 2.! When! the! fully!
specified! logical! framework! is!mapped! out,! it! becomes! clear! that! good! governance! aid! is! not! the!
single! causal! factor! that! leads! to! changes! in! institutions! over! time.! Other! exogenous! and!
endogenous! factors! combine! as!multiple! interaction! effects! and!multiple! causal! pathways! to! the!
same!outcome! (equifinality).! Process! tracing! can!help!map!out! the! causal! process!observations! in!
individual! cases,! ! as! it! is! an! analytical! method! that! “attempts! to! identify! the! intervening! causal!
process! —! the! causal! chain! and! causal! mechanism! —! between! an! independent! variable! (or!
variables)! and! the! outcome! of! the! dependent! variable.”35! In! the! case! of! Figure! 2,! then,! process!
tracing!helps!identify!the!stages!of!institutional!changes!(in!terms!of!a!causal!chain)!and!how!other!
independent! variables! (in! this! case,! the! actions! of! drivers! of! changes! and! other! factors)! lead! to!
changes! in! the! dependent! variable,! thus! illustrating! the! potential! pathways! or! causal!mechanism!
suggested!in!the!hypotheses.!Process!tracing!helps!narrow!down!the!list!of!potential!causes!leading!
to! the! outcome,! and! creates! space! for! mapping! out! multiple! causal! paths! consistent! with! the!
observed!outcomes!in!a!single!case.!Types!of!process!tracing!include!the!detailed!narrative,!which!is!
atheoretical! but! suggests! potential! causal! processes! and! the! sequence! in! which! they! occurred;!
analytical! explanation,! which! moves! historical! narratives! into! the! realm! of! analytical! causal!
explanations! based!on! specified! theories;! and! general! explanations,!which!move!up! the! ladder! of!
abstraction!from!minute!detail!to!a!higher!level!of!generality.!In!each!type,!the!main!components!of!
process!tracing!are!to!observe/establish!the!independent!variables!or!initial!conditions;!observe!the!













and! the! conditions! (independent! variables! and! causal!mechanisms)! that! are! present! or! absent! in!
each!case.!A!crossHcase!comparison!or!typology!allows!for!“contingent!generalizations!on!how!and!
under!what!conditions!they!behave!in!specified!conjunctions!or!configurations!to!produce!effects!on!
specified! dependent! variables.”38! While! process! tracing! allows! researchers! to! produce! causal!
statements! about! how! certain! sequences! occur,! it! remains! contextHspecific.! A! typology! allows! for!
multiple!causal!observations!to!be!compared!across!cases,!thus!“chart[ing]!the!repertoire!of!causal!
paths!that! lead!to!given!outcomes!and!the!conditions!under!which!they!occur.”39!While!this!thesis!




This! thesis! can! be! considered! an! original! contribution! to! knowledge! for! several! reasons.!





to!the!role!of!technical!assistance,!which! is! largely!considered!to!be! ineffectual.!Second,!this!study!
adds!a!new!empirical!case!that!employs!a!combination!of!process!tracing!and!crossHcase!comparison!
at! the! subHnational! level.! This! fills! a! knowledge! gap,! as!many! studies! of! historical! institutionalism!
focus!on!macroHlevel!phenomena!and!compare!cases!across,!rather!than!within,!countries.!
Aiming! for! this! level! of! analysis! also! opens! up! a! new! way! of! looking! at! Peru’s! political!






Peru!working!on!good!governance!projects.! It!will! also!provide!a! fresh!understanding!of!how!and!
under!what! conditions! institutions! change,! adding! to! the! literature! on! institutionalism.! Further,! it!
will! contribute! to!an!understanding!of! the! role!of!good!governance!aid!as! relates! to! the!power!of!
external! actors! to! foster! internal! change,! which! is! an! ongoing! discussion! in! both! international!
relations!and!development!studies! literature.!This!thesis!seeks!to!contribute!nuance!to!the!debate!
on! aid! effectiveness,! continuing! to!move!beyond! an! “aid! always!works”! versus! “aid! never!works”!
dichotomy,! by! showing! how! and! under! what! circumstances! aid!may! work! in! driving! or! fostering!




This! thesis! also! makes! a! contribution! to! the! methodology! aid! donors! can! use! when!
evaluating!the! impact!of!good!governance!aid!programs!without!the!benefit!of!a! largeHn!statistical!
sample,! baseline! study,! or! comparison! group.! Typically,! evaluations! of! aid! programs! are! only!
considered! rigorous! when! they! use! experimental! or! quasiHexperimental! methods! to! establish!
impact.! While! the! purpose! here! is! not! to! conduct! an! evaluation! of! each! discrete! project! or!
intervention,! it! does! suggest! how!a! program!might! be! analyzed!using!processHtracing!methods!—!
first! by! developing! a! hypothesis! that! specifies! a! causal! chain! or! theory! of! change! linking! program!
inputs,!such!as!training,!to!impact!at!the!institutional!level,!and!then!collecting!a!mix!of!quantitative!











focused!on! the! impact!of!U.S.! State!Department!programs!aimed!at!building! institutional! capacity!
within! Colombian! legal! institutions! in! line! with! outcomes! related! to! improved! rule! of! law.! The!
second! focused!on! the! impact!of!a!U.S.!State!Department! regional!program!aimed!at!building! law!
enforcement!capacity!to!fight!narcotics!trafficking!in!the!Caribbean.!!
Limitations!
There! are! several! limitations! to! this! study! that! the! author! has! tried! to!mitigate.! First,! the!
contextHspecificity!of!this!thesis!limits!its!generalizability.!This!is!a!positive!limitation!in!many!ways,!
as!the!idea!of!developing!universal!laws,!particularly!in!terms!of!good!governance,!and!then!applying!
those! laws! in!diverse!countries!without!regard!to! local!context,! is!one!of!the!major! fallacies!of!aid!
donors.!The!difficulty!in!generalizability!is!a!limitation!that!has!been!recognized!in!critiques!of!both!
historical! institutionalism!and!the!use!of!smallHn!case!studies.!There! is!a!constant!tension!between!




Another! limitation!was! the!difficulty!of! collecting!data!on!particular!events! internal! to! the!
organizations!being!studied,!as! those!working! in! these!organizations!are!often!not!willing!to!share!




fewer!sources!detailing! the!Executive’s! relationship!with! the! Judiciary! from!2000!to!2010,!and!not!
much! grey! literature! exists! on! the! Comptroller! General.! Doing! primary! research! in! Peru! was! an!
attempt!to!mitigate!this! issue.!This!entailed!interviewing!a!number!of!bilingual!research!assistants,!
hiring! an! extremely! competent! young! lawyer,! and! training! her! in! gathering! documents! and!




Finally,! there! are! a!number!of! potential! limitations! resulting! from! the!biases!presented! in!
both! the! use! of! official! donor! documents! and! the! use! of! semiHstructured! interviews! to! gather!
information.! Optimism! bias! can! be! present! in! both! cases,! in! that! documents! tend! to! be! more!
positive!about! the!outcomes!and! impacts!of!programs!than!the!reality!of!what!occurred,!and!that!
courtesy!bias!can!be!presented! in! interviews,!as! interviewees!often!attempt! to! tell! an! interviewer!
what!they!think!he!or!she!wants!to!hear.!The!documents!were!analyzed!with!this!bias!in!mind,!and!
the!results!reported!in!these!documents!were!triangulated!with!responses!from!other!sources!such!
as! external! surveys.! As! for! interviews,! the! questionnaires! were! designed!with! significant! thought!
given!to!how!to!mitigate!this!bias!in!terms!of!question!structure,!order,!and!wording.!In!addition,!I!
was! able! to! present! myself! in! different! roles! to! different! interviewees.! To! donors,! I! sent! a! CV!
emphasizing! my! experience! working! on! good! governance! projects,! so! that! donors! knew! I!
“understood!the!business.”!This!allowed!a!familiarity!that!helped!establish!rapport,!and!as!a!result!
most! donors! were! forthcoming! about! the! shortcoming! of! their! programs.! With! Peruvian!
government!officials,!I!presented!myself!as!a!university!scholar!and!did!not!send!a!CV,!in!hopes!that!
interviewees! would! consider! the! interview! less! “official”! and! be!more! open! about! opinions! they!
might!not!typically!share!with!outsiders.!
Thesis!Outline!
The! rest! of! this! thesis! in! divided! into! two! sections.! Chapters! 2,! 3,! and! 4! will! set! out! the!
argument!and!methods!used!to!guide!the!empirical!research.!Chapter!2!provides!a!brief!overview!of!
the! historical! power! dynamics! among! different! actors! in! Peru! for! the! purpose! of! developing! the!
reader’s! understanding!of! the!main!drivers! of! change! and!explaining! the!ways! in!which! they!may!
affect! good! governanceHrelated! changes! in! political! institutions.! Chapter! 3! shows! how! theories! of!
institutionalism! can! be! joined! together! into! a! cohesive! framework! that! explains! the! processes! of!
exogenous! and! endogenous! institutional! change,! and! how! this! relates! to! the! role! of! drivers! of!






conceptualized! and! operationalized,! and! presents! the! employed! methods! of! data! collection! and!
analysis.!!
The! second! section!of! this! thesis! (Chapter!5H7)!presents! the!empirical! research.!Chapter!5!
begins!with!an!overview!of!good!governance!in!Peru,!specifically!in!the!Judiciary!and!the!Comptroller!
General,!beginning!in!the!1980s.!This!is!laid!out!to!help!orient!the!reader!to!the!Peruvian!context!in!
the!era!prior! to!good!governance! interventions.!Chapter!5! then!traces!the!events! that!occurred! in!






breadth! of! the! Fujimori! administration’s! corruption! and! attempts! to! weaken! government!
institutions! precipitated! a! critical! juncture! in! 2000! that! fundamentally! altered! power! dynamics!
among!the!drivers!of!institutional!change.!Chapter!7!draws!upon!the!observations!derived!from!the!
process!tracing! in!Chapters!5!and!6!to!compare!across!cases!and!explain!variations! in!outcomes! in!
the!Judiciary!and!Comptroller!General!over!time.!It!then!suggests!how!different!actions!of!drivers!of!








of! good! governance! aid! in! reforming! Peru’s! political! institutions.! Thus,! this! chapter! begins! by!
providing!background!for!the!reader!on!how!shifts!in!donor!policy!led!to!an!emphasis!on!aid!as!a!key!
driver!of!good!governance!change!in!political!institutions.!In!the!last!two!decades,!there!has!been!a!




in! the! form! of! good! governance! aid! –! was! seen! as! a! way! to! improve! governance,! particularly!
governance!within!political!institutions.!!
Building! upon! this! background,! the! chapter! then! identifies! and! describes! four! other!
potential! drivers!of! change! that! affect! good!governanceHrelated! institutional! changes! in!Peru.! The!
first! is! the! Executive! branch,! in!which! policyHmaking! power! is! strongly! centralized! in! the! Peruvian!
political!system.!The!influence!of!the!Executive!branch!on!institutional!change!is!framed!in!terms!of!




providing!a! counterbalance! to! the!actions!of!other!drivers!of! change.!Depending!on! their!political!
alignment! and! level! of! engagement,! institutions! of! horizontal! accountability! can! drive! positive! or!
negative!change,!and!act!as!weak!or!strong!mechanisms!of!horizontal!accountability.!The!third!driver!
of! change! is!mechanisms! of! vertical! accountability,! comprising! citizens,! civil! society! organizations!




counterbalancing! role!served!by!Congress!and!other!government! institutions,! civil! society!also!has!
the!potential! to! serve! as! either! a!weak!or! strong!mechanism!of! accountability! by!monitoring! and!
exposing!the!actions!of!the!Executive,!Congress,!and!the!institutions!at!which!reforms!are!aimed!(or!
in! which! reforms! are! being! implemented).! However,! unlike! Congress! and! other! government!







This! section!begins! by! tracing! several! shifts! in! aid! policy! to! show! that! donor! emphasis! on!
providing!aid!to!strengthen!the!four!dimensions!of!good!governance!(accountability,!effectiveness,!
efficiency,!transparency)!in!political! institutions!evolved!concomitantly!with!the!conclusion!that!aid!
could! only! be! effective!when! recipient! countries! exercised! ownership! of! the! reform! agenda,! and!
when! donors! aligned! their! programs! to! recipients’! reform! objectives.! Thus,! there! is! an! implicit!
understanding! among!most! donors! that! good! governance! aid! can! only! facilitate! changes! that! are!
already! being! driven! by! at! least! one! other! actor! in! the! recipient! country.! However,! this!
understanding! often! competes! with! the! logic! –! implicit! or! explicit! –! underlying! how! most! good!
governance!projects!are!designed,!which!assumes!that!aid!is!the!main!driver!of!institutional!change.!!!
Development!Policy!and!Aid!as!a!Driver!of!Institutional!Change!
As! Erik! Thorbecke! (2000)! notes,! aid! policy! has! often! shifted! back! and! forth! on! whether!
states!or!markets!are!the!overarching!driver!of!development.!The!state!was!still!seen!as!the!driver!of!
development! through! the! late! 1970s,! and! aid! was! largely! given! to! governments! to! assist! with!
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redistribution,! basic! needs! fulfillment,! and! other!measures! to! alleviate! poverty.41! In! contrast,! the!
1980s!were!marked!by!the!rise!of!strong,!proHmarket!conservative!governments!in!two!of!the!largest!
aidHcontributing!donor! countries,! the!United!States! and! the!United!Kingdom.!This! in! turn! led! to!a!
shift! in! development! policy! in!which! the! private! sector!was! considered! the! key! driver! of! growth,!
supported! by! the! theory! that!market!mechanisms!would! naturally! lead! to! basic! needs! fulfillment!
and! poverty! reduction! through! increased! incomes.! Aid! policy! in! the! 1980s!was! dominated! by! the!
“Washington!Consensus,”!or! the! focus!on!ensuring! that! recipient!countries!were!adopting!policies!
consistent! with! disciplined! fiscal! policies,! trade! liberalization,! privatization! of! stateHowned!




countries! where! growth! did! occur,! the! link! between! growth! and! poverty! alleviation! was! cast! in!
doubt!because!large!sections!of!the!population!failed!to!receive!the!expected!trickleHdown!effects!of!
increased! growth.43! Public! opposition! to! IMF! austerity! conditionality! led! to! antiHIMF/World! Bank!
riots!in!many!countries!and!precipitated!a!shift!away!from!the!use!of!SAPs.44!
Another!shift! in!aid!policy!in!the!1990s!related!to!the!end!of!the!Cold!War,!given!that!Cold!
























and! legal! institutions! was! vulnerable! and! unsustainable…! [and! that]! development! experience!
showed! that! the! rule!of! law!promotes!effective!and! sustainable!economic!development!and!good!
governance.! Lack! of! the! rule! of! law! significantly! hinders! economic! growth,! and! corruption!
regressively!taxes!the!poor.”45!!
In!1998,!an!influential!report!reflected!upon!donors’!experience!with!both!SAP!conditionality!
and! the! transition! in! Eastern! Europe! by! asking!what! donors! knew! about!whether! aid!works,! and!
why.!Assessing! Aid:!What!Works,!What! Doesn’t! and!Why46! emphasized! that! conditionality! rarely!
works,! and! when! it! does,! it! is! because! those! conditions! align! with! the! reforms! that! a! recipient!
country’s! government!planned! to! implement!anyway.! It! also!asserted! that!aid! is!most!effective! in!
countries! that! have! sound! economic! management! —! not! just! policies! conducive! to! promoting!
growth,! but! strong! institutions! that! enforce! property! rights! and! limit! corruption.! The! first! set! of!
recommendations! suggested! that! recipient! “ownership”! of! reforms! and! alignment! between! aid!
donor! and! recipient! priorities! were! necessary! conditions! for! aid! to! be! a! positive! driver! of!
development,! while! the! latter! emphasized! that! development! was! difficult! to! achieve! or!
unsustainable!if!recipientHcountry!institutions!were!poorly!functioning!or!rife!with!corruption.!!
The! second! set! of! recommendations! led! to! the! rapid! entrenchment! of! projects! aimed! at!
promoting!good!governance!and!strengthening! institutions!as!a!separate!sector!of!aid,!although! it!
remains! a! small! percentage!of! donors’! aid!budgets.! For! example,!USAID’s! fiscal! year! 2012!budget!
allocation!shows!that!although!$1.86!billion!was!allocated!to!the!program!areas!of!good!governance,!








rose,! even! as! funding! to! other! aid! sectors! fluctuated,! between! 1990! and! 2001.48! As! a! result,! the!
number!of!projects!in!this!sector!rose!as!well.!Projects!that!fall!within!this!sector!are!diverse,!united!
by! a! common! goal! of! strengthening! processes! and! institutions! that! are! considered! important!
elements! of! strong,! functional! capitalist! economies! and/or! electoral! democracies.! In! some! cases,!
this!includes!working!with!recipient!governments!directly,!while!in!other!cases!it!entails!support!to!
civil! society! organizations.! As! an! illustrative! example,!USAID’s! Democracy,! Rights! and!Governance!




projects! aimed! at! strengthening! transparency,! antiHcorruption,! and! decentralization/local!
government.! This! example! shows! that! while! governance! can! either! refer! to! processes! or! to! the!























relationship! chain! to! ensure! that! recipients! spent! aid! money! on! its! intended! purpose.! However,!
evidence! showed! that! conditionality! was! usually! ineffective! in! inducing! political! change,! in! part!
because!of!pressures!on!donors!to!disburse!funds!even!when!faced!with!a!lack!of!compliance!with!
conditions.50! The! policy! response! to! this! finding!was! to! focus! on! the! imbalances! of! power! in! the!
donorHrecipient! relationship,! and! to! create! a! set! of! guiding! principles! for! both! donors! and! aid!
recipients!aimed!at!making!the!recipient!the!driver!of!change.!In!this!way,!aid!would!facilitate,!rather!
than!dictate,!policy!and! institutional!change.! In!essence,!the!rationale!was!that!conditionality!does!
not!work,!and!that!ownership,!or!strong!domestic!support! for!reforms,! is!essential! for!aid!to!work!
and!for!programs!to!be!sustainable.!This!principle!was!the!basis!of!several! international! initiatives,!
including!the!2002!Monterrey!conference!on!development!financing,!the!2003!HighHLevel!Forum!on!
Harmonization! in! Rome,! and! ultimately! the! 2005! Paris! Declaration! on! Aid! Effectiveness! —! the!
current!framework!that!commits!aid!donors!and!recipients!to!changing!the!aid!relationship.51!Among!
the! five! areas! of! the! donorHrecipient! relationship! that! the! Declaration! commits! signatories! to!
improve,! two! are! particularly! relevant! for! this! thesis:! Ownership,! defined! in! terms! of! recipient!





















link!donor! interventions! to! an!understanding!of! “deeper! structural! and! institutional! factors!which!
frame!the!political!context!within!which!individuals!and!organizations!act.”53!The!Drivers!of!Change!
approach! aims! to! unpack! the! concept! of! recipient! political! will,! which! has! often! been! cited! as! a!
reason!why!aid! interventions! fail! to!produce!change.! In! such!explanations,!political!will! is!a!“black!
box”! whose! constitutive! aspects,! such! as! the! structures,! agents,! incentives! and! institutions! that!
affect!observed!desire!for!changes,!remain!unexplored!(Nash,!et.!al.,!2006).!Employing!a!drivers!of!
change! approach! allows! donors! to! “disaggregate! the! rather! large…! concept! of! the! state! by!
highlighting! the! political! and! institutional! relationships! which! constitute! it,! and! the! rules! which!
underpin!it…![and!contribute!to!an]!understanding!of!the!idea!of!‘political!will’!by!suggesting!that…!
concept!is!best!thought!of!in!institutional!and!not!individual!terms”54![emphasis!in!original].!In!crude!
terms,! the!Drivers! of! Change! approach! is! a! tool!with! the! potential! to! familiarize! donors!with! the!
processes! of! change,! the! formal! and! informal! institutions! governing! these! processes,! and! the!
complex! motivations! for! actors’! behavior! in! relation! to! these! processes! –! in! sum,! the! types! of!





! Yet! despite! growing! donor! awareness! that! aid! alone! is! unlikely! to! drive! change,! good!
governance!projects!are!still!sometimes!designed!and!implemented!without!proper!attention!to!the!
agents,! institutions,! processes,! and! complex! incentives! for,! and! responses! to,! potential! reforms!
(Unsworth,!2007).!In!part,!this!shortcoming!is!due!to!the!incentives!within!donor!agencies!to!“move!










good! governance! projects.! The! latter! may! have! implicit! assumptions! about! the! relationships!
between!different!recipient!actors!and!the!ability!of!aid!to!drive!change.!For!example,!my!experience!
evaluating! U.S.! State! Department! projects! aimed! at! changing! how! legal! and! law! enforcement!
institutions! in! recipient! countries! operate! has! demonstrated! that! good! governanceHrelated!
assistance!in!general! is!negotiated!bilaterally!at!a!high!level,! i.e.!between!the!Foreign!Minister!and!
the! U.S.! Ambassador! or! their! representatives,! through! Letters! of! Agreement.! Yet! the! resulting!





analysis! not! being! conducted! systematically! is! that! actors! developing! and! implementing! good!
governance!projects,!particularly!antiHcorruption!projects,!often!have!a!dim!view!of!the!political!will!
of! recipients! for! change!and! the! incentives! that! individuals!have! for! adopting! changes.! This! is! the!
underlying! assumption! of! projects! designed! to! curtail! corruption! that! rely! on! a! rationalHchoice!
worldview!and!!assume!that!changing!the!monetary!incentives!for!corruption!will!reduced!instances!
of!corruption.56!In!such!cases,!there!is!an!implicit!–!and!at!times!explicit!–!assumption!that!aid!is!the!
main!driver!of! change!because!without! aid!no!actors!would!develop!and!adopt!new! standards!or!










can! be! attributed! to! the! fact! that! there! is! a! disconnect! between! highHlevel! policy! makers! and!
projects! implementers! within! the! same! donor! agency,! but! at! the! level! of! project! design! and!
implementation,!the!difference!between!the!two!is!often!between!the!assumption!of!a!direct!causal!
link!between!good!governance!aid!interventions,!as!illustrated!in!Figure!1,!and!a!causal!chain!that!is!
complex,! conjunctive!and! takes! into!account!multiple!drivers!of! change,! some!of!whom!may!have!
competing!aims,!as!illustrated!in!Figure!2.!While!recognizing!why!there!is!a!donor!assumption!about!
aid! as! a!main! driver! of! change,! this! thesis! takes! the! position! that! recipientHcountry! ownership! of!
reforms! and! alignment! of! aid! to! recipient! strategies! is! a! critical! element! in! the! capacity! of! aid! to!
facilitate! longHterm! institutional! change,! and! that! in! the!absence!of!ownership! and!alignment,! aid!
alone!cannot!drive!change.!In!terms!of!the!types!of!technical!assistance!that!this!thesis!focuses!on,!it!
simply! is! not! possible! for! aid! donors! to! impose! institutional! changes! without! the! buyHin! of! the!
recipient! government.! An! example! drawn! from! the! empirical! research! conducted! in! this! thesis!
serves!as!an!illustrative!example:!Part!of!the!World!Bank’s!judicial!reform!program!included!a!project!
that! replaced! a!paperHbased! signHin! system! for! parolees!with! a! biometrical! fingerprint! scan.57! The!





recipients! have! numerous! opportunities! throughout! the! project! cycle! to! delay! implementation! or!
sabotage!the!equipment.58!In!cases!where!the!government!is!driving!the!reforms,!and!these!reforms!
align!with!the!types!of!programs!aid!donors!want!to!implement,!there!is!more!likelihood!that!aid!will!












circumstances! under! which! aid! can! facilitate! institutional! change! raises! a! core! question! that! this!
thesis! aims! to! address!—!who! sets! the! reform! agenda! in! aidHrecipient! countries?!What! happens!




This! section! traces! the!historical!patterns! in!Peruvian!history! to! identify!with!which!actors!
the!balance!of!decisionHmaking!powers!in!Peru!has!rested,!and!which!of!these!actors!were!likely!to!
be!drivers!of!institutional!reforms!related!to!good!governance.!Two!facts!emerge!from!this!historical!
analysis:! (1)! Since! the! beginning! of! the! postHcolonial! era! in! 1836,! the! balance! of! decisionHmaking!
power!rested!with!the!president!and!the!Executive!branch,!and!(2)!authoritarian!tendencies!within!
this!branch!of!government!were!not! just!tolerated,!but!often!welcomed!by!Peruvian!citizens!when!
they! resulted! in! economic! prosperity! and! stability.! The! latter! can! be! explained! by! the! fact! that!
economic! instability!had!been!a!constant!pattern!since!the!beginning!of! the!postHcolonial!era,!and!
was! the! driving! force! behind! citizen! protests,! which! became! stronger! and!more! centralized! over!
time.!Historically,!however,! the!power!of! citizens! to!effect! institutional! change!has!been!weak,! as!
has!the!power!of!Congress!and!other!government!institutions.!The!next!section!will!provide!a!brief!
overview!of! Executive! influence! on! institutional! reforms! through! the! 1980s,!which! is! the! point! of!
departure!for!the!case!studies!presented!in!Chapters!5!and!6.!!
Executive!Power!
The! aim! of! this! section! is! to! show! that! power! has! historically! been! centralized! in! the!
Executive!branch,!which!has!represented!the! interests!of!a!small!number!of!elite!Peruvians.!Direct!




feature! of! executive! power! in! Peru,! and! that! institutional! reforms! driven! by! the! Executive! have!
focused! on! economic! and! social! development! rather! than! good! governanceHrelated! institutional!
reforms.! This! section! also! provides! the! relevant! historical! context! necessary! to! understand! the!
development! of! the! other! two! independent! variables! identified! in! this! chapter!—!mechanisms! of!
horizontal!and!vertical!accountability.!
Since! Peru’s! independence! from! Spain! in! 1836,! the! state! has! been! seen! as! a! vehicle! for!
consolidating! individual! wealth! and! power,! rather! than! as! an! engine! of! development! or! social!
change.!Peru!has! long!been!characterized!by! struggles!among! individual!elites! for!political!power,!
leading!to!fractured!political!parties!that!often!failed!to!cohesively!unify!behind!particular!policies!or!
platforms,!as!political!parties!were! largely!vehicles! for! individuals! from!elite! families! to!stake!their!
political!claims.!A!significant!consequence!of! this!political! fragmentation!was!a!craving! for!political!
stability!and!an!admiration!for!caudillos!—!strong!leaders!who!could!rule!with!authority,!particularly!
when! that! authority! generated! wealth! for! elites.59! A! side! effect! of! this! toleration! and,! at! times,!
outright!support!for!such! leaders!was!that!democratically!elected!presidents!were!typically! free!to!
























necessary! to! achieve! such! development! effectively! and! efficiently.61! This! pattern!was! repeated! in!
later!decades,!and!expanded!beyond!the!economic!conception!of!development!and!the!president!as!
the!main!driver!of!change.!In!the!1960s,!for!example,!the!military!began!to!expand!its!mission!from!
purely!national!defense! to!nationHbuilding,!a!move!driven!by! the!belief! that!underdevelopment! in!
Peru! posed! a! threat! to! national! defense.! In! 1968,! a! military! coup! staged! by! the! Revolutionary!
Government!of!Armed!Forces!(GRFA)!led!to!a!style!of!government!that!surprised!most!international!
observers:! a! developmental!military! regime! that!was!neither! communist! nor! capitalist,! and!which!
instituted! a! number! of! institutional! reforms! aimed! at! increasing! citizen! participation! in! economic!
institutions!such!as!agricultural!collectives.!This! is! the! first!major!example! in!Peru!of! the!Executive!




1960s.! Increased!migration! to! the! newly!modernized! Lima! led! to! the! creation! of! a! diverse! urban!
working! class,! which! in! turn! led! to! the! organization! of! labor! unions! and! other! nonHgovernment!
forces! and! the! development! of! new! political! parties,! like! the! American! Popular! Revolutionary!
Alliance! (APRA).!These!parties!represented!the! interests!of!a!broader!swath!of!Peruvians,!many!of!
whom!had! been! politically! sidelined! since! the! colonial! era,! and!were! thus! founded! around! policy!
platforms! rather! than! the! political! ambitions! of! individuals! coming! from! elite! families.! A!














continued! backHandHforth! between! elections,! bloodless! coups,! military! leadership,! and! semiH
authoritarian! regimes.! These! decades! represent! the! low! point! of! Executive! power,! and! no! long!
period!of!authoritarianism!took!hold!during! this!era!of!“dictatorial! rule!and!electoral! confusion.”62!
During!this!era,!the!military!was!more!than!willing!to!intervene!(usually!in!bloodless!coups)!in!cases!
where! the!president!proved!an! ineffectual! leader,! and! then! step!back!when!a!new!president!was!
elected.!
! By!1977,!however,! the!military!experiment!with! topHdown! social! engineering!had! lost!




1980.!A! key! step! in! the! transition!was! the!election!of! a!Constituent!Assembly! in!1978,!which!was!
tasked! with! reHdrafting! the! Constitution.! Both! the! military! and! the! political! parties! felt! that! the!
Executive’s!inability!to!make!economic!and!social!policy!decisions!led!to!crisis!situations,!culminating!
in!political!upheavals!such!as!the!1968!military!coup.!!
!The! 1979! Constitution!was! designed! to! strengthen! the! Executive! branch! and! to! create! a!
strong!presidential!regime!to!avoid!such!situations.!Yet!the!drafters!also!wanted!to!ensure!that!there!
was!a!stronger!series!of!checks!and!balances!to!this!executive!power,!and!thus!included!provisions!
for!a! legislature!with! two!chambers,!giving!Congress! the!ability! to!override!presidential! vetoes,! to!
block! legislation! initiated!by!the!Executive,!and,! if!necessary,! impeach!the!president.64!Thus!by!the!













As! Chapters! 5! and! 6! will! discuss,! despite! the! changes! brought! about! by! the! 1979!
Constitution,!Congress!did!not!act!as!a!strong!driver!of!institutional!change,!in!part!because!political!
parties! were! not! typically! unified! behind! different! policies! or! issues! related! to! good! governance.!
However,! the! Constitution! did! provide! a! basis! for! Congress! and! other! government! institutions!




institutions)! that! can! call! into! question,! and! eventually! punish,! improper!ways! of! discharging! the!
responsibilities! of! a! given!official.”65!Horizontal! accountability,! as! defined! by!Guillermo!O’Donnell,!
refers! to! the! “existence! of! state! agencies! that! are! legally! enabled! and! empowered,! and! factually!
willing! and! able,! to! take! actions! that! span! from! routine! oversight! to! criminal! sanctions! or!
impeachment!in!relation!to!actions!or!omissions!by!other!agents!or!agencies!of!the!state!that!may!




directions:! In! the! first,! one! government! agency! can! illegally! interfere! in! the! authority! of! another!
government!agency.!In!the!second,!public!officials!illegally!obtain!advantages!due!to!their!positions,!











encroachment! or! of! corruption.…! In! all! cases! of! [horizontal! accountability],! a! given! state! agency,!
directly!or!by!means!of!mobilizing!another!agency! (often!a!court),!addresses!another!state!agency!
(or! agencies),! on! the! basis! of! legally! grounded! arguments! about! presumably! unlawful! actions! or!
inactions!of!the!latter.”67!!
Horizontal!accountability!encompasses! three!elements:! a)!political!accountability,! in!which!
public! officials! are! accountable! to! elected! officials! (and! are! thereby! indirectly! accountable! to! the!
public! through! the! electoral! aspect! of! vertical! accountability)! or! to! political! parties;! b)! legal!
accountability,! in!which!public!officials!must! individually,!or!on!behalf!of! their!agency,!account! for!
their!actions!in!court!to!determine!compliance!with!or!violations!of!civil,!criminal,!or!administrative!
laws;!and!c)!administrative!accountability,!in!which!public!officials!are!held!accountable!by!auditors!
or! inspectors,! who! typically! have! the! independent! authority! of! financial! oversight! and! control! of!
other! government! agencies! for! the! purpose! of! detecting! fraud,! corruption,! and! compliance! with!
authorized!public!expenditures.68!
Vertical!Accountability!
Vertical! accountability! relates! to! both! the!mechanisms!of! elections! to! hold!public! officials!
accountable! for! their! actions,! as! well! as! to! the! influence! of! the! mass! media! and! civil! society!
organizations.!Structures!of!vertical!accountability! include!civil!society!organizations,!such!as!NGOs!
and! the!media.!For! the!purpose!of! this! investigation,! the!blanket! term!of!vertical!accountability! is!
used! to! denote! actions! taken! by! groups! of! loosely! organized! citizens! (such! as! protests).! Vertical!
accountability! refers! to! “the!means! through!which! citizens,!mass!media,! and! civil! society! seek! to!
enforce! standards! of! good! performance! on! officials.! While! parliament! [or! Congress]! is! typically!
considered!a!key!institution!in!constructs!of!horizontal!accountability,!it!is!also!important!in!vertical!









addition,! through! the! use! of! public! hearings,! committee! investigations,! and! public! petitioning,!
parliament! can! provide! a! vehicle! for! public! voice! and! a! means! through! which! citizens! and! civic!
groups!can!question!government!and!seek!parliamentary!sanctioning!where!appropriate.”69!!
Some! authors! make! a! distinction! between! electoral! accountability! and! societal!
accountability,! the! former! consisting!of! a! competitive! and! transparent! election!process,70! and! the!
latter!consisting!of!nonHelectoral!mechanisms!like!the!press!and!NGOs,!whose!actions!are!aimed!at!
“exposing! governmental! wrongdoing,! bringing! new! issues! to! the! public! agenda,! or! activating! the!
operation!of!horizontal! agencies.”71! This! thesis! groups!all! of! these!mechanisms!under! the! label!of!
vertical! accountability! and,! following! Catalina! Smulovitz! and! Enrique! Peruzzotti,! extends! this! to!
include! nonHinstitutional! forms! of! accountability,! such! as! social!mobilizations! and! protests,! which!
can!deliver!symbolic!sanctions.72!A!related!form!of!accountability,!diagonal!accountability,! links!the!
social! mobilization! aspect! of! vertical! accountability! to! horizontal! accountability! (see! below),! as! it!
seeks!to!“engage!citizens!directly!in!the!workings!of!horizontal!accountability!institutions.!This!is!an!
effort! to! augment! the! limited! effectiveness! of! civil! society’s! watchdog! function! by! breaking! the!
state’s!monopoly! over! responsibility! for! official! executive! oversight.”73!While! this! thesis! does! not!
explicitly! incorporate! diagonal! accountability! as! an! independent! variable,! it! does! recognize! the!
potential!relevance!of!this!type!of!participation!for!good!governance.!
Vertical! accountability! mechanisms! were! strengthened! in! Peru! as! a! result! of! the! 1968!
military! coup! as! the! military! regime! “left! in! its! wake! some! fundamental! changes! in! social! and!
political! structures,”! including! the! “elimination! of! the! old! oligarchy! as! a! political! force,! the!
consolidation!of!the!armed!forces!as!a!powerful!and!autonomous!actor,!a!larger!and!more!modern!












new! political! and! social! actors”! that! included! an! expanded! middle! class,! professionals,!
businesspeople,!and!a!broad!range!of!workers!and!leftist!groups!that! increasingly!demanded!more!
political! inclusion! and! social! justice.74! The! efforts! of! the! military! regime! to! increase! citizen!






priority! for! workingHclass! Peruvians.! By! the! 1960s,! Peru! had! the! worst! social! inequality! in! Latin!
America,! with! the! top! 1! percent! and! 5! percent! of! the! population! amassing! 20! percent! and! 48!
percent! of! GNI,! respectively,! while! the! bottom! 20! percent! of! the! population! only! received! 2.5!
percent!of!GNI.75!Geography,!of! course,! continued! to!play!a! role:! In!1961,! the!average!annual!per!
capita!income!in!the!southern!highlands!was!$280,!versus!$870!in!Lima.!As!income!grew!in!Lima!and!






necessary! for! growth.! It! then! showed! that! this! emphasis! on! institutions!was! in! part! borne! out! of!
concerns! about! the! failure! of! conditionality! to! induce! change! in! recipient! countries,! which!








Recognizing! the! necessity! of! ownership! and! alignment! to! aid! effectiveness! raised! the!




horizontal! accountability! mechanisms! to! drive,! block! or! facilitate! change,! and! nonHgovernmental!
actors! that! act! as! vertical! accountability! mechanisms! in! the! same! manner.! Throughout! Peruvian!
history,! power! has! been! centralized! in! the! Executive,! which! has! the! potential! to! act! as! a! strong!
driver! of! either! positive! or! negative! institutional! change.! The! ability! of! other! government!
institutions,!such!as!Congress,!to!drive!change!has!varied!over!time,!but!these!institutions!also!have!
the!ability! to!block!change!and! in!particular!keep!excessive!Executive!power! in!check.!Civil! society!





are!aimed.!Specifically! in! this! thesis! these!are!the!Judiciary!and!the!Comptroller!General.!The!next!
chapter! will! address! the! theory! of! how! this! endogenous! institutional! change! occurs,! and! further!








themselves! (the! Judiciary! and! Comptroller! General)! as! drivers! of! change! by! analyzing! how!
endogenous! institutional!change!occurs.!This!analysis! is!part!of! the! larger!purpose!of! this!chapter,!
which! is! to! explain! how! and!why! institutions! change! in! general.! In! this!way,! this! chapter! aims! to!
better!understand!from!a!theoretical!perspective!actors’!motivations!for!driving!or!resisting!change,!
how! these!motivations! impact!processes!of! institutional! change,! and!what! this!means! in! terms!of!
aggregated!institutional!behavior.!It!is!important!to!note!that!change!processes!happen!at!multiple!
levels!simultaneously!and!connect!to!one!another.!Within!the!institution,!theories!of!change!can!be!
used! to! explain! the! behavior! of! individuals! (in! this! case,! those! working! for! the! Judiciary! or!
Comptroller!General),!but! the! focus!here! is!on! the! (formal)! institution!or!organization!as!a!whole,!
not!the!individuals!that!comprise!the!aggregated!actions!of!the!institution.!!
Figure! 3! provides! an! illustration,! based! on! a! figure! adapted! from! the! drivers! of! change!
literature,! of! how! this! thesis! conceives! of! these! dynamics!within! the! overall! environment.! In! this!
chapter,! the! section! on! endogenous! institutional! change! provides! a! framework! for! analyzing! the!





other! drivers! of! change! besides! the! Judiciary! and! Comptroller! General! –! aid! donors! (the! blue!
squares),!the!Executive!(the!yellow!diamonds)!and!mechanisms!of!vertical!accountability!(the!green!







In! order! to! try! and! unpack! these! complexities,! this! chapter! reviews! theories! related! to!
institutional! continuity,! change,! and! resistance,! and! also! weaves! in! relevant! theories! from! the!
literature!on!organizational!change.!Expanding!upon!the!three!hypotheses!outlined!in!Chapter!1,! it!
begins!with!an!overview!of!rationalHchoice!institutionalism,!which!explains!institutional!continuity!in!
terms! of! actors’! fixed! preferences! and! selfHenforcing! patterns! of! behavior,! and! responses! to!
institutional!change!in!terms!of!a!logic!of!consequences!approach.!The!second!section!of!this!chapter!
focuses!on!the!perspective!of!sociological!institutionalism,!which!explains!institutional!continuity!in!











which! create! patterns! over! time! that! become! “sticky.”! Actions! become! path! dependent,! and!
institutional! change! occurs! in! repose! to! a! critical! juncture! that! forces! a! reconfiguration! of! these!
patterns.! This! is! the! most! relevant! framing! from! which! to! address! and! unpack! the! multiHlevel!
complexities! this! thesis! addresses,! and! it! merges! into! a! discussion! of! gradual,! endogenous!
institutional! change,! embedding! the! actions! of! leaders! and! other! actors! within! the! Judiciary! and!
Comptroller! General! within! the! larger! analysis! of! the! actions! of! the! Executive,! mechanisms! of!
vertical!and!horizontal!accountability,!and!good!governance!aid.!
Rational!Incentives!for!Change!
RationalHchoice! institutionalism! focuses! on! predicting! individual! behavior,! with! scholars!
formally!modeling! the! effects! of! how! institutions! constrain! “the! sequences! of! interaction! among!
actors,!the!choice!available!to!particular!actors,!the!structure!of!information!and!hence!beliefs!of!the!
actors,! and! the! payoffs! to! individuals! and! groups.”77! RationalHchoice! institutionalism! is! rooted! in!
microeconomics,! in! particular! the! theory! of! the! firm.! It! follows! the! rationalHchoice! approach! of!
assuming!that! individuals!have!wellHdefined!preferences!and!are!able!to!make!decisions!rationally;!
that!is,!they!make!decisions!based!on!an!objective!calculation!of!which!actions!will!lead!to!the!utilityH


















Using! game! theory! models! to! analyze! agent! preferences! and! predict! behavior,! rationalH
choice! institutionalists! consider! the! constraints! on! agents! during! repeated! interactions,! and! how!
these!constraints!shape!the!role!of!“strategic!interaction!in!the!determination!of!policy!outcomes.”78!
These!outcomes!are!framed!in!terms!of!achieving!equilibrium,!and!the!agent!interactions!in!terms!of!
transaction! costs.! With! its! heavy! emphasis! on! agency,! rationalHchoice! institutionalism! considers!
patterns! of! behavior! to! be! based! upon! selfHenforcing! expectations! that! constrain! agents! and!
coordinate! their! beliefs,! resulting! in! actions! that! will! continuously! maintain! a! social! equilibrium.!
Thus,! rationalHchoice! institutionalists! tend! to! focus!primarily! on!explaining! institutional! continuity,!
and!deductively!predicting!actor!behavior!within!this!framework.!!
RationalHchoice!institutionalism!has!significant!power!to!explain!the!microHlevel!foundations!
of!how! institutions!operate!at!a!macro! level,!and!why!different! institutional!arrangements! lead! to!
different!equilibrium!outcomes.!In!addition,!recent!work!has!expanded!the!scope!of!rationalHchoice!
institutionalism,! allowing! it! to! offer! robust! explanations! of! institutional! change! alongside! its!
explanations! of! institutional! continuity.! RationalHchoice!models! and! game! theory! can! help! explain!















application! of! rationalHchoice! theory! considers! what! happens! when! multiple! actors! are! pursuing!
utilityHmaximizing!actions!focused!around!the!same!issue,!such!as!a!public!policy,!but!with!different!
outcomes! in! mind.! In! such! a! situation,! institutions! are! the! rules! that! constrain! actor! behavior.!













RationalHchoice! theory’s! focus! on! agency! strongly! influences! rationalHchoice!
institutionalism’s!understanding!of!the!need!for!institutions.!North!suggests!that!institutions!are!the!
result! of! a! deliberate! effort! by! individuals!who! intentionally! devise! and! enforce! constraints! upon!
themselves.86!This!occurs!because!such!constraints!help! reduce! transaction!costs!—!that! is,!actors!













decisionHmaking!process.! Instead,! they!can! rely!on!established! institutions! for! signals! that! indicate!
what!the!consequences!of!different!courses!of!action!might!bring,!and!how!other!actors!will!behave!





Most! rationalHchoice! institutionalists! thus! deviate! from! a! strict! interpretation! of! rationalH
choice! theory! and! introduce! the! concept! of! bounded! rationality! into! their! analyses.! Individuals’!






Institutions! also! help! resolve! collective! action! dilemmas! and! distributional! asymmetries.!




also! be! the! “byHproduct! of! conflicts! over! distributional! gains,”89! resulting! from! actors! establishing!
rules!to!resolve!power!asymmetries!and!reduce!competitive!negotiation!over!goods.!In!either!case,!










be! considered! communal! goods! to! be! shared! among! (or! applied! to)! individuals,! politics! can! be!
considered!a!series!of!collective!action!dilemmas.90!Institutions!therefore!help!shape!the!process!of!
achieving! the! policy! outcome! that! best! reflects! the! shared! interests! of! utilityHmaximizing! players,!
resulting!in!an!equilibrium!in!which!the!outcome,!if!not!preferable,!is!acceptable!to!all!the!players.!!
The! ways! in! which! rationalHchoice! institutionalism! defines! these! features! explains! why!
institutions! persist! or! remain! stable.! Players! have! set! preferences,! and! want! to! achieve! optimal!
outcomes.! However,! because! other! players! in! the! game! are! also! trying! to! achieve! an! optimal!
outcome! based! on! their! needs! or! goals,! all! players! must! aim! for! the! best! mutually! acceptable!
outcome.!When! such! an! equilibrium! in! outcomes! are! achieved,! players! will! have! no! incentive! to!
deviate!from!the!rules!that!helped!produce!said!equilibrium,!because!of!the!risk!that!doing!so!could!
result! in! subHoptimal! outcomes.! Institutions! therefore! become! selfHenforcing,! or! a! “selfYsustaining!
system!of!shared!beliefs!about!a!salient!way!in!which!the!game!is!repeatedly!played.”91!!
Institutional! stability! is! thus! a! constitutive! part! of! how! rationalHchoice! institutionalism!
explains! institutions,! which! exposes! a! key! weakness! in! the! explanatory! power! of! rationalHchoice!
institutionalism.! While! institutional! continuity! can! be! understood! in! this! context,! institutional!




RationalHchoice! institutionalism! describes! how! the! need! for! institutions! to! reduce!
transaction!costs!and!distributional!asymmetries,!and!to!resolve!collective!action!dilemmas,!leads!to!







preferences! and! selfHenforcing! patterns! of! behavior.! While! these! tenets! of! rationalHchoice!
institutionalism! provide! a! cohesive! framework! for! explaining! institutional! stability,! they! do! not!
explain!institutional!variation.!!
In! explaining! how! different! equilibria! or! arrangements! of! institutions! occur! in! different!
contexts,! rationalHchoice! institutionalists! borrow! the! concept! of! path! dependence! from! historical!
institutionalism!—!in!particular!ideas!about!the!ways!in!which!longHheld!cultural!beliefs!have!shaped!
modern!institutions.92!Under!this!body!of!theory,!modern!institutions!evolved!differently!in!different!
places! based! on! endogenous! factors,! and! institutions! continue! to! be! influenced! by! prior!
arrangements,! and! by! structures! directly! linked! to! societal! beliefs.93! Once! these! institutions! have!
arisen!or!taken!root,!the!selfHenforcing!nature!of!institutions!means!that!they!continue!to!exist!and!
follow!a!similar!trajectory.!Following!this!argument,!property!rights!in!the!West!can!be!traced!back!
to! the! individualistic! nature! of! Western! culture! (which! also! reinforces! this! institution),! whereas!
China’s!more!communal!arrangement!can!be!traced!back!to!its!familyHoriented!culture.94!!
This! focus! on! path! dependence! represents! a! shift! in! focus! away! from! describing! how!
institutions!in!one!body,!such!as!the!U.S.!Congress,!predict!player!behavior!in!that!arena,!and!toward!
an! understanding! of! how! different! institutions! shaping! economic! development! and! growth! in! an!
entire! society! take! root! and! persist.! Peter! Boettke,! Christopher! Coyne,! and! Peter! Leeson,! for!
example,! explain! that! institutions! that! are! most! likely! to! “stick”! in! a! society! are! those! that!
endogenously!arose! in! that!society.95!Path!dependence!helps!explain!both!why!certain! institutions!
may! be! entrenched,! hard! to! change,! and! “sticky,”! and! why! institutions! imposed! externally! will!
therefore!be!less!sticky.!













(such! as! the! institutional! shifts! that! took! place! after! the! fall! of! the! Soviet! Union).! While! critical!
junctures! also!originated!with! scholars!of!historical! institutionalism,!Weingast! illustrates!how! they!
can!be!linked!to!rationalHchoice!institutional!analyses!to!explain!change.96!Using!the!example!of!the!
American!Revolution,!he!first!analyzes!the!actions!of!moderate!Americans!in!deciding!to!go!to!war!
against! the!British.! Although! their! support!was! critical! to! a!war! effort,!moderates! did! not! initially!
provide! that! support.! Weingast! models! this! support! in! terms! of! a! threat! probability! threshold:!




the! probability! that! radical! claims! were! correct,! thereby! shifting! moderate! belief! beyond! the!
probability!threat!threshold!and!leading!to!their!support!of!a!revolution.!Such!models!help!explain!
discontinuous! change!within! the! framework! of! set! preference! and! selfHenforcing! institutions:! The!
status! quo! will! continue! until! a! critical! juncture! shifts! the! threat! probability,! forcing! actors! to!
recalculate!the!best!course!of!action!to!regain!equilibrium.!
RationalHchoice! institutionalism! has! thus! been! able! to! incorporate! path! dependence! and!
critical! junctures! as! explanations! for! crossHcountry! and! interHtemporal! institutional! variation! and!
change.!Yet!these!explanations!expose!serious!gaps!in!the!ability!of!rationalHchoice!institutionalism!
to! explain! change.! First,! rationalHchoice! institutionalism! privileges! agency! as! the! key! driver! of!
institutional! change,!which! glosses! over! the! significant! role! that! structural! constraints! can! play! in!
allowing!for!or!limiting!change.!Second,!again!because!of!its!focus!on!agency,!application!of!rationalH
choice!analysis!tends!to!consider!a!narrow!set!of!variables!to!explain!change,!focusing!for!example!







here,! which! also! plagues! historical! institutionalism,! is! how! gradual,! endogenous! change! can! be!
explained.! Fourth,! and! related! to! the! second! and! third! point,! these! theories! do! not! adequately!
explain! how! power! dynamics! can! affect! institutional! change,! as! some! key! players!will! be! able! to!
influence!change!more! than!others!due! to! their! relative!power.!Finally,!and! rather! ironically!given!
rationalHchoice! institutionalism’s! raison! d’être! of! predicting! actor! behavior,! critical! junctures! and!






to! an! organization,! the! reactions! of! actors! to! these! reforms!might! be! partly! explained! by! such! a!
calculus.!For!example,!some!actors!may!be!resistant!to!such!changes!because!they!entail!extra!work,!
or!because!they!expose!illegal!practices.!Other!actors!may!be!in!favor!of!the!reforms!because!they!
reduce! their! workload,! or! because! they! expose! the! illegal! practices! of! others! players! who! have!
negatively!affected!their!own!outcomes!(see!Beer,!et.!al,!1990).!This!agentHcentered!approach!can!
also! help! explain! the! actions! of! individual! leaders! in! supporting! or! opposing! governance! reforms,!
based!on!how!such!reforms!would!affect!their!utility.!!
Taking! the! example! of! corruption! as! the! illegal! action! in! question! illustrates! the! linkage!
between!rationalHchoice!theory,! institutional!change,!and!good!governance!aid.!Economists!whose!
work!has!influenced!early!thinking!on!antiHcorruption!programs!within!USAID,!for!example,! include!
Robert! Klitgaard! and! Susan! RoseHAckerman.97! In!Corrupt! Cities! (2000),! Klitgaard! posit! the! formula!
that!Corruption!=!Monopoly!+!Discretion!–!Accountability,!and!draws!upon!principalHagent!theory!to!





focuses!on! the! role!of! incentives,!agreeing!with!Klitgaard! that!any! reform!program!must! raise! the!
costs!of!corruption!for!civil!servants!while!simultaneously!reducing!opportunities!and!incentives!for!
engaging!in!corruption.98!Both!proceed!from!an!assumption!that!individuals!are!inherently!driven!by!
a! logic! of! consequences,!which! explains! the! tendency! toward! engaging! in! corruption,! if! given! the!
opportunity,!and!the!incentiveHbased!“cures”!that!can!effectively!be!applied!to!prevent!corruption.!
That! this!perspective!has! influenced!good!governance!aid! is! clearly!evidenced!by! the! reference! to!





why! organizations! adopted! practices! that! seemed! inconsistent!with! the!most! rational! or! efficient!
choices.!It!argues!that!actors’!preferences!are!influenced!by!culturally!constructed!norms,!and!that!
behavior! is! shaped! by! cognitive! scripts! and! models.! Sociological! institutionalism! conceives! of!
institutions! as! “codified! cultural! constructs”! that! socialize! individuals! into! actions! fitting! within! a!
framework! of! what! is! acceptable,! sometimes! regardless! of! whether! these! actions! lead! to! utilityH
maximizing!outcomes.100!Institutions!“do!not!simply!affect!the!strategic!calculations!of!individuals…!
but! also! their! most! basic! preferences! and! very! identity.! The! selfHimages! and! identities! of! social!
actors!are!said!to!be!constituted!from!the!institutional!forms,! images,!and!signs!provided!by!social!
life.”101!
Sociological! institutionalism!moves! beyond! the! realm!of! the! individual! and! considers! how!











based!not! on! a! rationally! based! calculus! but! on! contextually! embedded,! culturally! specific! signals!
and! norms.! While! sociological! institutionalism! focuses! on! cultural! constructs! as! the! basis! of!
institutions,! it! remains! fairly!agentHoriented,!explaining!how!actors!are!shaped!by!different!norms,!




Sociological! institutionalism! provides! a! compelling! explanation! of! how! institutions! change!
over! time,! and! why! actors! behave! in! ways! that! are! seemingly! in! opposition! to! what! a! rational!









are! norms,! scripts,! or! templates! for! framing! behavior.! Institutions! such! as! cultures,! communities,!
and! personal! networks! embody! the! normative! contexts! that! shape! actor! behavior! because!












can! expect! other! actors! to! behave.! Sociological! institutionalism! posits! that! actors! conform! to!
routines! or! familiar! patterns! of! behavior! that! they! believe! are! correct! in! certain! circumstances.!
Action! depends! on! the! interpretation! of! a! situation! rather! than! an! instrumental! calculation,! and!
actors!make!choices!based!on!a!logic!of!appropriateness!rather!than!focusing!on!utilityHmaximizing!
outcomes.105!Actors!may!analyze!situations!from!a!consequentialist!perspective,!but!their!choice!of!
actions!will! already!be! limited!based!on!what! falls!within! their! scope!of! right!actions.! In! this!way,!
both! rationalHchoice! institutionalism! and! sociological! institutionalism! emphasize! the! bounded!
rationality!of!actors.!However,!for!rationalHchoice!theorists,!actors!are!bound!largely!by!asymmetric!
information,!whereas! for! sociological! institutionalists,! actors! are! bound!by! cognitive! or! normative!
scripts!that!relate!to!what!is!appropriate,!conceivable,!or!feasible!for!those!actors!in!terms!of!their!
socially! constituted! selfHidentity.106!Action! is! thus! tied! to! the! interpretation!of! a! given! situation!or!
context,!and!institutions!“influence!behavior!not!simply!by!specifying!what!one!should!do,!but!also!
by! specifying!what!one!can! imagine!oneself!doing! in!a!given!context.…!None!of! this! suggests! that!
individuals!are!not!purposive,!goalHoriented,!or!rational![but]!sociological!institutionalists!emphasize!
that! what! an! individual! will! see! as! ‘rational! action’! is! itself! socially! constituted,! and! they!
conceptualize!the!goals!toward!which!an!actor!is!striving!in!much!broader!terms!than!others!do.”107!
From! the! perspective! of! sociological! institutionalism,! institutions! do! not! arise! out! of! a!
calculusHbased!need!for!constraints,!but!rather!are!the!result!of!broader!cultural!forms!or!practices,!
which! influence! the! adoption! of! specific! behaviors.! Edwin! Amenta! and! Kelly! M.! Ramsey,! in!
explaining!different!modes!of!policy!adoption,!suggest!that!there!are!three!pathways!through!which!











schemas,! scripts,! and! paradigms! establish!what! is! conceivable,”! and! actors,!motivated! by! serious!
policy!concerns!but!bounded!by!the!inherent!ambiguities!of!whether!particular!choices!will! lead!to!
desired! policies,! resort! to! peer! emulation! based! on! their! perceptions! of! which! peers! are! most!
successful,! or! based! on! accessible! professional! expertise.! In! the! third,! “political! actors! are!
epistemologically! dependent! upon! other! actors…! to! develop! and! demonstrate! the! cognitive! or!
normative! feasibility! of! policy! rationales! and! prescriptions,”! and! rely! on! experts,! other!
authoritatively! knowledgeable! figures,! or! “early! adopting! peers”! to! recommend! courses! of! policy!
action,! which! these! actors! then! enact.108! These! three! modes! —! legitimacyHminded,! bounded!
rationality,!and!epistemologically!dependent!—!can!help!explain!why!actors!take!different!actions,!
or!behave!differently!in!different!contexts.!Other!authors!have!suggested!that!there!are!essentially!
two!main!modes! at! work:!Mimetic! isomorphism,! which! covers! peer! emulation! and! encompasses!
both! the! bounded! rationality! and! epistemologically! dependent! concepts;! and! normative!
isomorphism,! which! covers! appropriate! behavior! and! encompasses! the! legitimacyHminded!
concept.109!
Institutions! persist! over! time! because! actors! stick! to! these! cognitive! scripts,! thereby!
reinforcing! norms! and! practices! that! influence! contextHspecific! behaviors.! The! “highly! interactive!
and!mutually! constitutive! character! of! the! relationship! between! institutions! and! individual! action!
[results! in]! individuals! simultaneously! constitut[ing]! themselves! as! social! actors,! in! the! sense! of!
engaging!in!socially!meaningful!acts,!and!reinforc[ing]!the!convention!to!which!they!are!adhering.”110!
Institutions! as! practices! and! behaviors! stemming! from! culture,! norms,! and! cognitive! cues! can!
become! institutionalized!over!time!as!such!patterns!are!socially!or! formally!reproduced,!as!Ronald!
Jepperson!illustrates!using!the!example!of!democracy.111!Yet!unlike!rationalHchoice!institutionalism,!










institutional! change.! Institutions! are! understood! as! constantly! “subject! to! interpretation! and!
frequently! to! reinterpretation”! as! actors! shift! between! different! institutional! arrangements! and!
therefore!borrow,!carry,!and!diffuse!ideas,!norms,!and!beliefs!from!one!situation!to!another.112!Thus,!
sociological! institutionalism! has! significant! potential! to! explain! institutional! change! as! occurring!
through!norm!or!policy!diffusion!and!peer!emulation.!However,!like!rationalHchoice!institutionalism,!
sociological!institutionalism!has!trouble!determining!the!conditions!under!which!institutions!change,!
and! clarifying! why! and! how! certain! norms! are! adopted,! instead! taking! as! a! given! “the! prior!
establishment! of! a! newly! dominant! institution.! Policy! innovation! is! not! divergent! change! in! these!
explanations!so!much!as!a!unidirectional!wave!of!adaptation!to!a!new!paradigm.”113!!
Sociological! institutionalism! therefore! has! trouble! grounding! explanations! of! institutional!
change!into!a!framework!that!takes!into!account!the!possibility!that!change!occurs!due!to!more!than!




Sociological! institutionalism! conceives! that! actor! behavior! is! shaped! by! conformity! with!
different! norms,! cognitive! scripts,! and! cultural! or! other! templates.! Institutional! stability! can!
therefore!be!explained!by!the!fact!that!such!norms!and!templates!are!reinforced!and,!similar!to!the!
concept! in! rationalHchoice! institutionalism,! institutions! become! “sticky.”! Likewise,! institutional!
change!can!be!explained!by!a!shift! in!actor!preferences!—!in!this!case,!a!change!in! ideas!or!norms!
that! constitutes! a! cultural! shift.! Unlike! rationalHchoice! institutionalism,! such! change! does! not!
undermine! the! fundamental! assumptions! of! sociological! institutionalism! because! actors’! beliefs!
(a.k.a.!preferences)!are!not!assumed!to!be!fixed.!Thus,!there!is!a!cohesive!theoretical!consistency!in!








new! norms! and! adjust! or! put! aside! old! norms.! New! institutional! practices! in! organizations! are!
adopted! not! because! they! advance! the! utility!maximization! of! actors,! but! because! “organizations!
embrace! specific! institutional! forms! or! practices! because! the! latter! are! widely! valued! within! a!
broader!cultural!environment.”!This!can! result! in!either!positive!or!negative!organizational! shift! in!
practice,!as!“in!some!cases,!these!practices!may!actually!be!dysfunctional!with!regard!to!achieving!
the!organization’s!formal!goals.”114!!
Such! changes! can! occur! due! to! either! peer! emulation! effects! or! legitimacy! effects.! Recall!
that! in! the! former,! actors! are!motivated!by! substantive!organizational!or!policy! concerns,!but! are!
bounded! by! ambiguities! —! informationHbased! or! otherwise! —! about! how! different! choices! and!
actions!might!result!in!different!outcomes.!They!will!therefore!copy!those!peers!whom!they!deem!to!








Peter! Hall! and! Rosemary! Taylor! cite! two! examples! that! illustrate! such! change! stemming!
from!norm!diffusion.!In!the!first,!American!managers!in!the!1960s!embraced!product!diversification!
not!because!of!a!response!to!economic!or!technological!shocks,!but!because!the!professional!forums!
in!which! they!participated!promoted! the! value!of!diversification.115! This! is! an!example!of!mimetic!
isomorphism,!or!policy!diffusion.!The!second!example!discusses!how!different!nationHstates!adopted!









decade! later! by! Hall,! who! suggested! that! “the! fate! of! an! institution! can! be! closely! tied! to! the!
significance!attached!to!its!rituals,!whether!formal!or!informal,!and!conditioned!by!cultural!shifts!in!
which!new!sets!of!symbols!acquire!authority!as!others!fall!into!desuetude.”116!!
While! sociological! institutionalism! does! a! good! job! of! explaining! the! effects! of! policy! and!
norm!diffusion,!it!does!not!adequately!explain!the!link!between!norm!diffusion!and!norm!adoption.!
How!and!why!do!some!policies!or!norms!become!displaced!by!others?!And!what!are!the!necessary!
and! sufficient! conditions! under! which! such! displacement! occurs?! Like! rationalHchoice!
institutionalism,! sociological! institutionalism! seems! to! rely! on! the! “blackHbox! expectations! of!
‘exogenous! shocks’! that!may! disrupt! or! render! less! salient! norms,! schemas,! and! their! embedded!
resources.”117! Several! contrasting! theories!have!been!posited! to!explain! such! change.! Institutional!
change! may! result! from! a! confluence! of! smaller,! separate! developments;! from! a! process! of!
defection! “in! which! actors! gradually! stop! adhering! to! the! practices! formerly! constitutive! of! an!
institution…! without! any! formal! agreement! to! do! so”! (as! was! the! case! with! wage! bargaining! in!
Germany);!or!from!unintended!consequences!that!arose!out!of!adHhoc!adjustments!to!organizations’!
practices! and!procedures.118!All! of! this! suggests! that! there! is! no!one! general! theory!of! how!norm!
diffusion! leads! to! norm! adoption,! and! that! “alternative! norms! and! schemas! are! abundant,! and!
identifying! the! conditions! under! which! particular! alternatives! become! the! foundation! of!
replacement! institutions! and! waves! of! conformity! remains! a! subject! of! exploratory! inquiry”! for!
sociological! institutionalists.119! In! addition,! this! broad,! often! macroHlevel! focus! on! diffusion!
minimizes! the! fact! that! change! can! occur! based! on! incremental! steps! “issuing! from! a! series! of!








stage,! [which]! can! usher! in! profound! institutional! transformation.”120! As! with! rationalHchoice!
institutionalism,!the!interplay!between!exogenous!and!endogenous!change!is!not!wellHtheorized.!!
A! second! shortcoming!of! sociological! institutionalism! is! that! it! does!not! explicitly! theorize!
the!role!of!path!dependence!in!explaining!institutional!change.!Norm!and!policy!diffusion!may!affect!
different!actors!differently;!each!actor!or!group!of!actors!may!have!(socially!constituted)!reasons!for!
desiring! the! adoption! of! these! norms! or! policies.! Seeking! an! understanding! of! past! instances! of!
policy! adoption,! and! the! processes! through! which! they! occurred,! can! explain! why! similar!
institutional!changes!are!or!are!not!occurring.!While!historical!institutionalism!pays!attention!to!such!
issues,!this!type!of!process!tracing!of!“policy!convergence!to!the! influence!of!pervasive!norms!and!
schemas…! [is]! typically! absent”! in! studies! that! employ! purely! sociological! institutional!
perspectives.121!In!addition,!sociological!institutionalism!has!been!less!explicit!in!its!theorizing!of!the!
role!of!power!asymmetries!in!understanding!policy!and!norm!adoption,!although!it!does!not!ignore!
this! dynamic.! Both! sociological! and! historical! institutionalists! view! institutions! “as! objects! of!




aid! influences! institutional! change! through! knowledge! transfer! of! “best! practices.”! Donor!
governments!provide!experts!to!conduct!training!or!mentoring,!thereby!facilitating!norm!diffusion!of!
good! governance! principles! and! practices,! and! aid! donors! implicitly! assume! that! norm! adoption!
automatically!follows!norm!diffusion.!However,!this!is!not!necessarily!the!case;!for!governance!aid!to!
be! effective,! principles! and! practices! must! be! adopted! and! behavior! changed! so! that! the! normH












an! inductive,! comparative! vein! of! inquiry,! asking! questions! about! differences! in! realHworld!









more! than! one! case,! historical! institutionalists! consider! how! prior! configurations! or! patterns! of!
norms,! routines,! and! practices! affect! current! behavior! and! divergent! outcomes.! These!
configurations! are! the! institutions! “embedded! in! the! organizational! structure! of! the! polity! or!
political! economy,”123! which! shape! subsequent! behavior! and! outcomes! due! to! path! dependence.!
While!historical!institutionalists!do!not!dismiss!the!idea!that!individuals!have!agency,!they!consider!
this!agency!to!be!firmly!bounded!by!the!structures!within!which!these!individuals!operate.!Thus,!the!
trajectories! set! in! place! at! different! points! in! time! become! pathHdependent,! in! that! they! “trigger!
feedback!mechanisms!that!reinforce!the!recurrence!of!a!particular!pattern!in!the!future.”124!!
For!historical!institutionalists,!institutions!are!“object[s]!of!active!reinterpretation,!and!often!













Historical! institutionalism!has!been!classified!as!“agnostic”126! in! its!ontology! in! that! it!does!
not!strictly!adhere!to!either! the!rationalHchoice!or!sociological!worldview!on!what!motivates!actor!
behavior.!While! historical! institutionalism! tends! to! reject! the! rationalHchoice! idea! that! actors! are!
seeking!a!gameHtheoretic!equilibrium!outcome,!it!does!not!reject!the!notion!that!individuals!are!able!
to!act!in!accordance!with!a!“logic!of!consequences”!approach.!Rather,!it!incorporates!the!notion!that!
actors!may!be!driven!by! classic! rationalHchoice!notions!of! selfHinterest!while! simultaneously! being!
embedded! in! multiple! identities! that! influence! choices! and! actions.! In! part,! this! flexibility! is! the!
result! of! historical! institutionalism! privileging! structural! and! contextual! elements! over! agency:!
Historical! institutionalism! defines! institutions! as! “formal! or! informal! procedures,! routines,! norms,!
and! conventions! embedded! in! the! organizational! structure! of! the! polity! or! political! economy.”127!
While!bounded!by!these!institutions,!actors!may!shift!between!a!logic!of!consequence!and!a!logic!of!
appropriateness!during!a!single!decisionHmaking!process,!depending!on!what!the!issue!is,!and!these!
shifts!may! precipitate! either! action! or! inaction.! For! example,! “proposals! to! alter! the! institutional!
practices!associated!with!environmental! issues…!can!bear!differently!on! the! role!of! the!voter!as!a!









identities! are! engaged! most! intensely! in! debates! about! the! issue.”128! This! ontological! flexibility!
allows!historical! institutionalists! the! freedom!to!explain!patterns!of!behavior! in!a! less!narrow!way!
than!either!rationalHchoice!or!sociological!institutionalism!alone!does.!!
Historical! institutionalists’! take! on! the! need! for! institutions,! or!more! accurately!why! they!
arose!and!took!certain!forms,!is!influenced!more!by!structuralist!than!agentHcentered!explanations.!
Institutions! play! a! role! in! allocating! resources! and! structuring! the! incentives,! options,! and!
constraints!of!different!actors.!Explicit!in!these!configurations!are!power!dynamics,!which!are!largely!
ignored! in! rationalHchoice! institutionalism.! Different! groups! of! actors! are! imbued! with! different!
access! to! decisionHmaking! processes,! which! ultimately! affects! these! groups’! abilities! to! negotiate!
preferable!outcomes.! Institutions!are! therefore!byHproducts!of! the! struggle!among!unequal!actors!
for! access! to! decisionHmaking! power,! rather! than! a! functional! realization! of! actors’! goals.!
Understanding! past! power! distributions! and! inequalities,! and! the! struggle! for! a! balance! of! power!
and!resources,!is!therefore!key!to!understanding!how!institutions!shape!current!outcomes.!
Thus,! researchers!must! consider! historical! antecedents! when! analyzing!why! some! groups!
emerge!as!winners!and!losers!in!the!political!process!—!outcomes!that!can!be!reinforced!over!time!
due!to!path!dependence.129!Path!dependence!“refers!to!the!dynamics!of!selfHreinforcing!or!positive!
feedback! processes! in! a! political! system,”130! and! helps! explain! why! some! power! dynamics! can!
become! entrenched,! leading! to! status! quo! arrangements.! In! this! way,! institutions! are! the!
embodiment! of! past! politics.! Such! institutional! “stickiness”! can! exacerbate! embedded! power!
inequalities,!making!it!difficult!to!reverse!course!once!the!path!is!set.!Analyzing!the!presence!of!such!
reinforcing!patterns! is!one!hallmark!of!historical! institutionalism.!By! focusing!on!path!dependence!
and!patterns,!historical!institutionalism!takes!a!longerHterm!view!of!institutions!than!rationalHchoice!








to!different!outcomes.!For!historical! institutionalists,! the! timing!and!sequencing!of!multiple,!often!
nonHdramatic! or! smallHscale! events! are! key! explanatory! factors! in! a! causal! relationship,! and! the!
order! of! events! can!make! a! difference! in! explaining!divergent! institutional! outcomes.! Indeed,! the!
timing!and!order!of!events!can!lead!to!irreversible!changes,!as!the!example!of!labor!incorporation!in!
Latin! America! shows.! Although! organized! labor! was! eventually! incorporated! into! political!
participation!in!most!Latin!American!countries,!it!happened!at!different!times!in!different!countries.!
The! timing! of! incorporation,! and! whether! it! came! before! or! after! certain! stages! of! political!
development,!influenced!organized!labor’s!power!and!its!political!options!later.131!!




able! to! handle! the! possibility! of! conjectural! causality,! or! the! interaction! effects! between! causal!
sequences! that! join! up! in! certain! time! points;! and! of! equifinality,! or! the! fact! that!multiple! causal!
mechanisms! may! lead! to! the! same! outcomes.! Historical! institutionalism! captures! slowHmoving!
causal! processes! that!may! take! a! long! time,! encompass! several! links! in! a! causal! chain,! and! be! a!
multiHstage!causal!process.!In!contrast,!rationalHchoice!institutionalism!typically!uses!tools!that!offer!
a!snapshot!of!a!single!period!in!time,!and!gameHtheoretic!frameworks!can!be!limiting!in!explaining!
conjectural! causality,! slow! developments,! or! unintended! consequences.133! Sociological!
institutionalism!is!also! limited!in!that!“evidence!of![norm]!diffusion!is!usually!taken!to!be!evidence!
that! a! single! theorized! institutional! cause! is! at! work.”134! Historical! institutionalism’s! flexible!
approach! to! ontologies! of! actor! behavior! and! its! pluralistic!methodology! for! tackling! questions! of!
causality! make! it! the! most! useful! framework! for! analyzing! complex! institutional! arrangements.!








explaining! institutional! development! and! stability,! but! it! does! a! less! compelling! job! of! explaining!
institutional!change.!!
Historical!Explanations!of!Institutional!Change!
Historical! institutionalism! suggests! that! the! existence! and! persistence! of! institutions! is! an!
embodiment! of! the! struggle! over! power! for! resources! and! access! to! influence! over! policies! and!
political! outcomes.! It! suggests! that! institutional! continuity! and! stability! is! the! result! of! embedded!
power!relationships!and!feedback!loops,!which!create!path!dependencies.!Once!a!particular!path!is!
set!in!motion,!it!may!be!difficult!for!these!structural!elements!to!change.!Institutional!variation!is!the!
result! of! contextual! differences.! Thus,! researchers! must! understand! the! settings! from! which!




of! causal! linkages! leading! to! different! outcomes.! Explanations! of! how! different! institutional!
arrangements! occur! in! different! contexts! require! knowledge! of! that! context.! At! the! same! time,!
identifying!the!general!factors!necessary!to!conduct!this!initial!empirical!review!of!the!context!—!so!
as! to! somewhat! narrow! how! wide! a! net! is! cast! —! requires! only! minimal! deduction.! Historical!
institutionalism’s!grounding!in!political!science!provides!such!a!focus!through!its!emphasis!on!state!
institutions!and!the!process!of!politics!and!policymaking,!because!“state!institutions!provide!outside!
interest! groups! with! veto! points!—! where! proposed! policy! changes! can! be! defeated!—! or! deny!






proportional! representation.”135! In! a! historical! institutionalist! comparative! case! study,! then,!
researchers! should! seek! to! classify! the! enduring! characteristics! of! different! countries’! state!
institutions!as!one!of! the!variables! that!explain!why!different! institutional!arrangements!exist!and!
persist! in!different!settings.!This!need!to!understand!state!institutions!motivated!the!review!of!the!
literature! in! Chapter! 2,! in! which! different! state! and! nonHgovernmental! actors! were! identified! as!
drivers!of!change.!
In!explaining!institutional!change,!historical!institutionalism!looks!to!critical!junctures!as!the!
main! drivers! of! change.! Critical! junctures! are! significant! events! that! act! as! exogenous! shocks!
prompting!change! in! institutional!arrangements.!During!critical! junctures,!there! is!a!period!of!time!
during!which!the!typical!constraints!on!behavior!are!lifted,!which!opens!up!the!possibility!of!altering!
political! arrangements! that! have! heretofore! been! stable.136! This! can! change! the! development! of!
patterns! and! thus! the!path!of! an! institution.! In! this!way,! the! concept! of! critical! junctures! links! to!
notions! of! path! dependence! processes,! as! “outcomes! at! critical! junctures! trigger! feedback!
mechanisms! that! reinforce! the! recurrence! of! a! particular! pattern! into! the! future.”137! Historical!
institutionalism! thus! often! focuses! on! contextHspecific! trajectories! of! institutions! to! explain! how!
patterns! are! established,! and! then! looks! to! critical! junctures! to! explain! how! such! patterns! are!
disrupted,!resulting!in!new!institutional!arrangements.!This!aligns!with!research!in!the!literature!on!
organizational! change,! and! the! sustainability! of! change.! In! research! addressing! what! factors! are!
likely!to!lead!to!sustained!change,!Buchanan!et.!al.!(2005)!outline!factors!that!impact!sustainability,!












this! mischaracterizes! historical! institutionalism,! which! considers! institutional! change! in! terms! of!
multiple! critical! junctures! over! a! long! period! of! time,! rather! than! at! just! one!moment! in! time.! In!
addition,!historical! institutionalism’s!attention! to! the!continuous!struggle!over!power! incorporates!
the! idea!of!slowHmoving,! incremental!change!as!the!byHproduct!of!such!struggle.!The!challenge!for!
historical!institutionalists!is!to!link!these!two!types!of!change!into!one!cohesive!causal!argument.!
That! said,! as! with! rationalHchoice! institutionalism,! a! key! weakness! of! historical!
institutionalism!has!until!recently!been!its!failure!to!explain!how!change!occurs!endogenously.!James!
Mahoney!and!Kathleen!Thelen!note!that!one!of!the!shortfalls!of!historical!institutionalism!is!that!its!
emphasis! on! critical! junctures! conceives! of! only! one! type! of! change,! which! involves! “the!
‘breakdown’!of!one!set!of!institutions!and!its!replacement!with!another.”139!In!addition,!they!point!
to! the! fact! that! too!many! scholars! assume! that! largeHscale,! sudden! shifts! are!more! significant! for!
institutional! change! than! slow,! incremental! changes.! A! second! weakness! of! historical!
institutionalism!is!that!its!emphasis!on!the!inductive!origin!of!institutions!makes!generalization!more!
problematic,! and! confines! historical! institutionalism! to! a! set! of! midHrange! theories,! as! “historical!
institutionalists! have!been! slower! than!others! to! aggregate! their! findings! into! systematic! theories!
about!the!general!processes!involved!in!institutional!creation!and!change.”140!
Yet! the! inductive!nature!of!historical! institutionalism,!combined!with! its! longHterm!view!of!
change,!agnostic!view!of!actor!motivation,!emphasis!on!configurations!of!causal!linkages,!and!focus!













new! practices! are! the! right! behavior,! and! in! the! best! interest! of! their! organization.! An! inductive!
approach! to! understanding! how! different! groups! of! actors! may! view! the! same! phenomenon!




The! previous! sections! outlined! the! main! features! of! rationalHchoice,! sociological,! and!
historical!institutionalism,!showing!how!they!define!formal!and!informal!institutions,!and!how!those!
rules! and!norms! shape!actor!behavior.! The!main!underpinnings! in! each! tradition! flowed!naturally!
into! explanations! of! stability,! or! why! institutions! persist.! The! ability! of! each! tradition! to! explain!
institutional!change,!however,!was!hampered!for!the!same!reasons!that!they!were!able!to!explain!
stability.! For! rationalHchoice! institutionalism,! fixedHactor! preferences! leading! to! equilibrium!
outcomes!explains!stability.!However,!the!equilibrium!concept!makes! it!difficult!to!explain!change,!
as!it!can!only!be!attributed!to!a!shift!in!actors’!preferences,!which!are!taken!to!be!fixed.!Thus,!only!






This! is! also! true! of! historical! institutionalism,! which! turns! to! the! explanatory! power! of! critical!
junctures!to!explain!institutional!change.!!





the! different! institutionalisms! address! gradual! endogenous! change,! first! touching! briefly! on! the!
concept! of! quasiHparameters! drawn! from! rationalHchoice! explanations.! It! will! then! show! that! the!
ideas! taken! from! discursive! institutionalism! helps! sociological! institutionalism!move! forward! into!




theories! of! exogenous! and! endogenous! change! can! be! cohesively! joined! together! to! answer! the!
main!research!questions.!
Explanations!of!Endogenous!Institutional!Change!
RationalHchoice! theorists! explain! endogenous! institutional! change! by! building! upon! the!
notion!of!path!dependence!borrowed!from!historical!institutionalism.!A!prime!example!comes!from!
Avener!Grief! and!David! Laitin,!who!model! institutional!dynamics!using! repeated!game! theory!and!
path! dependence! to! explore! the! links! between! selfHreinforcing! behavior! and! parameters,! or!
exogenous! factors! that! determine! the! rules! of! the! game.142! They! suggest! that! behavior! in!
equilibrium!dictates!that!parameters!are!fixed!in!the!short!run!but!variable!in!the!long!run,!at!which!
point!such!parameters!then!become!quasiHparameters.!Behavior!in!equilibrium!gradually!alters!the!
quasiHparameters,! which! leads! to! institutions! being! selfHreinforcing;! the! selfHreinforcement!
characteristic!of!institutions!renders!them!more!or!less!resilient!to!external!shock.!However,!unless!
the! institution! continuously! supports! its! selfHenforcing! behavior! to! build! its! resiliency! against!
external!shocks,! it!will!change! in!the! long!run!and!become!more!selfHundermining.! Institutions!are!
therefore!pathHdependent,! in!that!those!that!selfHenforce!over!repeated!play!are!more!likely!to!be!
stable,!while!those!that!selfHundermine!over!repeated!play!are!more!likely!to!change.!!







endogenous! change,! it! still! seems!highly!dependent!upon!exogenous! factors! for! setting! in!motion!
such!change.!Second,! the!authors!do!not!clarify!what! factors!are!considered!parameters!or!quasiH
parameters,! and!how!each!one!might!be! given!a!different! value! in! explanations!of! change.! Third,!
they! fail! to! consider! contextual! factors,! such! as! social! and! political! elements,! which!might! affect!
institutions’! gradual! evolution.! Due! to! these! limitations,! this! thesis! does! not! adopt! this! theory! of!





This! is! rather! intuitive;! one! can! think! of! several! empirical! examples! in! which! this! is! the! case.! A!
sociological!explanation!of!gradual,!endogenous!change!might!chart!the!way!in!which!an!idea!shared!
by!a!few!eventually!becomes!a!norm!shared!by!many.!Such!an!explanation!draws!upon!a!distinction!
between! discursive! and! sociological! institutionalism.! As! Schmidt! notes,! discursive! institutionalism!
can! contribute! to! theories! of! institutional! change! by! demonstrating! “how! and! when! ideas! in!





old! ideas! fail! and! new! ideas! come! to! the! fore,! the! reasons! for…!why! certain! ideas! are! taken! up!
rather!than!others,!and!the!timing…!of!change.”145!A!particularly!important!dynamic!to!consider!that!
is!glossed!over!in!explaining!such!change!is!the!idea!of!power!asymmetries!and!distribution.!Do!ideas!








Theories! of! institutional! change! grounded! in! historical! frameworks! explicitly! focus! on! the!








considered! in!conjunction!with!compliance!with! institutional! rules!and!the!ways! in!which! they!are!
enforced.!Gradual,!endogenous!change!can!be!explained!by!“the!‘gaps’!or!‘soft!spots’!between!the!
rule! and! its! interpretation! or! the! rule! and! its! enforcement.! This! is! an! analytic! space! that! other!
conceptions! of! institutions! (as! behaviors! in! equilibrium,! or! as! scripts)! essentially! rule! out! by!
definition.!But!as!a!practical!matter,! this! is!exactly! the!space! in!which!contests!over!—!and!at! the!
same!time!within!—!institutions!take!place.”149!
The! Mahoney! and! Thelen! framework! outlines! four! types! of! change! that! can! take! place:!
displacement,! layering,!drift,!and!conversion.!Displacement!refers!to!the! introduction!of!new!rules!














links! this! context! to! the! type! of! change! that! occurs! are! the!motivations! of! the! dominant! change!
agents,!who!are!divided!into!four!types:!insurrectionaries,!subversives,!opportunists,!and!symbionts.!!
Insurrectionaries,! who! seek! to! actively! eliminate! rules,! emerge! as! change! agents! when!
defenders! of! the! status! quo! have! weak! veto! power! and! there! is! a! low! level! of! discretion.!
Insurrectionary! success! typically! occurs! based! on! critical! junctures,! and! results! in! displacement.!
Subversive! change! agents! aim! for! displacement,! but! are! hampered! by! strong! status! quo! veto!




that! when! opportunists! are! the! change! agents,! the! most! likely! outcome! is! conversion.! Finally,!
symbionts!seek!to!preserve!rules,!but!as! they!did!not!make!the!rules,!a!dynamic!can!result! in! two!
distinct!types:!Parasitic!symbionts!need!the!institutional!arrangements!to!be!preserved!so!that!they!
can!exploit! the!rules! for!their!own!private!gain!—!they!exploit! the! letter!of! the!rule!but!violate! its!
spirit,! ultimately! undermining! the! rule,! they! thrive! in! contexts! with! strong! status! quo! veto!
possibilities! and! a! high! level! of! discretion,! and! they! are! associated! with! outcomes! of! drift.!












































Mapping! Figure! 3! to! Table! 1! suggests! there! are! two! levels! are!which! institutional! change! can! be!
analyzed.!One!can!analyze!the!intraHinstitutional!dynamics!of!the!Judiciary!and!Comptroller!General!
(the!red!circles!in!Figure!3),!ignoring!the!external!drivers!of!change,!and!develop!an!understanding!of!
change! that! considers! leadership,! work! incentives,! and! other! aspects! highlighted! within! the!
organizational! change! literature.! ! A! broader! analysis! would! analyze! these! intraHinstitutional!
dynamics!and!then!embed!them!within!a!larger!analysis!of!the!overall!political!system,!including!the!
influence! of! external! drivers! of! change! (the! other! actors! highlighted! in! Figure! 3.)! This! type! of!
embedded!analysis! is!the!aim!of!this!thesis:!First,!to!analyze! internal!dynamics!within!the!Judiciary!
and!Comptroller!General,!with!particular!attention!paid!to!the!role!of!institutional!leaders!in!relation!
to! others! within! the! institution,! and! then! to! embed! this! analysis! within! the! overarching! political!
system,!in!part!to!understand!the!role!of!institutional!leaders!–!as!symbols!of!the!aggregate!interests!
of! the! institution! –! in! relation! to! other! institutional! leaders.! In! this! way,! the! resulting! crossHcase!
analysis!will!map!the! influence!of!different!drivers!of!change! in!a!way!that! includes!the! institution!





























































































































endogenous! change,! and! encompasses! the! possibility! of! linking! sudden! institutional! change! to!
gradual!changes!over!time.!Its!focus!on!power!distributions!and!asymmetries!as!relevant!factors!in!
the!outcomes!of! institutional!change!takes! into!account!the!realities!of!politics,!and!the!possibility!
that! differences! in! these! dynamics! account! for! both! path! dependence! and! different! institutional!
change!outcomes.!!
Taking! this! framework! as! a!departure!point! to! explain! the! role!of! good!governance!aid! in!
changing!political!institutions!allows!this!thesis!to!employ!those!theoretical!tools!and!concepts!that!
are! most! useful! for! investigating! different! hypotheses! and! inductively! developing! a! theory! of!
change.!These!tools!and!concepts!include!first!and!foremost!the!idea!that!context!matters,!and!that!
any!understanding!of! change!must!be! rooted! in! the!particular! institutional! context;! and! secondly,!
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that!change!over!the! long!term! is! rarely!due!only!to!exogenous!or!endogenous! factors,!but!to!the!
confluence!of!different!exogenous!factors!interacting!with!endogenous!processes!of!change.!Third,!
they! demonstrate! that! institutions! embody! power! dynamics! and! asymmetries! that! both! inform!
institutional! context! and! can! lead! to! selfHreinforcing! path! dependencies! or! institutional! change.!
Finally,!that!these!tools!are!grounded!in!the!traditional!of!historical!institutionalism!naturally!relates!
to!the!idea!that!a!single!causal!mechanism!does!not!explain!institutional!change;!rather,!there!is!an!
assumption! that! change! is! based! on! a! conjunctive! combination! of! causal! factors,! and! that!
equifinality!may!be!present.!!
Therefore,! this! framework! allows! for! the! appropriate! balance! between! deductive! and!
inductive!inquiry.!Five!drivers!of!change!were!deductively!identified!in!Chapter!2,!but!the!way!they!
work! together! in! conjunction! to! influence! good! governanceHrelated! institutional! change! is! best!
understood! as! an! inductive! inquiry,! particularly! when! embedded! an! analysis! of! internal! change!
dynamics! within! the! overall! analysis.! As! Figure! 3! shows,! there! can! be! multiple! actions! in! play!
stemming! from! different! drivers! of! change,! and! attempting! to!map! out! all! the! different! possible!
causal! combinations! is! not! particularly! fruitful.! Rather,! this! thesis! chooses! to! employ! the! tools! of!
historical!institutionalism!to!guide!this!understanding!inductively.!
How! can! this! framework! be! applied! to! the! research! questions! and! previously! stated!
hypotheses?!Recall!that!the!research!questions!ask!the!following:!
1)! What! has! influenced! or! driven! good! governanceHrelated! shifts! in! Peru’s! political!
institutions?!!









The! introduction! of! good! governance! aid! programs! acts! as! an! exogenous! shock,!
potentially! prompting! changes! to! quasiHparameters! that! change! actors’! preferences.!
Institutional! change! depends! on! how! these! aid! programs! affect! the! incentives! or!
preferences!of!actors!to!implement!governance!rules!and!practices.!!
• Institutional!change!occurs!because!actors!strive!to!do!what!is!correct,!and!what!makes!
sense! according! to! their! worldview.! Good! governance! aid! programs! act! as! a! normH
diffusion! mechanism! that! introduces! or! reinforces! concepts! that! are! proper! or!
appropriate!in!terms!of!peer!legitimacy,!prompting!institutional!change!as!these!norms!
are! adopted! over! time.! Institutional! change! depends! on! whether! the! norms! being!
diffused!by!the!aid!program!are!adopted!by!enough!actors!to!be!naturally!incorporated!
by!their!peers.!







by! developing! an! understanding! of! the! political! context! of! the! political! institutions! being! studied,!
and!the!dimensions!of!good!governance!present!within!those!institutions.!By!reviewing!the!historical!
record! over! a! long! period,! one! can! map! out! the! critical! junctures! that! could! be! considered!
exogenous!shocks,!and!the!periods!of!gradual!change!that!happen!within! those!events.!As!part!of!
this! process,! the! prior! configurations! of! norms,! practices,! and! power! balances! that! are! recurring!






the! veto! possibilities! of! the! status! quo! defenders! and! the! level! of! discretion!will! dictate!whether!
good! governance! aid! (and! its! promotion! of! new! rules! and! practices)! results! in! displacement,!
layering,!drift,!or!conversion.!In!the!second!hypothesis,!actors!are!driving!change!processes!because!
they! are! copying! their! peers! or! adopting! “correct”! practices! from! other! templates.!Moving! from!
diffusion! of! such! templates! to! adoption! of! practices! will! depend! on! the! value! assigned! to! good!
governance!by!different!actors,!which!may!vary!due!to!exposure!to!good!governance!principles!and!
practices.! In! this! scenario,! the! intersection! of! change! agents! with! the! veto! possibilities! of! the!
defenders!of!the!status!quo!and!the! level!of!discretion!also!dictates!whether!good!governance!aid!
(and! its! promotion! of! new! norms! and! templates)! results! in! displacement,! layering,! drift,! or!
conversion.!!
The!Mahoney!and!Thelen!framework!thus!helps!explain!how,!why,!and!what!type!of!change!
occurs,!whether!one!considers!actors! to!be!motivated!by!a! logic!of! consequences!or!by!a! logic!of!
appropriateness.! Reformulating! the! previous! hypotheses! within! this! framework! suggests! that!
different! types! of! institutional! change! occur! depending! on! the! intersection! of! configurations! of!
preferences,! norms! and! power! dynamics! endogenous! to! the! political! institution,! and! how! those!
dynamics! interact! with! the! actions! of! drivers! of! change! exogenous! to! the! institution.! Good!
governance! aid! is! one! of! the! drivers! of! change! exogenous! to! the! institution! that! interacts! with!




This! chapter! explained! three! different! perspectives! that! help! explain! how! and! why!
institutional! change! occurs.! It! showed! how! rationalHchoice,! sociological,! and! historical!
institutionalism!explain! institutional! continuity! in! terms!of!actor!behavior,!and!how!these! theories!
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link! to! the! role! of! good! governance! aid! in! changing! institutions.! It! argues! that! narratives! of!
institutional! change!grounded!solely! in! the!perspectives!of! rationalHchoice! institutionalism! (and! its!
attendant! logic! of! consequences),! or! in! sociological! institutionalism! (and! its! attendant! logic! of!
appropriateness)!do!not!adequately!explain!how!governance!aid!might! foster! institutional!change.!
Theories! grounded! in! the! tradition! of! historical! institutionalism,! which! draws! freely! from! both!
rationalHchoice!and!sociological!institutional!perspectives,!provide!more!compelling!explanations.!!
The! framework! of! gradual! endogenous! institutional! change! developed! by! Mahoney! and!
Thelen!was!used!to!develop!the!deductive!hypothesis,!which!states!that! institutional!change!is!the!





lead! to! a! theory! explaining!which,! if! any,! of! the! factors! influencing! this! shift! could! be! considered!
necessary! or! sufficient! conditions! for! moving! political! institutions! toward! the! ideal! of! good!
governance.! Good! governance! aid! has! precipitated! this! shift! by! acting! as! an! exogenous! driver! of!
change! that! interacts!with!drivers!of!change!endogenous! to! the! institution,!and! the!nature!of! this!
interaction!dictates!whether!new!(good)!governance!rules!and!norms!will!result!in!the!displacement,!












are! the!result!of! the!different! interactions!of!dynamics!endogenous! to! the!political! institution!and!
the!actions!of!drivers!of!change!exogenous!to!the!institution.!!
As! the! previous! chapter! illustrated,! theories! of! institutional! change! are! inadequate! for!
generating!a!deductive!hypothesis!that!addresses!the!relationships!and!interactions!among!different!
drivers! of! change! and! linking! these! interactions! to! positive! or! negative! good! governanceHrelated!
changes! in! political! institutions.! This! chapter! shows! how! the! actions,! and! interactions,! of! these!
drivers!of!change!will!be!operationalized!within!this!theoretical!framework,!and!how!the!dependent!
variable! of! good! governanceHrelated! institutional! change! will! be! measured.! Methods! of! process!




aid! drives! or! facilitates! change.! A! withinHcase! analysis! will! be! conducted! for! the! Judiciary! and!







of! the! process! and! justification! of! the! case! selection,! and! the! summary! of! the! cases! used! in! this!
thesis.! It! is! imperative!to! identify! the!selected!cases!before!explaining!how!this! thesis!moves! from!




drivers! of! change! as! independent! variables,! which! do! vary! over! the! three! time! periods! and! in!
relation! to! institutional! changes! in! the! Judiciary! and! the! Comptroller! General.! These! good!
governanceHrelated!institutional!changes!are!the!dependent!variables.!The!third!section!will!discuss!
how! the! data! related! to! each! variable! has! been! collected,! and! the! final! section! describes! the!
methods!of!data!analysis.!!
Evaluating!the!Role!of!Aid!in!Institutional!Change!
The! theory! of! endogenous! institutional! change! that! guides! the! empirical! inquiry! of! this!
thesis!is!situated!within!the!tradition!of!historical!institutionalism.!Historical!institutionalist!scholars!
are!not! joined!together! in!an!epistemic!community! in!the!way!that!rationalHchoice!scholars!are,!as!
there! is! diversity! among! historical! scholars! on! fundamental! issues! of! ontology,! such! as! what!













Such! singleHunit! analysis! provides! a! framework! for! understanding! the! causal! mechanisms!
that!connect!single!or!multiple!independent!variables!(A,!B,!C)!to!the!dependent!variable!(Y),!and!for!
developing! exploratory! research! that! aims! for! theoryHbuilding.! By! focusing! on! a! single! case,!
researchers! can!make!multiple!observations! about! the! causal!mechanisms!at!work,! allowing! for! a!
depth!of!analysis!that!cannot!be!derived!from!a!largeHn!analysis.!A!case!study!also!allows!researchers!
to! uncover! explanations! of! conjunctive! causation,! in!which! several! variables! together! lead! to! the!
outcome,!and!equifinality,!in!which!different!causal!pathways!made!lead!to!the!same!outcome.!Case!
study!methods! provide! the!most! useful! tools! for! achieving! the! goals! of! this! –! to! understand! the!
factors! that! influence! institutional! change! within! complex! publicHsector! organizations,! and! how!




the! generalizability! of! any! theory! developed! from! the! case! study.! In! addition,! it! is! difficult! to!
ascertain!a!valid!counterfactual!from!a!single!case!serving!as!the!factual.!Expanding!the!number!of!
cases! for! the!purpose!of! conducting! a! crossHcase! comparison!has! the!potential! to! resolve!both!of!
these!issues.!Although!some!of!the!depth!related!to!a!singleHunit!study!is!lost!when!the!number!of!
cases!is!expanded,!a!degree!of!breadth!is!obtained.!Establishing!the!presence!or!absence!of!variables!
and! causal!mechanisms! across! a! range! of! similar! cases! allows! the! researcher! to! support! a! causal!
argument!about!the!outcome!in!a!single!case,!and!establish!a!counterfactual!argument!about!cases!
in!which!the!outcome!did!not!occur.!Not!only!do!crossHcase!comparative!methods!and!withinHcase!















the! possibility! of! using! specific! good! governance! projects! as! cases,! rather! than! viewing! aid! as! an!
aggregate!in!two!institutions!in!three!time!periods.!However,!it!became!clear!during!my!desk!review!
of! these! projects! that! the! data! available! to! a! research! unaffiliated! with! a! sanctioned! project!
evaluation!was!very!limited.!In!addition,!I!faced!significant!time!and!financial!constraints!related!to!
conducting!fieldwork,!which!limited!further!my!ability!to!conduct!a!“shadow”!evaluation!of!even!one!





This! thesis! has! identified! the! dependent! variable! as! good! governanceHrelated! institutional!
change.!It!has!suggested!some,!but!not!all,!of!the!conditions!that!affect!such!changes;!and!for!those!
processes! that! have! been! suggested,! the! question! of! whether! they! are! necessary! or! sufficient!
conditions!for!change!remains!undetermined.!The!most!relevant!case!study!design!for!the!purpose!
of! this! research! is! therefore!a!hypothesisHgenerating! study,!which!aims! to! “generalize!beyond! the!








propositions,! which! can! then! be! tested! through! other! methods…! [C]ase! study! analysts! are! wellH
positioned! to! suggest! additional! explanatory! and! contextual! variables,! causal! mechanisms,!
interaction!effects,!and!scope!conditions.”156!Among!other!uses,!hypothesisHgenerating!case!studies!




of! the! “rules”! that! apply! to! case! selection! for! hypothesisHtesting! cases! are! not! as! ironclad! for!
hypothesisHgenerating! case! studies,! such! as! those! relating! to! selection! bias.! Researchers! strive! to!
mitigate! selection! bias!when! choosing! cases! by! avoiding! using! the! case! that! helped! generate! the!
hypothesis,! or! avoiding! using! one! that! fits! the! hypothesis.! The!most!wellHknown! rule! about! caseH
selection! bias,! in!which! the! researcher! strives! to! avoid! overrepresentation! of! a! key! variable,! is! to!
avoid! choosing! based! on! the! dependent! variable.158! However,! hypothesisHgenerating! case! studies!
follow! a! different! inferential! logic! than! hypothesisHtesting! cases.! As! Jack! S.! Levy! notes,! “if! the!
hypothesis! in! question! posits! necessary! conditions,! the! only! observations! that! can! falsify! the!




would! be! possible! to! simply! choose! a! case! that! represents! a! sample! of! the! overall! population! of!
cases! and! conduct! a! single! case! study! using! withinHcase! techniques! to! generate! a! hypothesis.!
Indeed,! this! thesis! does! aim! to! analyze! two! cases! that! represent! two! samples! of! the! overall!










cases.!Therefore,! this! thesis!proceeds!from!the!assumption!that!at! least! two!cases!are!required!to!
conduct! the!empirical! inquiry,!and! that! these!cases! should!vary!based!on! the!dependent!variable.!
The!cases!also!need!to!follow!the!basic!definition!of!a!case!study!in!that!the!main!unit!of!inquiry!is!a!
spatiallyHbounded!phenomenon.! It! is! important! to!note,!however,! that!a!unit! is!not! the!same!as!a!
case.!The!set!of!cases!studied! is!a!sample!of! the!entire!population!of!cases;! the!sample!comprises!
units! that!are!both! studied!and!unstudied.160! Studying!only! certain!units!within! the! sample!allows!
one! to! develop! a! hypothesis! that! can! be! tested! on! the! unstudied! units! in! a! subsequent! research!
project.! In! this! thesis,! the! population! comprises! publicHsector! organizations! that! received! good!
governance! aid.! The! sample! comprises! units! that! are! the! different! publicHsector! organizations,!
including!the!courts,!Prosecutor!General!offices,!Comptroller!General!offices,!electoral!bodies,!and!
others.! Each!unit! is!observed!at!different!points! in! time,! and! these!periods!of! time!are! the! cases.!
Each! case! consists! of! different! dimensions,! or! variables,! which! are! built! upon! observations.!






country.! Comparing! different! publicHsector! organizations! from! two! different! countries! would!
necessarily! require! a! focus! on! both! organizationHlevel! variables! and! macroHlevel! variables,! which!
would! result! in! more! variables! than! cases,! leading! to! a! degreesHofHfreedom! issue.! Further,!









across! organizations.! The! latter! is! the! key! area! of! interest! for! this! thesis,! and! as! such,! the! subH
national! comparison! makes! the! most! sense.! Therefore,! the! first! step! in! selecting! cases! was! to!
determine! the! country! from! which! to! select! units.! Because! this! thesis! seeks! variation! in! the!
dependent! variable! of! governanceHrelated! indicators,! the! ideal! strategy! would! be! to! compare!
changes! in! outcomes! across! all! publicHsector! organizations! that! receive! good! governance! aid! to!
determine!which!countries!had!such!variations!within!their!organizations.!However,!while!not!every!
country! receives! good! governance! aid,! a! significant! number! do,! and! no! dataset! exists! that! allows!
comparison! of! changes! in! governance! over! time! in! subHnational! entities! like! publicHsector!
organizations.!Thus,!to!be!able!to!choose!the!particular!units!for!this!study,!it!was!necessary!to!first!




it! has! the! longest! history! of! donor! engagement! (since! the! 1980s)! on! the! types! of! political! and!




for! all! aspects!of! governance,! as! it! is! one!of! the! key!proxy!measures! that! can!be!used! to! capture!
several! dimensions! of! the! dependent! variable.! The! rationale! for! using! corruption! as! a! scope!
condition!relates!to!finding!variation!in!governance!outcomes!among!subHnational!organizations!that!
receive! good! governance! aid.! Good! governance! aid! generally! does! not! flow! to! countries! where!










the! last! complete! year! of! data! available! at! that! time,!which!was! 2008.! Of! the! 213! countries! that!
were!included!in!the!2008!Worldwide!Governance!Indicators!survey,!68!scored!above!the!33rd!and!
below! the! 67th! percentile! on! the! Control! of! Corruption! indicator.! Of! these,! 11!were! countries! in!
Central!or!South!America!(see!Annex!I).!For!10!of!these!11!countries,163!two!indicators!were!used!to!
gauge! the! level! of! potential! good! governance! aid! flowing! to! each! country:! the! number! of!
governmentHrelated!projects! implemented! in! the!countries!between!2000!and!2010,!and! the! total!
official!development!assistance!(ODA)!flows!to!each!country.!The!higher!the!number!of!projects!and!
amount!of!ODA,! the!more! likely! the!country!would!have!more! than!one! institution! receiving!nonH
trivial!amounts!of!good!governance!aid,!thus!making!the!existence!of!diverse!cases!more!likely.!Each!
of!these!indicators!were!calculated!using!data!drawn!from!the!AidData!database,164!which!records!all!
aid! flows! from!donors! reporting! to! the!Organization! for! Economic! Cooperation! and!Development!
(OECD)! Credit! Reporting! System! (CRS)! and! supplements! this! financial! information! with! projectH
specific!information!drawn!directly!from!donors.!!
Table! 3! shows! the! results! of! this! analysis:! Peru! and! Colombia! had! the! highest! number! of!




































! Both! Colombia! and! Peru! offer! interesting! examples! of! how! good! governance! aid! affects!
institutional!change!in!a!middleHincome!Latin!American!country!that!experienced!the!escalation!and!
end! of! significant! domestic! terrorism! in! the! 1990s,! followed! by! steady! economic! growth! in! the!
2000s.166! Peru! was! chosen! because! it! had! a! higher! number! of! projects! represented;! Colombia!
represents!an!ideal!starting!point!from!which!to!broaden!the!number!of!cases!in!future!applications!
of!this!research.!!





in! Peru! and! the! publicHsector! organizations! that! received! such! aid.! The! list!was! triangulated!with!












Agency! (Agencia! Peruana! de! Cooperación! Internacional,! or! APCI),! the! Peruvian! government!
organization!that!manages!all!international!aid!projects!implemented!in!Peru.!The!APCI!Web!site!has!
a! database! of! all! the! projects! implemented! in! Peru,! listed! by! title,! donor,! recipient! organization,!
year,! and! amount! of! aid.167! This! search! was! narrowed! to! those! organizations! that! fit! within! the!
purview!of!the!democracy!and!governance!sector!outlined!in!Chapter!1,!which!includes!judicial!and!
legal!institutions,!legislative!and!electoral!bodies,!and!certain!executive!and!oversight!bodies.168!This!
data! was! aggregated! and! combined! to! make! a! master! list! of! all! the! good! governanceHrelated!
projects!implemented!in!Peru!from!1990!to!2010!(see!Annex!II).!
An!aggregation!of!this!projectHlevel!data!by!institution!is!presented!in!Table!4,!which!shows!
that! judicial! institutions! (the! Ministry! of! Justice! and! Judiciary)! received! the! highest! amount! of!
governance!aid,!followed!by!the!Ombudsman!and!the!Comptroller!General.!There!are!two!caveats!to!
this! financial! data:! First,! part! of! the! amount! included! in! the! total! for! the! Comptroller! General!
included!an! IADB! loan! that! extends! to!2025,! and! therefore!has!not!been! fully! disbursed.! This!will!
affect! the! figure!downward,!but!by!more! than!$17!million,!which!does!not!affect! the!Comptroller!
General’s!position!in!this!funding!hierarchy.!Second,!the!Ministry!of!Justice!figures!include!aggregate!
amounts! from! FINNIDA! and! MCC! for! multiHinstitution! projects,! and! I! was! unable! to! obtain!
information!on!the!precise!amounts!disbursed!to!each! institution.!However,!eliminating!these!two!
funding!sources!entirely!from!the!MOJ!aggregate!would!still!keep!it!in!the!top!three!of!the!hierarchy.!










Institution! Amount!of!Aid! #!of!Donors! Years!
Ministry!of!Justice!(MINJUS)! $88,915,620! 8! 2002H2011!
Ombudsman!(Defensoría!del!Pueblo)! $46,217,461! 22! 2002H2011!
Comptroller!General!(La!Controlaría)! $31,270,769! 6! 2002H2011!
National!Office!of!Electoral!Processes!
(JNE)! $2,019,193! 5! 2004H2010!
Judiciary!(Poder!Judicial)! $1,231,087! 4! 2003H2010!
Prosecutor!General’s!Office!(Ministerio!
Publico)! $912,026! 6! 2002H2011!
National!Election!Commission!(ONPE)! $383,302! 2! 2007H2010!
Source:!APCI!Database,!http://www.apci.gob.pe/bancoproyecto.php!
Each! of! these! organizations! represents! a! unit! that! received! a! significant! amount! of! good!
governance!aid! from!2002! to!2011.! (Information!on!good!governance!aid! flows!prior! to!2002!was!
unavailable! on! the!APCI! database,! and!will! be! explored! in! the! individual! cases! studies).!However,!
unlike!the!other!two!institutions,!the!Ombudsman!was!not!created!by!law!until!1993,!and!came!into!
existence!in!1996!as!an!independent!institution!tasked!with!defending!human!rights!in!Peru.!The!aid!
channeled! to! the!Ombudsman! through!a!“basket! fund”!of!22!different!donors! is!aimed!at!helping!
the! Ombudsman! promote! accountability! among! other! institutions! within! Peru,! rather! than! at!
helping! it!become!more!accountable! itself.!This!differs! from!the!aid!given!to! the! Judiciary!and!the!
Comptroller! General,! which! follows! the! model! of! good! governance! aid! in! which! this! thesis! is!
interested,! that! of! donors! implementing! discrete! projects! aimed! at! promoting! good! governance!
within!the! institution!to!which! it!provides!the!aid.!The!Ombudsman!was!therefore!eliminated!as!a!
unit! of! inquiry! in! this! research.! Therefore,! the! Judiciary! and! the!Comptroller!General! are! the! two!
main!units!within!which!the!empirical!case!analysis!were!conducted,!and!by!which!endogenous!and!
exogenous!features!are!defined.!The!next!section!provides!a!brief!overview!of!the!six!cases!that!are!




and! Comptroller! General.! These! units! were! observed! at! different! points! in! time,! and! these! time!
90!
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periods!make!up! the! specific! cases.! Although! there!were! some!aid! projects! aimed! at! institutional!
reforms!in!the!1980s!in!Latin!America,!governance!aid!did!not!exist!as!a!standHalone!sector!prior!to!
the! 1990s! because! it! was! not! yet! a! priority! area! of! reform! for! international! aid! donors.! There! is!
therefore!more! information!about!good!governance!projects,!and! indictors!of!good!governance! in!






aspects! of! good! governance.! Therefore,! the! base! of! evidence! for! the! two! 1980s! cases! are! the!
thinnest.! However,! I! believe! it! is! relevant! to! include! these! as! cases! to! provide! a! baseline! for!
understanding!the!good!governance!changes!that!occurred!in!the!1990s!and!2000s.!Exploring!these!
cases!helped!further!the!understanding!of!the!power!dynamics!within!these!institutions!and!aids!in!
identifying! potential! pathHdependent! features! of! Peruvian! politics! that! influence! the! 1990s! and!
2000s!!cases!under!investigation.!!
There!are!three!distinct!time!periods!that!will!be!explored!in!each!institution,!for!a!total!of!
six! cases.! The! first! era! spans! the! 1980s! (1980H1992),! during!which! electoral! democracy! had! been!
resorted!following!a!12Hyear!period!of!military!rule.!The!second!era!can!be!considered!a!period!of!
“electoral!authoritarianism”! (1992! to!2000)!during!which!democratically!elected!President!Alberto!
Fujimori! declared! a! selfHcoup,! suspended! the! Constitution,! sacked! the! Congress! and!most! judges,!
and! embarked! on! a! series! of! reforms! aimed! at! the! Judiciary.! The! third! era! can! be! considered! a!
“democratic! transition! and! consolidation”! period! (2001! to! 2010)! following! a! massive! corruption!
scandal!that!resulted!in!Fujimori’s!ouster,!during!which!time!political!will!for!good!governanceHtype!




governance! related! institutional! change.! This! thesis! first! aims! to! establish! the! nature! of! good!
governance!in!the!Judiciary!and!Comptroller!General!in!these!three!time!periods,!and!the!forces!that!
shaped! those! outcomes.! It! then! compares! across! time! periods! to! understand! the! changes! that!
happened! over! time.! Thus,!measuring! good! governanceHrelated! institutional! change! require! both!
measuring! levels! of! good! governance;! and! understanding! processes! of! change! leading! to! these!
outcomes.!!
Measuring!Components!of!Good!Governance!!
As! noted! in! Chapter! 1,! good! governance! relates! to! the! ability! of! governments! to! conduct!




their! conceptualization! of! what! are! necessary! and! sufficient! aspects! of! good! governance.!
Technocratic! approaches! advocated! by! the!World! Bank! emphasize! accountability,! transparency,! a!
low! level! of! corruption,! and! efficient! provision! of! services;! rightsHbased! approaches! advocated! by!
USAID! emphasize! enforcement! of! human! rights! through! a! wellHfunctioning! judicial! system! and!
democratic! structures;! and! poverty! alleviation! approaches! advocated! by! Dfid! emphasize! building!
functional!and!transparent!state!entities! that!promote!proHpoor!strategies,!making!services!widely!
accessible!to!the!poorest!people.170!!
Despite! criticism! of! conceptual! stretching,! there! is! a! common! denominator! behind! the!
diverse! trajectories! of! the! good! governance! agenda:!Government!organizations! should! fulfill! their!
specific!purposes!(such!as!service!delivery)!in!a!manner!that!is!efficient,!effective,!transparent,!and!
accountable.!These! four!dimensions!constitute! the!minimal!definition!of!good!governance!used! in!








effectiveness,! transparency,! and! accountability! of! the! Judiciary! and! the! Comptroller! General.! The!
next! section!will! define! the! necessary! attributes! of! these! dimensions! of! good! governance.! These!
definitions!follow!the!logic!of!conceptualization!proposed!by!Gary!Goertz,171!which!outlines!both!the!
positive! and! negative! poles! of! each! concept,! theorizes! about! the!whether! there! is! an! underlying!
continuum! between! these! poles,! and! determines! whether! the! concept! should! be! considered!
dichotomous!or!continuous.!!
It! should!be!noted!that,!while!some!of! these!macroHlevel! indicators!have!been! included! in!
Annex! V,! on! the! whole! I! found! them! irrelevant! for! showing! changes! in! political! institutions! over!
time.!These! indicators! tend! to!aggregate!at! the!country! level,! rather! than!disaggregate!by!specific!
political!institutions.!As!such,!the!macroHlevel!indicators!noted!here!are!merely!illustrative,!and!not!
utilized!as!key!pieces!of!data!in!this!study.!Indeed,!one!of!the!most!frustrating!and!difficult!aspects!of!!
conducting! this! research! was! the! lack! of! institutionalHlevel! quantitative! data! available! that! could!
show! changes! in! good! governance! over! time.! I! had! to! spend!more! time! that! I! imagined! tracking!
down! single! studies! and! extracting! data! from! them,! or! constructing! observations! about! good!
governance!from!qualitative!data!sources.!!
Effectiveness!relates!to!the!ability!of!government!entities!to!implement!policies!and!provide!
public! goods! or! services.172! An! effective! Comptroller! General! would! be! able! to! competently!
investigate!cases!of!public!fraud!and!bring!them!to!conclusion!(resulting!in!an!arrest,!for!example),!
while!an!ineffective!Comptroller!General!would!be!unable!to!do!so.!Effectiveness!is!therefore!related!
to! actual! implementation! (number! of! cases! investigated! and! concluded),! as! well! capacity! for!
implementation! (the! competence! of! those! investigating! the! cases).! Each! of! these! dimensions! lies!
along!a!continuum;!so!too,!therefore,!does!effectiveness.!The!key!indicator!of!effectiveness!related!







which! relates! to! the!Weberian! ideal! of!meritHbased! recruitment! and!promotion.173! In! an! effective!
Comptroller!General,!each!employee!would!be!qualified!or!trained!to!do!his!or!her!job,!while!in!an!






and! services.! This! has! been! measured! on! the! macro! level! using! data! from! AfroBarometer’s!
Government!Effectiveness!Indicator,!which!tracks!government!handling!of!public!services.!Indicators!
of! corruption! can! serve! as! proxy! measures! of! effectiveness! as! well.! Corruption! relates! to!
effectiveness!because!it!creates!a!multiHtiered!system!in!which!those!who!can!afford!to!pay!bribes!
receive! service,! at! the! expense! of! those! who! cannot.! Corruption! may! increase! service! delivery!
effectiveness! at! an! individual! level,! but! this! does! not! aggregate! to! the! system! level;! rather,!
corruption! undermines! the! effectiveness! of! the! system.! Corruption! has! been! measured! on! the!
macro!level!using!data!from!the!Worldwide!Governance!Indicators!Control!of!Corruption!Index!(see!
Annex!I).!In!this!thesis,!the!types!of!subHnational!indicators!that!can!measure!different!dimensions!of!
effectiveness! include! citizen! perceptions! of! corruption,! access! to! justice,! and! professionalism.!
Several!civil!society!measures,!such!as!Proética’s!national!corruption!survey,!are!the!main!sources!of!
such!data!(see!Figures!4H7!in!Chapter!6).!











efficiency! is! bureaucratic! delay.175! Bureaucratic! delay! as! a! necessary! aspect! of! efficiency! is! selfH
explanatory,! and! on! the! macro! level! have! been! measured! using! data! from! the! Business!
Environmental! Risk! Intelligence’s!Operation!Risk! Index.! In! this! thesis,! efficiency! is!measured!using!
specific!institutional!indicators,!such!as!caseHprocessing!times!and!case!backlog!in!the!Judiciary!(see!
Table! 10! in! Chapter! 5).! The! institutions! themselves,! as! well! as! donor! reports! that! track! such!
indicators,!are!the!main!sources!of!such!data.!
Transparency!relates!to!the!openness!and!availability!of!information!related!to!government!
policies,! decisions,! and! information.! A! transparent! judicial! system! would! publish! its! judicial!
decisions,!and!its!annual!rates!of!preHtrial!detention,!for!example,!or!make!this!information!available!
upon! request! from! journalists! or! to! the! public! at! large.! A! nonHtransparent! Judiciary!would! fail! to!
provide!such! information,!or!provide!no!way! for!such! information!to!be!obtained.!Transparency! is!
also! a! continuum,! in! that! some! entities! are!more! or! less! transparent! than! others.! Key! questions!
related! to! transparency! are! how! the! number,! types! of,! and! citizen! access! to! documents! have!
changed! over! time,! and! whether! policies! and! decisions! have! become! more! accessible! to! citizen!
review! in! practice.! Key! indicators! of! transparency! can! therefore! be! the! amount! of! information!
published,! and! whether! the! organization! regularly! responds! to! such! requests! by! providing!
information.!Transparency!has!been!measured!at! the!macro! level!using!data! from!surveys!such!as!
the!OECD’s!Open!Government!Survey,!which!tracks!“the!cost!of!requesting!information,!the!extent!
to!which! information! is! published!proactively,! the! frequency!with!which! information! requests! are!
appealed!and!denied,!the!exemptions!frequently!used,!and!how!long!the!information!law!has!been!
in!place.”176!When!available,!similar!indicators!are!used!in!this!thesis,!as!are!indicators!that!track!the!
number! of! documents! made! publicly! available.! The! two! main! sources! for! such! indicators! are!









Accountability! relates! to! the!mechanisms!ensuring! that! the! activities! and! functions!of! the!
government!entity!are!subject! to!oversight!by!another!entity!or! individual.!Accountability! includes!
both!a!dimension!of!answerability,!which!“refers!to!the!obligation!of!the!government,!its!agencies,!
and!public!officials!to!provide!information!about!their!decisions!and!actions,!and!to!justify!them!to!
the! public! and! those! institutions! of! accountability! tasked! with! providing! oversight;”! and!
enforcement,!in!which!“the!public!or!the!institution!responsible!for!accountability!can!sanction!the!




governance,!accountability! lends! itself! to!dichotomization,! in! that!accountability!mechanisms! tend!
to!exist!or!not!exist;!this!would!be!one!key!indicator!of!accountability.!However,!the!functioning!of!
those! mechanisms! can! run! along! a! continuum,! in! that! in! the! early! stages! of! existence,! the!



















“whether”! and! “when.”! Explaining! how! or! why! these! outcomes! occurred,! particularly! within! the!
framework! of! endogenous! institutional! change! within! publicHsector! organizations,! does! not! lend!
itself!to!the!same!methods!of!variance.!!
From!a!historical!perspective,!institutional!change!is!a!process!that!is!rarely!linear;!rather,!it!
is! the! result! of! interactions! of! different! actors,! events,! interests,! and! choices.! These! choices! are!
often!pathHdependent,! in! that! they!are! shaped!and! limited!by!past!events!and!actions.!Therefore,!




inductively! identify! single! variables! or! configurations! of! variables! that! may! causally! relate! to! the!
dependent!variable.!!
Conceptualizing!how! this! thesis! frames!events,! actors,! and!actions! as!either!exogenous!or!
endogenous! to! the! organization! is! a! meaningful! exercise! in! further! clarifying! the! boundaries!
involved.!Exogenous!process!of! change!are! those!actions!driven!by!actors!outside!of! the! Judiciary!
and!Comptroller!General!that!potentially!affect!their!internal!dynamics,!such!as!a!new!law!passed!by!
the! Congress! that! restructures! the! Judiciary.! Endogenous! processes! of! change! occur!within! the!
institution,!such!as!new!policies!issued!by!the!head!of!the!organization!related!to!how!specific!rules!
are! implemented.! Changes! to! governance! rules! and! norms! within! the! institution,! such! as! what!
information! is! made! publicly! available! (transparency),! or! what! behaviors! are! sanctioned!
(corruption),! represent! the! dependent! variable! of! institutional! change.! These! changes,! however,!
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may! be! attributed! to! exogenous! factors,! endogenous! factors,! or! a! combination! of! both.! From! an!
agentHcentered!perspective,! the!endogenous!boundaries! include!all! those!employed! in!and!by! the!
Comptroller!General!and!the!Judiciary.!This!thesis!suggests!that!the!shift!toward!good!governance!in!
publicHsector!organizations! relates! to! the! intersection!of!both!exogenous!and!endogenous! factors,!
with! endogenous! factors! related! to! the! intersection! of! veto! possibilities! of! the! defenders! of! the!
status!quo,!the!level!of!discretion!in!the!interpretation!and!enforcement!of!the!rules,!and!the!nature!
of!change!agents.!This! intersection!is!an!ongoing,!shifting!organizational!process!of!actors,!actions,!
and! decisions! that! are! determined! by! and! affect! those! agents.! In! the! Comptroller! General,! for!
example,! the! realm! of! the! endogenous! would! include! investigators,! project! managers,! and! the!
Comptroller!General!himself,!and!endogenous!change!would!be!an!ongoing!process!involving!those!








changes! already! initiated!by! and! taking!place!within! the! institution.! For! example,! the!Comptroller!
General!may!have!already!decided!that!it!wants!to!increase!its!transparency;!this!would!be!part!of!
the!process!of!gradual,!endogenous!change.!The!World!Bank!may!offer!to!provide!technical!experts!
to! assist! the! Comptroller! General! with! updating! its! Web! site! to! facilitate! this! shift! toward!
transparency;! this! technical! assistance! would! be! exogenous,! but! would! align! with! endogenous!








Therefore,! rather! than!conceptualize! these!processes!by!defining! them!as!dimensions!and!
operationalizing!them!with!indicators,!this!thesis!uses!a!set!of!guiding!questions!in!its!review!of!the!
historical! record! to! understand! these! processes,! arrangements,! and! complex! phenomena.! In!
understanding!the!veto!possibilities!of! the!defenders!of! the!status!quo! in!an! institution,! it!asks! (1)!
Who! are! the! institutional! actors?! (2)! What! are! their! interests,! in! terms! of! governanceHrelated!
reforms,!and!how!have! these! changed!over! time?!and! (3)!What!organizational! features!may!have!
helped! shaped! or! constrain! these! interests! over! time?! In! understanding! the! discretion! in!
interpretation!and!enforcement!of!formal!rules,!this!thesis!also!asks!(4)!What!are!the!"rules!on!the!
books,"! in! terms! of! different! dimensions! of! good! governance?! (5)! How! narrowly! are! these! rules!
interpreted?! (6)! How! strictly! are! these! rules! enforced?! and! (7)!What! organizational! features!may!
have! helped! shape! or! constrain! these! differing! interpretations! and! applications! of! the! rules! over!
time?!In!analyzing!the!exogenous!forces!that!helped!shaped!institutional!change,!this!thesis!asks!(1)!
What! is! the! nature! of! the! relationship! between! the! Executive! and! the! Comptroller! General! and!







General! and! the! Judiciary?! and! finally! (6)! What! macroHlevel! historical! events! may! have! acted! as!
exogenous! shocks! or! critical! junctures! that! influenced! or! constrained! good! governanceHrelated!
policy!choices!within!the!Comptroller!General!and!the!Judiciary?!!
It!was!not!possible! to!answer!all!of! these!questions! for!each!case,!due! to! the! lack!of!data!






and! what! institutional! constraints! on! discretion! exist.! These! questions! did! serve! an! excellent!
purpose! in! that! they! guided! my! process! tracing! in! a! theoreticallyHdriven! way,! ensuring! that! the!
narrative!did!not!become!atheoretical!or!purely!historical.!!
Data!Collection!Methods!
While!this! thesis!attempted!to!collect!data! from!a!broad!array!of!sources,! the!overarching!
framework!from!which!the!data!collection!proceeded!were!the!major!good!governance!aid!projects!
that!were! implemented! in!the!Comptroller!General!and!the!Judiciary.!These!projects!were!used!as!
the! starting! point! for! finding! the! names! of! project! principals! in! the! donor! organizations! and!
government! institutions.! Quarterly! reports! and! other! project! documentation! typically! contained!
project!statistics!and!data!related!to!good!governance!indicators,!and!pointed!toward!explanations!
for! project! success! or! failure.! There! are! 10! major! projects! that! served! as! guides! for! the! data!
collection;! these! were! chosen! based! on! the! amount! of! funding! committed,! via! the! project,! to!
promoting!good!governance!in!the!Judiciary!and!Comptroller!General!(see!Annex!III).!As!previously!
mentioned,!in!analyzing!the!dynamics!of!aid!aimed!at!institutional!change,!there!is!an!iterative!shift!
between! levels!of!analysis,! from! the!project! level! to! the! institutional! level.! For!example,!a!project!




• Support! for! Justice! Reform! in! Peru!—! financed! by! the! European! Commission! (EC)! and!
implemented!by!the!German!Development!Cooperation!(GIZ)!
• Strengthening!Democratic! Institutions!and!Processes! in!Critical!Areas!—! financed!by! the!









• Access! to! Justice! in! Rural! Communities! –! financed! and! implemented! by! the! Swiss! State!
Secretariat!for!International!Affairs!(SECO)!
The!projects!implemented!in!the!Comptroller!General!are:!
• Strengthening!of! the!National! System!of! Fiscal! Control!—! financed!and! implemented!by!
GIZ!






and! documents,! including! donor! reports,! institutional! policies! and! memos,! and! media! reports.! I!
began! by! finding! documents! that! were! freely! available! online,! including! documents! on! donor!
Websites,! the! websites! of! the! Comptroller! General! and! judicial! institutions,! and! via! database!









reviewing! the!sources!used! in!policy!papers,! journal!articles,!and!donor!documents,!and!by!asking!
interviewees!if!they!knew!of!relevant!statistics!that!captured!mesoHlevel!data.!
The!limitations!of!this!secondary!source!data!are!twofold:!First,!comparable!coverage!across!
cases! is! not! possible,! both! in! terms! of! statistics! and! in! terms! of! documentation.! I! attempted! to!
mitigate!this!by!using!different!pieces!of!evidence!to!compare!similar!processes!and!outcomes,!and!
to! create! a! convincing! base! of! evidence! for! each! unit.! Second,! analyzing! the! content! of! both!

















































































triangulated!with! other! sources.! SemiHstructured! interviews!bridge! the! gap!between!unstructured!
and!structured!interviews:!Unstructured!interviews!utilize!wide,!openHended!questions!designed!to!
get! a! broad,! “insider”! perspective,! rather! than! test! an! explicit! hypothesis,! whereas! structured!










ideal! for! interviewing! elite! actors! in! the! government! and! international! aid! donor! community.! The!
assumption! is! that!elites!are!busy!professionals!whose! time! is! limited,!and! therefore!a! researcher!
must! have! a! certain! level! of! knowledge! about! the! topic! going! into! the! interview! in! order! to! ask!
focused!questions!related!to!different!aspects!of!the!topic.!However,!elites!often!have!personal!or!
professional! reasons! for!not! revealing! information,!particularly!negative! information.! Interspersing!
openHended! questions!with! closedHended! questions! allows! the! researcher! to! try! and! delve! into! a!
deeper! explanation! of! events! or! processes! that! may! draw! out! this! hidden! information.! Such!
explanations! often! come! once! the! researcher! has! been! able! to! establish! a! rapport! with! the!
interviewee.!It!is!for!this!reason,!and!the!fact!that!research!has!shown!that!the!alternative!mode!of!
telephone! interviewing!can!result! in!a! low!response!rate,! that!these! interviews!were!conducted! in!
person!in!Peru.181!
The! interviews!were! conducted! in! two! stages,! the! first! in! April! and!May! of! 2011! and! the!
second!in!June!through!October!of!2012.!The!first!stage!followed!the!logic!of!a!plausibility!probe,!in!
which! I! conducted!a!pilot! study! to! refine! the! theory!and!hypotheses,!get!a! sense!of!what! the!key!
variables! are! and! how! they! could! be! operationalized,! and! determine! if! the! chosen! case!would! fit!
prior! to! engaging! in! more! intensive! fieldwork.! During! this! phase,! the! focus! was! on! interviewing!
international!aid!donor!and!NGO!representatives!rather!than!Peruvian!government!officials.!Due!to!
prior!experience!working!on!good!governance!aid!projects! for!an! international!NGO,! I!was!able! to!
present! myself! as! a! credentialed! insider,! which! facilitated! access! to! interviewees.! These!











the!publicHsector!organizations! that! received!good!governance!aid,! the! specific!projects! that!were!






The!responses! from!this! first! stage!of! interviews!pointed! the!way! toward!possible! reasons!
for! change!or! stagnation! in!outcomes,!which!helped! inform!the!development!of!questions! for! the!
second!stage!of!interviews.!During!this!phase,!I!interviewed!current!and!former!government!officials!
who!work!or!worked!in!the!Judiciary!and!the!Comptroller!General,!identifying!these!interviewees!in!
a! similar! manner! to! those! identified! in! the! first! stage:! document! review,! cold! calls,! and! the!
aforementioned! snowball! technique.! The! research! was! aided! by! the! personal! connections! of! my!
research!assistant,!whose!father!worked!in!the!Comptroller!General,!and!who!was!therefore!able!to!
provide! both! relevant! information! as! an! interviewee! and! access! to! other! interviewees! in! the!
Comptroller!General.182!!
The!second!stage!of!interviews!consisted!of!13!individuals,!four!of!whom!worked!in!or!with!
judicial! institutions,! four! of! whom! worked! in! the! Comptroller! General,! and! five! of! whom! were!
government! or! NGO! good! governance! experts! who! monitored! these! institutions.! The! interview!
questions! (see! Annex! IV)! focused! on! the! processes! that! occurred! prior! to,! during,! and! after! the!













I! did! not! find! actually! conducting! the! interviews! themselves! to! be! challenging,! as! I! have!
strong!interview!skills!and!felt!I!was!able!to!develop!rapport!with!each!of!my!interviewees.!What!was!
challenging!was!setting!up!a!professional!research!effort!in!a!country!in!which!I!had!no!contacts,!and!
actually! scheduling! the! interviews! in! the! first! place.! Once! I! made! the! first! contact! with! a! donor!
agency,! and! proved! myself! by! asking! intelligent! questions,! this! opened! the! door! to! a! rapid!
succession!of!interview!with!other!donor!agencies.!As!a!result,!I!conducted!18!interviews!in!the!last!
three!weeks!of!my! first! stay! in!Peru,!whereas! the! first! four!weeks!consisted!of! trying! to!make!the!
first! contact.! This! proved! to! be! a! similar! situation!with! the! Peruvians! I! interviewed,! although! the!
snowball!technique!worked!much!more!slowly!with!those!individuals,!and!it!was!mostly!through!my!
research!assistant’s!dogged!persistence!in!continuing!to!call!the!institutions!to!set!up!interviews!that!




There! are! three! potential! limitations! of! this! method! of! data! collection! that! must! be!
acknowledged.!The!first!is!the!response!biases!that!present!themselves!in!the!interviewing!process.!
In! particular,! interviewees! often! do! not! want! to,! or! cannot,! share! certain! information! with! the!
interviewer,! and! they! tend! to! gloss! over! conflict! or! other! negative! aspects! of! the! topic! being!




during! the! interviews,! in! an! effort! to! be! responsive! to! appropriate! timing! of! what! followHup!
questions! to! ask,!when! to! stay! silent,! and!when! to! intervene.! I! also! reflected! at! the! end! of! each!
interview!on!whether!my!research!assistant!had!been!able!to!develop!a!rapport,!and!whether!she!
felt!the!interviewee!was!being!expansive!or!holding!back.!!











for! a! sample! size,! but! the! concept! of! sample! size! sufficiency! is! one! that!must! be! addressed.! The!
usual!advice!is!that!a!sample!is!adequate!once!one!has!reached!theoretical!saturation;!that!is,!when!
themes! or! trends! begin! to! be! repeated! by! interviewees! and! no! new! information! is! being!
presented.183! Several! empirical! studies!have! shown! that!between! four! and!20! interviews! tends! to!
achieve! this! saturation.! Based! on! 60! inHdepth! interviews! with! women! in! West! Africa,! one! study!
shows! that! 80! of! the! themes! for!which! they!were! coding! interview! responses!were! documented!
from! the! first! six! interviews,! and! an! additional! 20! themes! emerged! from! the! subsequent! 7! to! 12!
interviews.184!After!that,!there!was!a!diminishing!returnHtoHscale,!with!only!14!new!themes!emerging!









six! interviews.! The!authors! concluded! that! “small! samples! can!be! sufficient! in!providing! complete!
and!accurate! information!within!a!particular!cultural!context,!as! long!as! the!participants!possess!a!
certain! degree! of! expertise! about! the! domain! of! inquiry.”185! This! study! found! that! so! long! as! a!
certain! degree! of! expertise! existed! among! the! interviewees,! even! four! interviews! could! result! in!




I! analyzed! the! transcripts! of! interviews! and! primary! documents! using! a! coding! schema!
developed! in! the!Nvivo!software!platform.!This! involved!developing!codes! related! to! the!different!
indicators! established! for! the! dependent! variable,! and! related! to! the! questions! used! to! guide!
observations!related!to!the!process!discussed!in!the!section!on!independent!variables.!The!pieces!of!
text! in! which! relevant! information! appeared,! such! as! a! particular! passage! in! an! interview,! were!
coded! accordingly.! When! relevant,! more! than! one! code! was! applied! to! the! same! piece! of!

























Accountability! 19! Effectiveness! 28!
Adoption!of!Good!Governance!Norms! 10! Efficiency! 13!
Agenda!Setting! 19! Exogenous!Factors! 224!
Bureaucratic!Quality! 9! Exposure!to!Good!Governance!Norms! 12!








Citizen!Perceptions! 11! Leadership! 46!
Continuity! 16! Logic!of!Appropriateness! 4!
Critical!Junctures! 15! Logic!of!Consequences! 19!
Defenders!of!Status!Quo! 11! Mission,!Duty,!Sense!Of!Public!Service! 8!
DemandHDriven,!Ownership! 14! Other!Exogenous!Shocks! 4!
Differences!Among!Donors! 16! Path!Dependency! 12!
Discretion!in!Rule!Interpretation! 16! Peer!Mimicry,!Peer!Emulation! 7!
Effect!of!Executive!Interference! 22! Power!Dynamics! 43!
Effect!of!International!Aid!Donors! 159! PrincipleHBased!Rationale! 7!
Effect!of!NonHGovernmental!Actor! 34! SelfHInterest!Rationale! 18!








helps!establish,! for!each!case,!what! factors! connect!good!governance!aid! to! institutional!changes,!
and! how! these! factors! form! a! plausible! causal! explanation! of! the! relationship! between! the!
independent!variable!processes!and!the!dependent!variable!of!institutional!change.!ProcessHtracing,!
which! “involves! an! intensive! analysis! of! the! development! of! a! sequence! of! events! over! time,! is!
particularly! wellHsuited! to! the! task! of! uncovering! intervening! causal! mechanisms! and! exploring!
reciprocal!causation!and!endogeneity!effects.!By!focusing!on!what!Henry!Brady!et!al.188!call! ‘causal!
process! observations,’! case! study! researchers! get! inside! the! ‘black! box’! of! decision! making! and!








as! predicted! by! a! hypothesis…! or! else! that! hypothesis! must! be! amended.”190! In! this! thesis,! the!
hypothesis! deliberately! remains! underspecified! so! as! to! facilitate! the! development! of! a! more!
predictive!hypothesis.! This! goal!of! the!processHtracing! is! to! identify!multiple! causal!processes! that!
can!help!explain!divergent!outcomes!in!two!cases!with!similar!features.!!
Process! tracing! relies! upon! the! researcher! to! make! astute! observations! about! what! is!
relevant! and!not! relevant! in!historical! narratives.! Such!observations! can!be! facilitated!by! asking! a!
focused!series!of!theoretically!grounded!questions!about!what!happens!between!points!A!and!B!—!
that! is,!questions! that!help!unpack! the!black!box!of!causality! that! typically! remains!unobserved! in!
correlative!studies.!Asking!such!questions,!which!were!outlined!in!the!section!on!conceptualization!
of! the! independent! variables!discussed!earlier! in! this! chapter,! allows! the! researcher! to! “eliminate!
rival!causal!mechanisms”!and!“narrow!the!potential!list!of!causes.”191!This!type!of!questioning!lends!
itself! to!the!analytical!narrative!form!of!processHtracing,!which!“converts!a!historical!narrative! into!
an! analytical! causal! explanation! couched! in! explicit! theoretical! forms.…! The! explanation! may! be!
deliberately! selective,! focusing! on! what! are! thought! to! be! particularly! important! parts! of! an!
adequate!or!parsimonious!explanation;!or…!reflect!the!investigator’s!inability!to!specify…!all!steps!in!
a!hypothesized!process.”192!Process! tracing!also!allows! the!researcher! to!observe!causal!processes!












come! into! play,! as! policyHrelated! decisions! “taken! at! one! point! that! reduce! the! likelihood! of!
achieving!a!desired!policy!goal!may!be!recouped!by!changes!in!the!situation!that!give!policymakers!a!
second!chance!to!accomplish!a!desired!goal!or!to!avoid!a!poor!outcome.”193!!
There!are!numerous!benefits! to!using!process! tracing!as!a!method!of!data!analysis! in! this!
thesis.! First,! it! helps! determine! unknown! variables,! unclear! causal! processes,! and! underspecified!
links!between!variables!(i.e.!the!causal!chains),!which!is!a!main!goal!of!this!thesis.!Second,!it!can!help!
establish! or! validate! the! linkages! between! these! variables! and! processes,! and! the! dependent!
variable,! in! a! way! that! goes! beyond! a! simple! linear! explanation! of! causality! and! accounts! for!
complex,!multivariate! relationships.! This! includes! the! possibility! of! equifinality,! or!multiple! causal!




The! first! is! that! it! requires! the! researcher! to! be! able! to! “establish! an! uninterrupted! causal! path!
linking!the!putative!causes!to!the!observed!effects,!at!the!appropriate!level(s)!of!analysis!as!specified!
by! the! theory! being! tested.…! When! data! is! unavailable! or! theories! are! indeterminate,! processH
tracing!can!reach!only!provisional!conclusions.”194!I!attempted!to!mitigate!this!limitation!by!casting!
my! dataHgathering! net! far! and! wide,! and! incorporating! different! types! of! data! and! multiple!
observations! in!an!effort! to!have!both!sufficient!data! to!substantiate!all! the! links! in!a!causal!path,!
and!to!be!able!to!triangulate!that!data!to!strengthen!the!analysis.!The!second!potential!limitation!is!
that! equifinality! requires! the! researcher! to! assess! “whether! alternative! explanations! are!










A! crossHcase! comparison! allows! researchers! to! develop! “contingent! generalizations! about!
combinations! or! configurations! of! variables! that! constitute! theoretical! types.”196! Conducting!
processHtracing! for!more! than!one!case!allows!different!causal! chains,! factors,!and!variables! to!be!
mapped! out! in! different! instances! of! the! same! type! of! phenomenon.! These! cases! can! then! be!
compared! based! on! the! presence! or! absence! of! each! independent! variable! (or! configuration! of!
variables)! and! the! outcomes! of! the! dependent! variable.! This! crossHcase! comparison! helps! build! a!
typology!of!different!types!of!cases,!allowing!the!researcher!to!inductively!generate!a!theory!based!











periods.! These! organizations!may! have! differing! levels! of! good! governance! in! each! of! these! time!
periods,!leading!to!variation!on!the!dependent!variable.!Assuming!this!is!true,!one!can!then!map!out!
the!key! independent!variables!that!were!at!play! in!each!of!these!cases,!not! just! individually!but! in!
specified! conjunctions! or! configurations.! These! specified! conjunctions! or! configurations! are! case!
types;!typological!theories!map!out!multiple!types!of!cases!(often!the!most!common!types!of!cases,!






“specify! the! pathways! through!which! particular! types! [of! cases]! relate! to! specified! outcomes.”198!
This! is!consistent!with!historical!explanations! in!political! science!that!aim!to!specify!necessary!and!
sufficient! conditions! using! case! study! designs.! The! benefit! of! typological! theory! is! that! it! allows!
conjunctions! of! variables! to! be! analyzed,! rather! than! just! individual! variables.! Therefore,!






change,! and! good! governance! aid! in! particular,! in! terms! of! institutional! change.! The! interplay!
between!the!withinHcase!analysis!and!the!development!of!the!crossHcase!comparison!allows!for!both!
contextualization! of! relevant! causal! mechanisms! and! parsimony! of! identifying! necessary! and!
sufficient! conditions! related! to! the! phenomenon! being! investigated.! The! aim! in! doing! so! is! to!
understand! why! good! governanceHrelated! institutional! change! occurs! or! fails! to! occur,! and! how!
good!governance!aid!and!other!drivers!of!change!affect!these!processes.!
Conclusions!
This! chapter! outlined! the! overall!methodology! used! to! investigate! the! research! questions!
posed!in!this!thesis.!It!described!the!scope!conditions!used!to!select!the!two!main!units!for!which!a!
withinHcase!analysis!would!be! conducted,! and!outlined!how! these!units!would!be!analyzed!across!
three! time! periods,! resulting! in! a! total! of! six! cases! to! be! analyzed.! It! then! described! how! the!
dependent! variable!of! good!governance! is!defined! in! terms!of! a! systematized! concept! comprising!
four! dimensions,! and!explained!how! these!dimensions! could!be!operationalized! through!different!
indicators.! The! independent! variables! were! shown! to! be! complex! processes! that! could! not! be!





terms!of! their!boundedness!as!exogenous!and!endogenous!processes,!and!a! set!of!questions! that!
would!help!guide!the!collection!of!observations!related!to!these!processes!was!laid!out.!WithinHcase!
observations!will!be!made!using!processHtracing!techniques,!which!will!result!in!theoretically!driven!
analytical! narratives.! These! narratives! will! then! be! used! to! compare! across! cases! to! arrive! at! an!
inductive,! parsimonious! set! of! conclusions! based! on! an! analysis! of! necessary! and! sufficient!
conditions.!!
Chapter!5,!which!is!the!first!empirical!chapter,!employs!the!technique!of!process!tracing!in!
an! analysis! of! good! governance! changes! during! the! 1980s! and! the! 1990s.! It! shows! how! good!
governance!was!initially!weak! in!both!the!Judiciary!and!Comptroller!General! in!the!1980s,!but!was!
made! even! weaker! as! a! result! of! the! actions! taken! by! the! Fujimori! administration.! That! this!
undermining!of!an!already!weak!level!of!good!governance!could!occur!without!significant!opposition!


















at! good! governanceHrelated! institutional! change! during! this! era! that! were! driven! by! either! the!
Executive,!Congress,!or!NGOs!and!citizens.!In!addition,!good!governance!did!not!become!a!sector!of!
aid! until! the! midH1990s,! and! thus! there! were! no! donorHdriven! efforts! to! reform! Peru’s! political!
institutions! along! the! lines! of! good! governance.! In! terms! of! endogenously! driven! changes,! there!
were! some! good! governanceHrelated! reforms! driven! by! the! leader! of! the! Comptroller! General,!
specifically! in! terms! of! accountability! and! effectiveness.! However,! the! effectiveness! of! the!
Comptroller!General!was!also!undermined!by! the!ability!of! the!Executive! to! influence!which!cases!







vertical! accountability! to! allow! this! negative! influence! to! prevail.! In! the! Comptroller! General,! the!
moderate,! positive! influence! of! the! reformHoriented! leader!was! sufficient! to! result! in! some! good!
governanceHrelated! reforms,! but! the! absence! of! similar! proHreform! leadership! in! the! Judiciary!
resulted!in!a!low!level!of!good!governance.!!
This!chapter!then!traces!the!events!that!occurred!in!Peru!during!the!Fujimori!era,!from!1990!
to! 2000,! showing! that! there!was! a! significant! shift! in! Executive! actions! that! severely! undermined!
good! governance.! It! explains! how! the! events! of! Fujimori’s! 1992! selfHcoup! further! weakened!
mechanisms!of!horizontal!and!vertical!accountability,!and!hindered!the!ability!of!actors!within! the!
Comptroller! and! Judiciary! to!endogenously! drive! good!governance! reforms! (whether!or! not! these!
internal!actors!chose!to!do!so).!In!the!case!of!the!Comptroller!General,!this!resulted!in!institutional!
shifts! to!a! lower! level!of!good!governance.!Whatever!aspects!of!good!governance!were!present! in!
the! Judiciary! were! weakened! by! the! strong,! negative! influence! of! Executive! actions.! In! this!





Economic! crises! and! violent! struggle! were! the! dominant! concerns! of! the! Peruvian!
government! and! citizens! during! the! 1980s.! In! response! to! these! crises,! mechanisms! of! vertical!
accountability! grew! in! strength! –! but! were! not! focused! on! good! governance! as! a! priority.!
Mechanisms!of!horizontal!accountability!were!also!not!focused!on!driving!good!governanceHrelated!
institutional! changes,! and! did! little! to! keep! the! Executive! from! engaging! in! the! corruption! and!
cronyism! that! had! long! dominated! Executive! leadership! styles! (see! Chapter! 2).! However,!
mechanisms!of!horizontal!accountability,!while!they!failed!to!do!much!about!the!quotidian!practices!
contributing! to! systematic! political! patronage! and! nepotism,! were! able! to! block! particularly!
egregious! Executive! efforts! to! weaken! the! state.! Both! the! second! presidency! of! Terry! Belaúnde!
116!
!
(1980! to! 1985)! and! the! first! presidency! of! Alan! García! (1985! to! 1990)!were! characterized! by! the!
Executive’s! mostly! unchecked! ability! to! use! the! public! administration! to! reward! loyalists! and!
facilitate! patronage,! installing! cronies! in! public! positions,! “swelling! public! payrolls,”! and! pushing!
forward!with!questionable!public!works!projects.199!While!this!type!of!corruption!might!have!raised!
the! ire! of! citizens! in! other! circumstances,! the! economic! shocks! related! to! the!world! recession! of!
1981! to! 1983! and! the! Mexico! debt! crisis! in! 1982! meant! that! citizens’! priorities! lay! with! the!
worsening!economy.200!In!1982,!GDP!declined!by!13!percent!in!1983,!the!worst!singleHyear!decline!in!
the!postHWWII!era.!In!the!meantime,!the!government!failed!to!find!investors!for!the!majority!of!the!
stateHowned! enterprises! (SOEs),! a! situation! exacerbated! by! Peru’s! suspension! of! debt! payments,!




García! pursued! populist! strategies! designed! to! appease! voters! and! fix! the! economy.! He!
increased! real!wages,! cut! taxes,! reduced! interest! rates,! froze! prices,! and! devalued! currency! in! an!
effort! to! stimulate! demand.! This! strategy! proved! unsustainable,! and! as! foreign! reserves! were!
exhausted! and! the! trade! deficit! grew,! García! was! forced! to! default! on! all! of! Peru’s! debt.203! An!
attempt! in! 1987! to! nationalize! the! private! banking! system! was! met! with! violent! strikes,! the!
resignation!of! several!ministers,! the! ire! of! elites,! and! resistance! in! Congress.! This! is! one! sign! that!
mechanisms!of!horizontal!accountability!did!keep!Executive!power!in!check!to!some!degree.!
García!quickly!reversed!course!on!this!decision,!imposing!austerity!measures!in!1988.!While!












reserves! grew! —! it! was! not! enough! to! compensate! for! the! consequences! of! decades! of! poor!
economic!governance.204!By!1990,!GDP!had!dropped!28!percent,!real!wages!fell!60!percent,!public!
debt! grew! to!more! than! $23! billion,205! public! health! and! education! spending! fell! 30! percent,! the!
government!had!defaulted!on!$2!billion!in!IMF!and!foreign!loans,!and!inflation!topped!almost!7,000!
percent.206!!
Partly! in! response! to! this! continued!economic! chaos,! antiHgovernment! groups! such! as! the!
Shining! Path,! which! had! started! as! protest!movements,! grew! increasingly! violent! in! their! tactics,!
creating! a! culture! of! fear! that! extended! from! the! countryside! to! Lima.! The! Shining! Path’s! fervent!
version!of!Maoist! revolutionary! ideology!—!which! could!be! summed!up!as! “if! you’re!not!with!us,!
you’re! against! us”! —! meant! that! it! justified! the! massacre! and! assassination! of! peasants! and!
community!organizers.!Fueled!by!profits!from!the!cocaine!trade!in!the!northern!highlands!of!Peru,!





García,! increasingly! put!major! parts! of! the! country! under! emergency! rule.! By! the! end! of! García’s!
presidency! in! 1990,! oneHthird! of! the! country!—!a! full! 50! percent! of! the! population!—!was! under!
emergency! rule,! with! civil! liberties! suspended.! By! that! point,! the! war! with! the! Shining! Path! had!














Given! this! state! of! chaos,! it! is! perhaps! not! surprising! that! the! lack! of! good! governanceH
related! reforms! persisted.! García! did! nothing! to! shake! up! the! order! of! institutions,! and! repeated!
previous! leaders’! patterns! of! clientelism! and! corruption.! If! anything,! political! institutions! were!
severely!weakened!under!García!because!of!these!dual!crises.!The!Judiciary,!which!was!already!rife!
with! political! interference! and! corruption,! was! further! intimidated! by! the! Shining! Path! and! was!
therefore!unable! to!exercise!consistent!authority.209! Low!salaries! that! resulted! from!the!economic!




Path! became! a! feature! of! citizen! protests! as! well.! Protests! were! the! main! means! of! voicing!
complaints,! because! institutions! like! the! Congress! failed! to! represent! the! majority! of! Peruvians.!
Congress! was! viewed! as! weak! due! to! a! long! history! of! fractured! political! parties! that! served! as!
vehicles!for!elite!individuals!to!gain!and!hold!power.!These!protests!were!largely!focused!on!issues!of!
economic! justice! and! equality,! rather! than! on! issues! of! corruption! or! effectiveness! in! political!
institutions.! In!addition,! the!periodic! corruption! scandals! that! led! to! these!protests,!particularly! in!















General! or! Supreme! Audit! Institution! in! some! countries)! is! to! monitor! and! audit! government!
expenditures,!to! investigate!cases!of! fraud,!and!to!ensure!that!public!procurement!procedures!are!
followed.! There! are! several! models! of! audit! systems:! the! Napoleonic/judicial! model,! the!
Westminster! model,! and! the! Board! system.! Peru’s! Comptroller! follows! the!Westminster! system,!
similar! to! that! of! the!United! Kingdom!and!United! States,! in!which! the! Comptroller! (Auditor)! is! in!
charge!of!and!responsible!for!the!operations!of!the!entire!Comptroller!General,! including!ensuring!
that!there!is!a!professional!audit!staff!in!place.!In!Peru,!the!Comptroller!is!appointed!to!a!sevenHyear!
term.! The! organization! is! horizontally! accountable! to! Congress! through! periodic! reporting! on! the!
financial!operations!and!expenditures!of!government!entities,!and!“generally,!there!is!less!emphasis!
on!compliance,!although!compliance!issues!are!not!ignored!if!they!are!identified.”211!Typically,!both!
financial! audits,! which! examine! the! accuracy! of! government! agencies’! accounts! of! how! state!
budgets! funds! were! spent,! and! compliance! audits,! which! ensure! that! funds! were! spent! in!










authorized!—!were!actually! spent!by! the!government!agencies! to!which! they!were!allocated.! The!







and!able!to!hold!the![E]xecutive!to!account.!Where! legislatures!are!weak,!the!model! is! ineffective,!
regardless!of!the!state!of!the![Comptroller!General’s!Office,!and]!the!system!breaks!down.”212!Thus!




the! 1980s! (see! the! Senate! reaction! to! the! Bank! of! the! Nation! scandal! in! the! next! paragraph),!
although! again! the! base! of! evidence! is! admittedly! thinner! for! this! decade! than! for! subsequent!
decades.! In! the! 1980s,! the! dual! crises! of! economic! instability! and! the!war! with! the! Shining! Path!
preoccupied! Peruvians! as! the! most! significant! challenges! facing! the! country.! While! government!
inefficiency,!bureaucratic! ineffectiveness,! and! corruption!were!grumbled!about,! particularly! in! the!
wake!of!major!scandals,!none!of! these! factors!were!considered!the!top!three!problems! facing! the!
country.214! The! concept! of! good! governance! had! not! become! a!widely! diffused! global! norm,! and!
considering! all! of! these! issues! alongside! transparency! and! accountability! under! the! umbrella! of!
improving!governance,!they!were!not!preoccupations!for!Peruvian!legislators,!the!public,!NGOs,!or!
researchers.215! As! a! consequence,! establishing! quantitative! baseline! levels! of! transparency,!
accountability,! effectiveness,! and! efficiency! of! the! Comptroller! General! prior! to! 2000! poses! a!
challenge,! particularly! in! understanding! how!well! the! Comptroller!General! did! its! job! prior! to! the!




















observations! of! public! institutions! as! a! whole! at! that! time! in! Peru,! which! are! drawn! together! to!
provide!an!overall!impression!of!the!Comptroller!General.!!
For! example,! in! terms! of! transparency,! there! are! no! indications! that! transparency! was! a!
priority! of! the! Executive! or! the! Comptroller! General! leadership! in! the! 1980s,! in! terms! of! reports!
being!made!publicly! available.216!However,! as! noted!below,! there! is! at! least! one!observation!of! a!
memo! being! published! that! is! damaging! to! the! state,! suggesting! some! transparency! and!
independence!from!the!Executive.!(As!Chapter!6!shows,!this!move!toward!transparency!was!greatly!
facilitated!by!technology!and!the!ability!to!publish!information!on!Web!portals.)!!
While! the! efficiency! of! the! Comptroller! General! is! another! black! hole! of! information! for!
which! a! quantitative! estimate! is! impossible! to! ascertain,! there! are! some! indicators! that! the!
Comptroller!General!was!effective!and!accountable! in!terms!of! investigating!claims!of!government!
waste! and! fraud,! and! that! the! Comptroller! General! had! a! fair! amount! of! independence! to! so!
investigate!such!claims.!For!example,!in!November!of!1984,!the!Comptroller!General!issued!a!report!
that!the!head!of!Peru’s!paramilitary!civil!guard!misused!more!than!$600!million,!transferring!money!
meant! for!police!equipment!and!stations! from!the!stateHowned!Bank!of! the!Nation!to! two!private!
banks.!Based!on!this!report,!which!caused!a!scandal!for!President!Belaúnde,!the!Senate!removed!Lt.!
Gen.! Juan! Balaguer! from! his! position.217! The! Comptroller! at! this! time,! Miguel! Cussianovich,! was!
considered!an!extremely!professional!and!technical!Comptroller,!and!oversaw!the!hiring!and!training!
of! more! than! 460! Comptroller! General! auditors.218! Despite! his! affiliation! with! Belaúnde’s! Accion!
Popular! party,! Cussianovich! initiated! several! investigations! that!were! potentially! damaging! to! the!






















in! power.!While! serving! as! Comptroller,! Aurea! Saenz! headed! an! investigation! of! alleged! theft! by!
police!of!goods!worth!$100!million!over!13!years,!and!exposed!the!bribery!that!occurred!between!
public! officials! and! the! Southern! Peru! Copper! Corporation! in! negotiating! water! usage! rights.223!
However,! these! two! investigations! took! place! after! the! end! of! García’s! presidency,! which! was!
considered!by!Peruvians!to!be!the!second!most!corrupt!besides!Fujimori’s.224!!
While!Aurea!Saenz!may!have!lacked!independence,!there!does!not!seem!to!be!a!question!of!
her! competence,! as! she! subsequently! served! as! Chairwoman! of! the! Statutes! Committee! for!






















to! investigate! were! influenced! by! the! relationship! between! the! Comptroller! General! and! the!
Executive! branch,! thus! indicating! a! horizontal! accountability! deficiency.! When! the! Comptroller’s!
office! was! in! alignment! with! the! Executive,! it! was! less! likely! to! initiate! investigations! that! might!
politically!damage!the!president.!When!it!was!in!opposition,!this!constraint!was!lifted.!In!some!cases,!










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a$ different$ function.$ The$ judicial$ branch$ of$ government,$made$ up$ of$ judges$ and$ court$ personnel,$
which$ decides$ all$ civil$ and$ criminal$ cases,$ is$ called$ the$ Poder$ Judicial.$ The$ Supreme$ Court$ is$ the$




Tribunal$ Constitucional,$which$ rules$ on$questions$of$ the$ constitutionality$ of$ laws$ and$ treaties$ and$
serves$as$the$ultimate$authority$on$violations$of$constitutional$rights;$and$the$electoral$court$(Jurado$
Nacional$de$Elecciones$or$ JNE),$which$decides$on$ issues$ related$to$ issues$such$as$political$party$or$
presidential$ candidate$ registrations.226$ The$ Ministry$ of$ Justice$ and$ Human$ Rights$ (MINJUS)$ is$ in$
charge$ of$ disseminating$ and$ coordinating$ national$ law,$ including$ developing$ and$ implementing$
public$ policies$ that$ increase$ access$ to$ justice$ and$ ensure$ citizen$ protection$ from$ human$ rights$
abuses;$ giving$ legal$ advice$ to$ the$ Executive$ branch;$ providing$ funding$ for$ the$ administration$ and$
operation$ of$ courts;$ coordinating$ policies$ and$ procedures$ related$ to$ the$ management$ and$
administration$ of$ the$ legal$ system$ (including$ oversight$ of$ prosecutors$ and$ public$ defenders);$ and$
strengthening$ the$ rule$ of$ law.227$MINJUS$ was$ established$ as$ an$ autonomous$ body$ of$ the$ judicial$
















autonomy$ and$ independence,$ selection$ of$ magistrates$ was$ conducted$ based$ on$ patronage$ and$
nepotism,$resulting$in$the$selection$of$poorly$qualified$judges$who$were$deeply$resistant$to$change$
once$ they$were$ part$ of$ the$ system,$ and$ continued$ to$ utilize$ outdated$ procedures$ and$ engage$ in$
petty$corruption.229$
The$ result$ was$ that$ citizens$ held$ the$ Judiciary$ in$ extremely$ low$ regard$ in$ the$ 1980s,$
considering$ it$extremely$ inefficient,$with$poorlybmanaged$courts$doing$ little$to$clear$the$significant$
backlog$of$cases$or$speed$up$incessant$delays$in$processing$time$and$administrative$procedures.230$In$
cases$where$corruption$might$speed$up$processes,$the$cost$of$bribery$created$a$system$of$unequal$
access$ to$ justice$ for$ the$ poor,$who$were$ further$ disadvantaged$ by$ the$ lack$ of$ an$ effective$ public$
defense$system.231$This$in$turn$had$consequences$for$the$effectiveness$of$the$Judiciary$in$providing$
its$ public$ service,$ which$ was$ further$ hampered$ by$ both$ physical$ limitations,$ such$ as$ crumbling$
infrastructures,$as$well$as$human$capital$limitations$extending$from$ineffective$police$investigations$
and$criminal$prosecutions$to$poorly$educated$judges$who$“appeared$to$a$skeptical$public$to$dwell$on$

















an$ institution$ that$ delivered$ the$ intended$ services,$ and$ thus$ often$ optedbout$ of$ pursuing$ formal$




reform$ the$ Judiciary$ along$ the$ lines$ of$ (mainly$ horizontal)$ accountability,$ efficiency,$ and$
effectiveness,$many$ of$ which$were$ efforts$ initiated$ by$ the$ Executive.$ That$ the$ Executive$was$ the$
driver$ of$ change$ may$ help$ explain$ why$ these$ efforts$ tended$ to$ fail.$ Most$ of$ them$ focused$ on$
changing$ the$ system$ of$ judicial$ appointment,$ or$ purging$ the$ Judiciary$ of$ “corrupt”$ judges.$ Often,$
these$were$ simply$ efforts$ by$ the$ Executive$ to$ rid$ the$ Judiciary$ of$ the$ appointments$made$ by$ his$
predecessor.$Both$Belaúnde$and$García$vowed$to$create$an$independent$judiciary,$with$García$going$





Revolutionary$Movement$ (MRTA)$ guerrilla$ activity$ increased$ during$ the$ 1980s,$ the$ government’s$
response$ became$ increasingly$ hostile,$ and$ patterns$ of$ human$ rights$ abuses,$ carried$ out$ by$ the$
military$but$presumably$with$the$consent$of$the$Executive,$increased.$García$wielded$his$influence$to$
















antibcorruption$ subsystem$ and$ could$ have$ been$ promoted$ to$ a$ criminal$ chamber.$
Instead$I$was$sent$back$to$a$regular$criminal$court.$My$problem$was$that$in$the$1980s$I$
was$ a$ highbranking$ clerk$ in$ a$ special$ Supreme$ Court$ panel$ that$ tried$ four$ of$ García’s$
ministers.$ As$ a$ result,$ for$ APRA$ I$ am$ a$ persona$ non$ grata.$ These$ are$ the$ informal$
mechanisms$ that$ do$ not$ kick$ you$ out$ of$ the$ game,$ but$make$ your$ life$ really$ difficult.$
They$are$the$ones$who$decide$on$your$professional$future.$When$I$was$about$to$begin$
investigating$the$El$Fronton$case,$they$sent$me$to$another$court.$They$obviously$kn[e]w$




he$had$ less$ success$doing$ so$when$ it$ came$ to$ the$economy.$Siding$with$ the$majority$of$Peruvians$
who$ opposed$ García’s$ plan$ to$ nationalize$ the$ banks,$ the$ Judiciary$ issued$ injunctions$ against$ the$
García$administration’s$takeover.$Approximately$24$judicial$challenges$to$the$measure$were$filed$in$
the$courts,$with$the$ultimate$decision$resting$with$the$Supreme$Court.239$García$fought$back$against$
a$ court$ ruling$ that$ temporarily$ suspended$ the$ takeover,$ while$ it$ mulled$ over$ whether$ the$ move$























leaders$meant$ it$was$critically$hampered$ in$ its$ capacity$and$willingness$ to$prosecute$cases$against$
suspected$terrorists.241$At$the$lower$levels,$the$inefficiency,$ineffectiveness,$and$unresponsiveness$of$
the$courts$to$Peruvian$citizens$—$particularly$poor,$indigenous$Peruvians$—$meant$that$the$majority$
of$ people$ essentially$ circumvented$ using$ the$ courts$ as$ an$ institution$ of$ justice.$ By$ the$ time$ of$
Fujimori’s$autogolpe$ in$1992,$“[s]hort$of$resources,$riddled$with$corruption,$constrained$by$archaic$
procedures$ designed$ for$ an$ epoch$ long$ past,$ beset$ by$ conflicts$ between$ and$ within$ its$ major$
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Despite# the# fact# that# by# 1990# Peru# could# arguably# be# described# as# a# failed# state,# García#
managed# to# serve# out# his# term,# and# Alberto# Fujimori# was# elected# president# via# free# and# fair#
elections.#Although#he# campaigned#on#a#platform# that# rejected#neoliberalism,#once#he# took#office#
Fujimori# instituted# an# extreme# form# of# shock# therapy# in# an# effort# to# restore# Peru’s# international#
credit# rating# and# begin# receiving# loans# and# foreign# investment# again.# Although# he# did# not# have# a#
Congressional# majority,# Fujimori# was# able# to# utilize# the# executive# power# granted# by# the# 1979#
Constitution# to# institute# liberalization# and# stabilization# measures# (which# both# supporters# and#




Fujishock#had#a#dramatic# effect#on#poor#Peruvians,# as#between#1990# to#1992# real# income#
dropped#by#oneOthird,#one#million#workers#lost#their#jobs,#public#sector#wages#dropped#60#percent,#
private#sector#wages#dropped#40#percent,#consumption#dropped#24#percent,#and#levels#of#inequality#
and# poverty# rose.# However,# “Fujimori's# cultivation# of# the# army# was# widely# seen# as# a# kind# of#
insurance#policy,# providing# an# ally# in# case#his# economic# adjustment# leads# to#widespread#disorder.#
But#despite#the#hardships#the#program#has#caused#—#the#minimum#wage#[was]#still#only#about#$60#a#











admiration# of# the# caudillo245# spirit# Fujimori# invoked# in# taking# strong,# decisive# action# to# fix# the#
economy.246##
Fujimori#used#his#strongman#appeal#in#his#fight#against#the#Shining#Path,#appointing#officers#
loyal# to# him# to# top# posts# in# the#military.# One# of# these#measures# included# providing# weapons# to#
peasants# so# that# they# could# directly# take# up# arms# against# the# Shining# Path,# a# tactic# that# proved#
extremely# effective.# As# his# economic# policies# started# to# bring#money# from# the# IFIs# back# into# the#
Peruvian# economy,# and# the# counterinsurgency# strategies# started# to# work# to# reduce# violence,#
Fujimori# became# increasingly# arrogant.# In# turn,# Congress# became# increasingly# frustrated# with#
Fujimori’s#overuse#of#executive#privilege,#which#started#to#exceed#Congressional#authority.#The#stage#
was# thus# set# for# a# showdown#between# a# Congress# the#president# considered#obstructionist,# and# a#
president#that#the#Congress#considered#increasingly#authoritarian.247##
The$Self;Coup$and$State$Capture$
On#April#5,#1992,#Fujimori# seized#even#greater#power# in#an#selfOcoup# that#was#exceedingly#
similar# to# the# one# staged# by# Augusto# Leguía# 73# years# earlier# (see# Chapter# 2).# He# suspended# the#





seemed# imminent# thanks# to# a# perpetually# deadlocked# Congress# and# a# corrupt# Judiciary.# Having#













in# the# context# of# the# fact# that# by# 1992,# there# was# a# sharp# decline# in# inflation,# so# Fujishock# was#




Fujimori’s# authoritarian# rule# may# have# prevailed,# if# not# for# international# outcry,# as# the#
United#States,#Japan,#and#Spain#suspended#aid#and#threatened#sanctions.#In#the#end,#Fujimori’s#need#
for# international# funding#to#continue#Peru#along# its#solid#economic#path#forced#him#to#reOestablish#
the#basic#mechanisms#of#democracy.#Within#a#month,#Fujimori#announced#that#he#was# reinstating#
Congress,# would# hold# municipal# elections,# and# would# work# with# Congress# to# rewrite# the#






Unfortunately,# the# international# community’s# lack# of# scrutiny# of# the# governance# of# these#
institutions,#combined#with#Fujimori’s#popular#appeal,#allowed#him#to#recreate#political# institutions#




















populated#with#officials# loyal# to# Fujimori,# had# its# rules#modified# so# that# a# fourOfifths#majority#was#
required# for# new# resolutions# to# be# adopted,# making# future# electoral# rulings# against# Fujimori#
unlikely.251# Fujimori# also# had# the# military# on# his# side,# especially# after# he# created# secret# military#
tribunals# in# which# hooded# judges# tried# suspected# terrorists.# Efforts# by# Congress# to# question# the#
legality#of# these# trials,# or# to# investigate#human# rights# violations#perpetrated#by# the#military,#were#
blocked.252#A#series#of#amnesty#laws#were#proposed#in#1995#pardoning#any#military,#police,#or#civilian#
authority# member# responsible# for# human# rights# violations# between# 1980# and# 1995;# Congress#
supported# the# passage# of# these# laws.# Any# attempts# by# the# Judiciary# to# bring# charges# against#
members#of# the#military#were#assumed#by# the#military#courts,#despite#them#having#no# jurisdiction#
over# the# cases.# The# ensuing# military# proceedings# typically# involved# fraudulent# legal# tactics# and#
resulted#in#dismissals#or#light#sentences.253#Furthermore,#such#attempts#were#few#and#far#between,#
given#the#ability#of#the#Fujimori#regime#to#dismiss#judges#at#will#based#on#political#motivation.##













intelligence,# Vladimir# Montesinos.# Montesinos# habitually# bribed# members# of# Congress# and# the#
Judiciary# to# produce# the# political# outcomes# that# the# Executive# branch# desired,# making# monthly#
payments# to# judges# and# ensuring# that# any# legal# investigations# never# led# to# prosecutions.254# To#
ensure#compliance,#Montesinos#taped#all#of#the#meetings#in#which#he#procured#favors#in#exchange#





the#media#and#over# the#political# institutions# that#usually# serve#as#checks#on#executive#power.#This#
illustrates#the#depth#to#which#horizontal#accountability#was#weakened#in#this#era.#
That#much#of#Fujimori’s#political#manipulation#remained#hidden#for#so# long#was#the#key#to#




economic#and#political# stability#was#a# rare#accomplishment# for#a#Peruvian#president,# and#Fujimori#
handily#won# the# 1995# election#—#which#went# uncontested# by# international# observers# for# several#
reasons:#First,#victory#was#overwhelming,#and#declared#fair#after#being#observed#by#the#Organization#
of#American#States#(OAS)#election#mission#and#local#NGO#Transparencia.#Only# later#was# it#revealed#
















economy# worsened# slightly,# leading# to# a# decline# in# his# popularity,# which# he# attempted# to#
compensate# for# by# launching# new# social# welfare# programs.258# Second,# despite# the# pervasive#
corruption#perpetrated#by#Fujimori#and#Montesinos,#there#were#some#islands#of#independence,#such#
as#media#activists#who# refused# to#be# intimidated.#These#activists#were# increasingly#able# to#expose#
allegations# of# human# rights# abuses# perpetrated# by# the#military,#which# called# Fujimori’s# actions# as#
Executive#into#question.#The#most#damning#event#was#Fujimori’s#bid#for#reOelection,#beginning#with#
his#audacious#argument#that#his#first#term#in#office#did#not#count#toward#the#twoOterm#presidential#
limit,# since# that# limit# was# enacted# while# he# was# in# office.259# Fujimori’s# rubberOstamp# Congress#
approved#this#measure,#and#Fujimori#ostensibly#began#collecting#voter#signatures#to#get#his#name#on#
the#ballot.#However,# it#emerged# that# these# signatures#had#been# falsified,#which#provoked#outrage#
among#citizens#and#in#the#media.#Given#his#other#abuses#of#democracy,#it#seems#odd#that#this#should#
cause#a# scandal.#The#difference# is# that# the#network#of#bribes#was# largely#hidden,#and#violated# the#
spirit#of#the#law,#whereas#the#signature#falsification#scandal#was#exposed,#and#was#a#violation#of#the#
actual# letter# of# law#—# a# distinction# that# raised# domestic# ire# and# was# particularly# worrisome# for#


















Fujimori# uneasily# governed#Peru# for# the#next# few#months,# and#might#have#weathered# the#
ongoing#protests# against# the# fraudulent# election#had# it# not#been# for# the#exposure#of#Montesinos’#
corruption#ring.#In#September#2000,#a#television#station#broadcast#a#video#of#Montesinos#bribing#an#
opposition# Congressman.# Broadcasts# of# subsequent# videos# showed# that# Fujimori# and#Montesinos#
(dubbed#the#“Vladivideos”)#had#diverted#state#funds#to#offshore#bank#accounts#by#selling#arms#and#
siphoning#money# from# the# armed# forces#budget;# one#estimate# suggests# that# the# amount# the# two#
stole#from#the#state#was#as#high#as#$1.5#billion.262##
To#say#that#a#furor#ensued#is#an#understatement.#Even#as#they#maintained#a#stoic#cynicism#
about# the# system# of# nepotism# and# patronage# in# their# country,# the# extent# of# Fujimori# and#
Montesinos’# web# of# bribery# and# theft# of# state# assets# deeply# shocked# the# Peruvian# population.#
Although#Fujimori# tried# to#distance#himself# from#Montesinos#and# the#scandal,# it#was#clear# that#he#
was#losing#the#support#of#the#military,#the#Congress,#and#the#Peruvian#people.#Sensing#that#the#end#
was#near#for#his#regime,#Fujimori#departed#for#an#APEC#summit#in#Brunei#and,#instead#of#returning#to#




actions#of# the#media# in#exposing# the#Vladivideos,# show#that#mechanisms#of#vertical#accountability#


















the# Judiciary# and# inefficiency# of# Congress# and# other# government# institutions# as# impeding# Peru’s#




years# remaining# in# her# sevenOyear# appointment.# This# is# perhaps# not# surprising,# given# that# Aurea#








left# only# 80# auditors# to#monitor# and# investigate# government# expenditures# in# all# of# Peru,# and# the#
result# of# this# dramatic# downsizing# was# a# significant# reduction# in# the# Comptroller# General’s#
operational# capacity.266# The#majority# of# those# fired#were# hired# and# trained# during# the# 1980O1987#
leadership# of# Comptroller# Miguel# Cussianovich,# who# focused# on# increasing# the# technical# skill,#
capacity,#and#professionalization#of#the#Comptroller#General#staff.267#Although#a#budget#law#passed#













the# Comptroller# General’s# Office.268# This# indicates# that# one# of# the# key# dimensions# of# good#
governance,# effectiveness,# suffered# in# the# Comptroller# General# during# the# Fujimori# era# due# to#
declining#institution#capacity.#
Another#factor#that#decreased#the#effectiveness#of#the#Comptroller#General#was#the#changes#
in# the# legal# framework# governing# its# mandate.269# Under# Article# 10# of# the# 1933# Constitution,# the#
Comptroller# General# was# granted# administrative# autonomy# and# functional# independence.#
Subsequent# decree# laws# outlined# the# powers# and# duties# of# auditors,# and# Decree# Law# 19039#
established# the# National# System# of# Control,# stating# that# the# Comptroller# General# was# Peru’s#
Supreme#Audit#Institution,#and#that#the#Comptroller#was#a#Minister#of#State.#Article#146#of#the#1979#






in# its# investigations# and# had# sanctioning# capacity# within# its# jurisdictional# function.# As# the# sole,#
centralized# autonomous# body# that# constituted# the# National# System# of# Control,# the# Comptroller#
General#therefore#had#wideOranging#powers#of#supervision.#
This# legal# framework# was# undermined# in# 1992# with# Decree# Law# 26162,# which# repealed#
Decree#Law#19039.#Decree#Law#26162#explicitly#lays#out#the#powers,#principles,#and#criteria#that#can#













the# same.# However,# the# Comptroller# General’s# powers# were# devolved# and# shared# among# other#
institutions#in#the#National#Control#System,#and#its#ability#to#control#state#expenditures#was#reduced.#
The#Comptroller#General#could#no#longer#audit#expenditures#in#a#number#of#companies#in#which#the#
government# was# a# majority# shareholder,# which# allowed# corruption# to# flourish# due# to# a# lack# of#
oversight.271#The#same# lack#of#oversight#was#present# in#Peru’s#handling#of# its# internal#and#external#
indebtedness:# Under# the# previous# legal# framework,# the# Comptroller# General# had# a# mandate# to#
advise#the#government#on#its#negotiations#and#renegotiations#of#debt,#but#this#mandate#was#deleted#
in# the#new# legal# framework.272# In# terms#of# its# jurisdictional#purview,# the#Comptroller#General#now#
was#considered#only#a#firstOinstance#control#entity#in#administrative#litigation#proceedings,#with#the#
judiciary#given#power#over#the#secondO#and#lastOinstance#proceedings.273#Thus,#the#1992O1993#legal#
changes# transformed# the# Comptroller# General# from# an# organization# with# a# strong# sanctioning#
capacity#to#one#that#was#exclusively#oriented#to#monitoring#due#process,274#thereby#reducing#both#its#
effectiveness# as# an# audit# institution# and# its# ability# to# hold# the# government# accountable# to# the#
Peruvian#people#over#state#expenditures.#
Fujimori’s# justification# for# the# legal# changes# seemed# valid# on# the# surface:# The# excessive,#
centralized#power#in#the#Comptroller#General#allowed#corruption#to#flourish#among#its#auditors,#and#
audits#were#often#used#as#a#political#weapon.#Therefore,#only#a#radical#reorganization#and#change#to#
the# legal# framework#of# the#Comptroller#General#could# restore# it#as#a#proper# institution#of#control.#
Yet# less#than#a#year#after#taking#her#post,#Comptroller#Drago#resigned,#saying#that#she#had#neither#










60,000# troy# ounces# of# gold# were# missing# from# the# Central# Reserve# Bank# (BCR).# This# allegation#
prompted# the# Congressional# Supervisory# Committee# to# vote# against# her# ratification# as#
Comptroller,275# leading# to#her# letter#of# resignation,# in#which#she#stated#“I#want# to# leave#on#record#
the# mistreatment# being# suffered# by# the# Comptroller# General's# Office# as# a# consequence# of# the#





was#aligned#with# the#Executive#branch,# and#nominated# thanks# to# Fujimori’s#new#party#majority# in#
the# Congress,# and# thus# proved# to# be# submissive# to# executive#wishes.277# In# terms# of# its# efficiency,#
there#are#several#indicators#that#the#Comptroller#General's#Office#was#inefficient#in#the#execution#of#
its# work.# First,# according# to# the# same# law# that# established# the# National# System# of# Control# with#
devolved# powers# to# the# Comptroller# General,# Decree# Law# 26162,# the# office# was# compelled# to#
prepare# an# annual# operational# plan,# with# each# unit# preparing# an# annual# action# plan.# However,#
during#Caso# Lay’s# term,# only# two# annual# plans,# in# 1993# and#1997,#were# submitted# and# approved;#
during# the# other# five# years,# work# was# conducted# without# any# established# plans.278# Yet# Caso# Lay#
managed#four#comprehensive#reorganizations#during#his#sevenOyear#term,#one#of#which#was#a#plan#
to# computerize# the#Comptroller#General's#Office# (a#plan#which#did#not# come# to# fruition,#despite#a#
significant# amount# of# effort).279# During# this# time,# the# Comptroller# General's# Office# also# opened# a#
number#of#offices#in#the#provinces#of#Peru#in#an#effort#to#decentralize#auditing#and#decisionOmaking.#


















major# audits# at# the# behest# of# the# Executive.# In# the# postOFujimori# era,# the# Comptroller# General's#
Office# was# accused# of# not# doing# its# job# in# its# failure# to# investigate# purchases#made# under# seven#






had# to# respect# the# primacy# of# secrecy.283# In# addition,# despite# Drago’s# wish# to# the# contrary,# the#
Comptroller#General's#office#did#not#scrutinize#or#control#privatization#transactions,#a#huge#number#
of#which#occurred#in#Peru#in#the#1990s.284##

















municipalities# that# were# controlled# by# mayors# who# belonged# to# opposition# political# parties.285#
Financially,#these#cases#represented#a#trivial#amount# in#comparison#to#those#cases#the#Comptroller#
failed#to#investigate#related#to#arms#procurement#by#the#military.286#For#example,#in#1996,#some#46#
emergency#decrees#were#passed#that#eliminated#oversight#of# the# financing#and# implementation#of#
public#works,#such#as#competitive#bidding.#These#measures#paved#the#way#for#greater#corruption#of#
the#social# support#program.#“Irregularities”#detected# in# the# financing#of#protective#public#works# to#
repair# damage# caused# by# El# Niño,# for# example,# were# so# flagrant# that# they# prompted# regional#
government# officials# to# request# that# a# special# Congressional# committee# be# formed# to# investigate#
these# irregularities.# This# committee#has#yet# to#be# formed,#nor#has# the#current#Comptroller# shown#
interest# in# exercising# its# investigative# prerogatives.# Therefore,# the# actual# extent# of# corruption# in#
these#sectors#is#unknown.287#





chief# Montesinos,# which# is# why# it# failed# to# investigate# any# fraud# or# procurement# issues# in# the#
military#and#instead#pursued#the#majority#of#its#investigations#of#officials#who#were#opposed#to#the#
Fujimori# regime.288# Ultimately,# no# one# was# controlling# the# Comptroller# General# but# Fujimori# and#
Montesinos,# and# the# office# in# turn# failed# in# its# ability# to# be# an# effective# instrument# of# control# of#
government#expenditure.##
This# achievement# was# facilitated# both# by# the# lack# of# transparency# in# the# Comptroller#











by# the#media# about# fiscal# deals# that# the# Comptroller# failed# to# investigate.# Examples# included# the#
deviation#of#public# funds# from# their# intended#purpose# to# support# Fujimori’s# reOelection# campaign;#
excessive#purchases#of#medicines#by#Essalud#(the#entity# in#charge#of#the#social#security#for#health),#
and# the#mishandling#of# funds#destined# to# the# Intelligence#Administration.289# It#was#not# until# 1999#
that# the# Congress# passed# a# Prudence# and# Transparency# Law,# requiring# some# fiscal# transparency.#
However,#its#compliance#mechanism#did#not#have#explicit#sanctions#attached#to#it,#and#thus#the#law#
had#little#power#to#make#financial#information#more#transparency#while#Fujimori#was#in#office.290##
That# this# law# was# passed# at# all# signals# a# break# between# the# political# support# Fujimori#
enjoyed# throughout# most# of# his# two# terms# in# office,# and# the# late# 1990s,# when# more# and# more#
Peruvians# began# protesting# against# him# due# to# his# audacious# bid# for# reOelection.# Fujimori’s#
opposition# gained# strength,# and# other# legal# mechanisms# that# attempted# to# inject# a# measure# of#
accountability# back# into# institutions# were# passed,# such# as# the# 1999# Governmental# Auditor# Ethics#
Code.291#It#was#in#this#context#that#Fujimori#selected#and#the#Congress#approved#a#new#Comptroller,#
Carmen# Higaonna,# who#was# asked# to# investigate# actions# taken# by# Caso# Lay# during# his# term.# The#
auditors# chosen# to# investigate# Caso# Lay’s# administration# were# those# who# had# worked# with# him#
during# his# term,# leading# to# the# perception# that# a# transparent,# accurate# assessment# of# the#
expenditures# and# actions# taken# during# the# Caso# Lay# administration# would# not# be# forthcoming.#










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































all$ judges,$ including$ Supreme$ Court$ and$ Superior$ Court$ judges$ as$ well$ as$ those$ on$ the$ Tribunal.
Constitucional,$under$Decree$Laws$25423$and$25446.294$That$same$month,$Fujimori$enacted$Decree$
Laws$25447$and$25454,$which$replaced$the$fired$judges$with$appointees$who$had$provisional$status,$
meaning$ that$ they$ could$ be$ removed$ from$ their$ positions$without$ cause$ by$ the$ Executive$ or$ the$
Congress.$ Further,$ their$ appointments,$ also$made$ by$ the$ Executive$with$ the$ support$ of$ Congress,$








judges$ ceded$ to$ the$ Executive$ branch$ and$ to$ Congress.$ Partly$ in$ reaction$ to$ this$ backlash,$ the$















Two$ cases$ underscore$ the$ consequences$ of$ these$ legal$ changes,$ and$ the$ tension$ in$ the$
1990s$between$judges$appointed$by$and$loyal$to$Fujimori$and$those$who$resisted$the$interference$of$
the$Executive.$In$1994,$the$Supreme$Court$was$set$to$decide$whether$a$member$of$the$Colina$Group$
should$ be$ tried$ for$ the$ 1992$ incident$ at$ La$ Cantuta$ University.$ The$ Colina$ Group$ was$ a$ secret$
paramilitary$ death$ squad$ authorized$ by$ Fujimori’s$ administration$ to$ eliminate$ Shining$ Path$ and$





against$this$ law,$ultimately$the$Supreme$Court$endorsed$ it.297$A$second$criminal$case$ involving$the$
Colina$Group$focused$on$the$1991$massacre$of$15$people$in$the$Barrios$Altos$neighborhood$of$Lima,$
who$were$mistakenly$thought$to$be$Shining$Path$guerrillas.298$In$1995,$a$lower$court$judge$opened$a$
criminal$ case$ against$ the$ Colina$ Group$ on$ behalf$ of$ several$ of$ the$ families$ of$ the$ Barrios$ Altos$
victims.$Under$pressure$from$the$military,$Congress$passed$Law$No.$26479,$which$granted$amnesty$
to$members$of$ the$military$who$had$committed$human$rights$violations$while$engaged$ in$ the$war$










are$ incompatible,$ [and]$ continue$ processing$ the$ members$ of$ the$ armed$ forces$ involved$ in$ the$
killings.$The$decision$was$based$on$formal$legal$arguments,$but$before$the$Superior$Court$could$rule,$





the$ Organic$ Law$ of$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ created$ a$ Judicial$ Executive$ Commission$ and$ technical$
secretariats$ that$ had$ the$ power$ over,$ among$ other$ things,$ judicial$ budgets.$ In$ essence,$ the$ law$
created$ structures$ that$ allowed$ those$ in$ charge$ of$ the$ judicial$ reforms$ to$ evaluate,$ hire,$ and$ fire$
administrative$ staff,$ assess$ court$ capacities$ and$ implement$ new$ technologies,$ and$ institute$ new$
rules$to$streamline$court$procedures,$discourage$corruption,$and$increase$judicial$competencies.$$
Fujimori$ appointed$ as$ head$ of$ the$ reform$ process$ an$ ex^military$ commander,$ José$
Dellepiane,$ who$ had$ overseen$ a$ successful$ administrative$ reform$ of$ the$ Ministry$ of$ Energy$ and$
Mining.$One$of$ the$ justifications$ for$Dellepiane’s$ appointment$was$ the$ fact$ that$ the$ Judiciary$was$
ruled$ by$ judges$ who,$ while$ very$ knowledgeable$ about$ the$ law,$ were$ not$ good$ managers$ of$ the$
bureaucratic$ aspects$ of$ the$ judicial$ system;$ hence$ the$ significant$ case$ backlog$ and$ other$












Cases$Solved$by$Magistrates$ 392$ 1,171$ 1,382$
Accumulated$Case$Backlog$ 106,000$ 75,000$ 2,000$
$
That$ the$ reforms$brought$measurable$ improvements$was$ likely$ surprising$ for$ the$ Judiciary,$ as$ the$
reforms$ were$ really$ more$ of$ a$ political$ patch$ than$ a$ concerted$ effort$ to$ provide$ better$ service$
delivery.$ The$ reforms$ were$ convened$ not$ in$ response$ to$ citizen$ grumbling,$ but$ in$ response$ to$ a$




to$ non^jurist$ technocrats,$ whose$ authority$ over$ different$ parts$ of$ the$ Judiciary$ was$ gradually$
increased$over$time.$The$charge$brought$by$the$anti^reform$factions$within$the$judiciary$is$that$the$
reforms$were$imposed$by$the$Executive,$specifically$Montesinos.$The$judicial$reforms$in$some$ways$





Tribunal$ Constitucional$ established$ that$ six$ votes$ of$ seven$ were$ needed$ to$ declare$ a$ law$












The$ judicial$ reform$ process$ piqued$ the$ interest$ of$ international$ aid$ donors,$ who$ initially$
pledge$support$to$assist$Peru$in$this$process.$The$reforms$were$attractive$for$several$reasons.$First,$
they$were$an$ initiative$that$originated$with$the$aid$recipient,$which$demonstrated$political$will$ for$
reforms.$ Second,$ the$ reforms$ focused$ on$ changing$ administrative$ systems$ in$ order$ to$ reduce$
inefficiencies,$ which$ appealed$ to$ donors$ like$ the$ World$ Bank$ wanting$ to$ avoid$ overtly$ political$
reforms$ and$ focus$ on$ technical$ solutions.$ Third,$ the$ reforms$ were$ already$ showing$ measurable$









dismissed$ these$ three$ members$ of$ the$ Tribunal.$ The$ president$ of$ the$ Tribunal$ Constitucional$
resigned$ in$ protest,$ saying$ that$ “the$ rule$ of$ law$ has$ broken$ down$ in$ Peru.”304$ Then$ in$ December$
1997,$ Congress$ passed$ Law$ No.$ 26898$ that$ gave$ provisional$ judges$ the$ same$ rights,$ powers$ and$
privileges$as$permanent$judges.$$
The$ rationale$ behind$ this$move$ relates$ to$ how$ the$ judicial$ representative$ of$ the$ JNE$ (the$
National$ Elections$ Board),$ who$ was$ key$ in$ ensuring$ Fujimori’s$ right$ to$ run$ for$ re^election,$ was$
chosen.$The$Organic$Law$on$the$Judiciary$mandates$that$the$Plenary$Chamber$of$the$Supreme$Court,$








serving$ on$ the$ Plenary$ Chamber$were$ provisional$ judges,$ and$ as$ such$ could$ not$ vote$ for$ the$ JNE$
judicial$ representative.$ Law$No.$ 26898$ changed$ this,$ allowing$ those$ provisional$ judges,$who$were$
beholden$to$Fujimori$for$their$continued$job$security,$to$have$a$vote,$thus$guaranteeing$that$a$pro^
Fujimori$representative$would$be$elected$to$the$JNE.$$
Anticipating$ the$ outcry$ that$ would$ arise$ from$ this$ move,$ in$ March$ 1998$ Fujimori$ got$
Congress$to$pass$another$law,$No.$26933,$which$deprived$the$CNM$of$its$power$to$remove$Supreme$
Court$judges,$and$invested$that$power$into$the$Oficina$de$Control$de$la$Magistratura$(OCMA).$As$a$
result,$ the$ entire$ CNM$ resigned$ in$ protest.305$ At$ this$ point,$ both$ the$ IADB$ and$ the$ World$ Bank$
announced$the$suspension$of$planned$disbursements$of$a$$22.5$million$judicial$reform$loan$that$had$
been$finalized$in$early$December,$ten$days$prior$to$the$passage$of$Law$No.$26898.$The$Bank$said$it$
would$ begin$ disbursements$ once$ the$ government$ had$ restored$ the$ “conditions$ necessary$ for$ the$

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While$ significant$ domestic$ and$ international$ criticism$ followed$ these$ actions,$ nothing$
changed$ until$ the$ 2000$ election,$ when$ Fujimori$ lost$ his$ Congressional$ majority.$ The$ opposition$
embarked$on$an$effort$ to$sweep$away$Fujimori’s$changes$and$guarantee$the$ independence$of$ the$
Judiciary,$ starting$ with$ the$ nullification$ of$ Law$ No.$ 26898.$ The$ autonomy$ of$ the$ CNM$ was$ reK







Peru’s$ political$ institutions$ was$ becoming$ apparent.$ Congress,$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ supposedly$
autonomous$ agencies$ like$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ were$ no$ longer$ functioning$ as$ independent$
checks$on$executive$power.$While$these$ institutions$of$horizontal$accountability$varied$ in$terms$of$
their$strength$in$the$past,$all$three$were$left$severely$weakened$by$the$end$of$the$Fujimori$regime.$




election$ in$2000$energized$his$political$opponents.$Yet$ from$1992$until$ the$events$surrounding$the$
2000$election,$Fujimori$was$able$to$manipulate$state$institutions$in$a$manner$that$often$undermined$
principles$ of$ good$ governance.$ In$ terms$ of$ accountability,$ both$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ and$ the$
Judiciary$became$accountable$primarily$to$the$Executive$branch$rather$than$to$the$Peruvian$people.$
The$ Comptroller$ General,$ which$ was$ fairly$ effective$ in$ investigating$ and$ reporting$ on$ state$




reputation$ for$ corruption,$ inefficiency,$ lack$ of$ accountability$ to$ its$ users,$ and$ a$ poor$ record$ of$
effective$and$transparent$administration$of$justice.$As$Table$10$showed,$there$is$some$evidence$that$
the$ reforms$ undertaken$ during$ the$ Fujimori$ era$ resulted$ in$ increased$ efficiency.$ However,$ these$
reforms$ were$ implemented$ at$ the$ same$ time$ that$ measured$ were$ taken$ that$ decreased$ the$
independence$of$the$Judiciary,$opened$up$new$modes$of$corruption$and,$at$a$higher$levels$of$justice$
administrative,$undermined$the$effectiveness$and$transparency$of$the$judicial$system.$$
This$ section$ attempts$ to$ explain$ why$ good$ governance$ within$ these$ two$ institutions$ was$
undermined$or$made$worse$during$the$Fujimori$era,$drawing$on$the$explanatory$framework$outlined$
in$Chapter$3.$Based$on$evidence$from$interviews$conducted$in$Peru,$ it$suggests$that$although$they$
were$ different$ for$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ and$ the$ Judiciary,$ the$ endogenous$ power$ dynamics$
meant$ that$ those$within$ the$ institution$were$ unable$ and/or$ unwilling$ to$ formulate$ a$ unified$ and$
cohesive$ response$ to$ the$ executive$ interference.$ Situating$ this$ endogenous$ dynamic$ within$ the$
larger$ context$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime$ shows$ that$while$ institutional$ leaders$may$ have$ had$ strong$
veto$power$over$other$actors$within$the$institutions,$they$had$weak$veto$power$over$the$Executive$
and$Congress,$and$little$discretion$in$interpreting$new$rules$instituted$by$the$Fujimori$regime.$Thus,$
Fujimori$ was$ able$ to$ change$ the$ dynamics$ of$ power$ across$ institutions,$ and$ in$ some$ cases$ this$
shifted$ the$ power$ dynamics$ within$ institutions$ as$ well.$ In$ addition,$ Fujimori’s$ hidden$ network$ of$
bribery$and$weakening$of$vertical$accountability$structures$meant$that$civil$society$and$citizens$had$




are$definitively$ linked$to$ institutional$ leadership$and$continuity.$The$leader$ is$a$political$appointee,$
and$ has$ the$ power$ to$ appoint$ topKlevel$ staff,$ while$ midK$ and$ lowerKlevel$ civil$ servants$ typically$
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remain$ in$ the$ institution$ through$ different$ periods$ of$ leadership.308$ Almost$ all$ of$ the$ people$ I$




will$ for$ reforms$generated$by$outgoing$ leaders,$and$ thus$has$a$potentially$damaging$effect$on$ the$
reform$ process.310$ This$ helps$ explain$ the$ variations$ in$ good$ governance$ both$ between$ the$
Comptroller$General$and$the$Judiciary$and$within$the$different$time$periods$being$observed.$In$the$
1980s,$ Comptroller$Miguel$ Cussianovich$ oversaw$ reforms$ aimed$ at$ increasing$ the$ capacity$ of$ the$
auditing$ staff$ and,$ despite$ his$ affiliation$ with$ President$ Belaúnde’s$ party,$ initiated$ several$
investigations$damaging$ to$ the$state.$ In$contrast,$his$ successor,$Luz$Aurea$Saenz,$ shied$away$ from$
such$ investigations$ until$ after$ García$ had$ left$ office.$ These$ examples$ indicate$ different$ styles$ of$
leadership$and$a$lack$of$continuity$in$carrying$over$reforms$from$one$Comptroller$to$another.$In$the$
Judiciary,$the$lack$of$serious$reform$efforts$in$the$1980s$could$be$tied$to$the$fact$that$the$President$
of$ the$ Judiciary$ typically$ served$ a$ oneK$ or$ twoKyear$ term$ at$ most,$ disrupting$ any$ continuity$ of$
reforms.$The$concentration$of$power$ in$a$single$ individual,$or$a$small$handful$of$ individuals$at$ the$
top,$thus$makes$reforms$very$personality$driven.$
The$concentration$of$power$in$a$hierarchal$leadership$meant$that$those$who$did$not$agree$
















In$ the$ Judiciary,$ survival$ was$ manifested$ in$ terms$ of$ the$ ability$ to$ win$ cases,$ and$ helps$
explain$ to$ some$ degree$ the$ motivation$ for$ corruption.$ Whatever$ one$ felt$ about$ bribery,$ it$ was$
pervasive$in$the$legal$system,$and$it$was$the$way$things$were$done,$and$if$you$failed$to$socialize$fully$
into$this$system,$you$would$not$be$a$successful$lawyer.$As$one$former$lawyer$who$practiced$law$in$
the$ late$ 1980s$ and$early$ 1990s$ said,$ “When$ you$ get$out$of$ university$ you$are$ full$ of$ dreams,$ you$






The$ concentration$ of$ power$ within$ the$ top$ leadership,$ combined$ with$ the$ need$ for$
professional$survival$meant$that$there$was$little$willingness$or$ability$on$the$part$ individuals$at$the$
mid$ and$ lower$ levels$ to$ challenge$ the$ status$ quo.$ During$ the$ 1980s$ and$ 1990s$ in$ both$ the$
Comptroller$ General$ and$ the$ Judiciary,$ the$ status$ quo$ could$ be$ characterized$ as$ an$ institutional$
culture$that$did$not$recognize$or$embrace$the$good$governance$agenda.$Certain$ leaders$embraced$
the$ idea$ of$ reforming$ some$ structures$ in$ line$ with$ dimensions$ of$ good$ governance,$ such$ as$
Comptroller$ Cussianovich’s$ efforts$ to$ increase$ effectiveness$ and$ efficiency$ by$ strengthening$ the$
technical$ skills$ and$ capacity$ of$ the$ auditing$ staff.$ However,$ while$ corruption$ was$ recognized$ as$
pervasive$and$somewhat$problematic,$ the$ term$good$governance$wasn’t$used$at$all$ in$ connection$







norm$diffusion$ of$ the$ good$ governance$ agenda,$ and$ the$ domestic$ focus$ on$more$ pressing$ issues,$
namely$the$economy$and$human$rights,$especially$in$the$1980s.$It$was$not$until$the$exposure$of$the$
extent$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime’s$ state$ capture$ that$ thinking$ began$ to$ shift$ en$ masse$ in$ these$
institutions.$One$ interviewee$noted$ that$ those$employees$who$had$ lived$ through$ the$Fujimori$era$
and$subsequently$remained$in$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$are$much$more$responsive$to$issues$
of$good$governance$now:$“We$saw$a$ lot$of$ things$ in$ the$Fujimori$era$that$we$never$thought$were$
bad,$ because$ it$ was$ the$ dayKtoKday$ life,$ but$ now$ we$ can$ tell$ the$ difference$ and$ we$ know$ what$
happened$ before$ was$ very$ bad.$ And$ those$ of$ us$ who$ have$ been$ here$ a$ long$ time,$ we$ want$ to$
change,$because$the$country$ is$changing.$Sometimes$people$ in$Peru$don’t$understand,$don’t$know$
how$to$distinguish$between$corruption$and$inefficiency,$and$don’t$realize$that$the$person$[working$
in$ the$ institution]$ is$ not$ necessarily$ corrupt,$ he$ is$ just$ the$ product$ of$ a$ very$ inefficient$ and$ old$
process.”315$$
In$ the$ Judiciary,$ the$ need$ for$ good$ governance$ reforms$was$ recognized$more$ than$ in$ the$
Comptroller$ General,$ because$ of$ courts’$ direct$ relationship$ with$ end$ users;$ in$ particular$ the$
enormous$ case$ backlog$ and$ punitive$ effect$ of$ bribery$ on$ the$ poor$ caused$ ongoing$ complaints.$
However,$those$working$within$the$Judiciary$remained$unwilling$to$engage$in$reforms,$as$many$just$
accepted$ the$ system$ as$ it$ was.$When$ the$ status$ quo$ seemed$ as$ if$ it$ might$ shift$ toward$ a$ more$
effective$and$efficient$way$of$doing$ things,$ there$was$ support$ and$excitement$ for$ such$measures.$
One$example$was$a$proposed$new$civil$procedure$law,$which$would$have$streamlined$processes$and$











discretion$ employees$ had$ in$ interpreting$ rules,$ as$ the$ example$ of$ the$ failure$ to$ consistently$
implement$ the$ civil$ procedure$ code$ illustrates.$ In$ the$ Judiciary,$ the$ decentralized$ nature$ of$ the$
courts$meant$ that$ there$was$a$high$ level$of$discretion$ that$ judges$had$ in$ interpreting$ institutional$
rules$and$ legal$codes.$This$high$ level$of$discretion$ in$turn$facilitated$the$system$of$bribery,$and$for$
lawyers,$ part$ of$ the$ survival$ process$ was$ knowing$ which$ individuals$ to$ be$ friends$ with$ so$ that$ a$
lawyer$ could$ try$ cases$ in$ front$of$a$ judge$who$would$ rule$ in$his$ favor:$ “As$ the$plaintiff,$ you$don’t$
know$which$judge$you$will$be$assigned$to,$so$beforehand$you$have$to$oil$the$machinery.$Usually$the$
plaintiff$wins$ the$ case$ because$ of$ this.$ The$ defendant$ needed$ to$ use$ a$ different$ set$ of$ tools,$ like$




Citing$ an$ example,$ a$ former$ lawyer$ spoke$ of$ a$ case$ in$ 1993$during$which$ the$ defendants$
failed$to$show$up$in$court,$which$under$the$law$meant$that$the$plaintiff$automatically$won$the$case.$
In$asking$the$judge$to$deliver$the$final$sentence,$the$judge$asked$the$lawyer$for$$500$(about$$800$in$
2013,$ a$ rather$ significant$ sum$ given$ the$ state$ of$ the$ Peruvian$ economy$ in$ 1993)$ to$ expedite$ the$
sentence$delivery.$The$ lawyer$ responded$that$his$client$was$unable$ to$pay$ that$sum,$ to$which$ the$
judge$responded,$“Well,$you$take$the$price$to$them.$It’s$not$my$problem$anymore.”318$The$high$level$
of$ discretion$ and$ system$ of$ bribery$ also$ meant$ that$ administrative$ reforms,$ such$ as$ case$
management$software$that$randomized$the$selection$of$judges$for$different$trials,$did$not$have$any$
impact$other$than$to$delay$the$process$and$make$ it$more$expensive.$This$was$because$“there$was$









In$ contrast,$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ was$ more$ centralized,$ and$ there$ was$ almost$ no$
discretion$ in$ interpretation$ of$ the$ rules.$ As$ one$ employee$ noted,$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ “has$
always$ characterized$ itself$ for$ having$ a$ kind$ of$ military$ behavior,$ and$ everybody$ has$ to$ align$ or$
otherwise$you$are$going$to$have$a$bad$time.$For$example,$if$in$a$report$on$an$investigation$we$make$
observations$ about$ the$ purchase$made$ by$ a$ certain$ institution$ and$ your$ boss$ doesn’t$ agree$with$
[those$ observations],$ he$ tries$ to$ convince$ you$ to$ change$ it.$ They$ encourage$ you$ to$ change$ any$
observations$ that$might$ turn$ into$ an$ accusation$ of$ [violations$ of]$ criminal$ law$ to$ [accusations$ of]$
administrative$ violations.$ There$ is$no$discretion.”320$Another$employee$ supported$ this,$ saying$ that$



































































































































and$ 153$ embed$ the$ endogenous$ political$ dynamics$ described$ in$ Table$ 12$ above$within$ the$ larger$
framework$ that$ takes$ into$ account$ exogenous$ drivers$ of$ change.$ In$ terms$ of$ this$ relationship$
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between$ endogenous$ dynamics$ and$ the$ Executive,$ both$ the$ institutional$ response$ to$ the$
interference$of$ the$Executive,$and$ the$ strategy$of$ the$Fujimori$administration$ itself,$ can$be$ traced$
back$to$dynamics$of$leadership,$selfKinterest,$and$varying$levels$of$discretion.$The$regime$utilized$its$
understanding$ of$ these$ dynamics$ to$ temporarily$ change$ the$ incentives$ of$ judges$ in$ terms$ of$
employment$ security,$ which$ in$ turn$ affected$ these$ judges’$ interpretation$ of$ rulings$ in$ cases$ that$
would$ not$ favor$ the$ regime.$ In$ this$ way,$ the$ Fujimori$ administration$ shifted$ the$ internal$ power$
dynamics$ of$ the$ Judiciary$ more$ in$ line$ with$ those$ of$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office,$ and$ then$
proceeded$ to$weaken$ the$ veto$ power$ of$ key$ leaders$ in$ both$ institutions.$While$ this$ strategy$was$
temporarily$ successful,$ it$ was$ ultimately$ undone$ by$ the$ continued$ actions$ of$ the$ regime$ to$





case$ of$ the$ Comptroller$ General:$ Comptroller$ Miguel$ Cussianovich$ (1980K1987)$ oversaw$ a$ shift$
toward$ good$ governance$ by$ increasing$ the$ technical$ skills$ of$ auditors$ and$ bolstering$ the$ CGR’s$
operational$ capacity,$while$Comptroller$Maria$Herminia$Drago$ (1992K1993)$ significantly$decreased$
this$ capacity$ by$ reducing$ the$ number$ of$ auditors$ from$ 540$ to$ 80.$While$ it$ is$ not$ clear$ from$ the$
available$ evidence$ whether$ there$ were$ significant$ internal$ protests$ over$ either$ of$ these$ actions,$





both$ cases$ in$ the$ 1980s,$ these$ leaders$ enjoyed$ a$ balance$ of$ power$ across$ other$ institutions$ of$
horizontal$ accountability,$ at$ least$ formally.$ Cussianovich$ and$ his$ successor$ were$ able$ to$ initiate$
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investigations$ as$ necessary,$ with$ the$ support$ of$ Congress,$ although$ the$ evidence$ suggests$ that$
political$party$affiliation$sometimes$influenced$decisions.$However,$there$is$no$evidence$to$suggest$
that$Comptrollers$were$ legally$barred$ from$ investigating$ specific$government$entities,$ should$ they$
wish$ do$ to$ so.$ The$ Judiciary$ was$ also$ often$ influenced$ by$ politics,$ with$ nepotism$ in$ judicial$
appointment$being$the$norm$rather$than$the$exception.$However,$in$cases$like$the$1987$attempt$to$




The$ strategic$ legal$ maneuverings$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ administration$ shifted$ this$ balance$ of$





which$ effectively$ took$ away$ the$ CGR’s$ sanctioning$ power.$ The$ Fujimori$ administration$ also$
manipulated$the$existing$legal$structure$of$the$CGR,$such$as$the$Offices$of$Internal$Control$(Oficinas$
de$Auditoria$Internal,$or$OAIs),$which$are$the$internal$audit$offices$in$each$government$entity.$These$
offices$ were$ set$ up$ prior$ to$ the$ Fujimori$ era,$ and$ embedded$ staff$ members$ of$ the$ Comptroller$
General$ in$ the$ government$ entities.$ However,$ by$ dismissing$ 460$ auditors$ as$ part$ of$ the$
administrative$restructuring$in$1992,$these$positions$were$then$filled$by$individuals$loyal$to$Fujimori.$
The$result,$according$to$an$employee$of$ the$CGR,$was$that$“the$[OAI]$scheme$went$ from$one$of$ ‘I$
trust$you,’$where$we$were$certain$that$[the$OAI$staff]$belonged$to$the$[Comptroller$General’s$office]$
in$ every$ sense,$ including$ payroll,$ and$ that$ they$ were$ independent$ from$ the$ one$ who$ is$ being$




This$manipulation$was$ possible$ due$ to$ the$weak$ veto$ power$ of$ the$ leader$ outside$ of$ the$
institution,$combined$with$the$weak$veto$power$of$those$working$inside$of$the$institution.$Fujimori’s$
first$Comptroller$clearly$did$not$have$much$room$to$maneuver$as$Comptroller,$as$when$she$resigned$
less$ than$ a$ year$ after$ taking$ up$ her$ position,$ she$ noted$ that$ she$ had$ neither$ the$ authority$ nor$
autonomy$needed$to$execute$the$functions$of$her$office.$This$is$supported$by$those$working$in$the$
CGR$at$the$time,$one$of$whom$noted$that:$$
[The$ Fujimori$ regime]$ knew$ how$ the$ [Comptroller$ General’s$ office]$worked,$ and$ they$
modified$ the$ laws$ so$ that$ we$ were$ forbidden$ to$ do$ certain$ things.$ For$ example,$ we$
could$not$interfere$with$the$Armed$Forces$—$where$everything$was$cooked.$Even$if$we$
wanted$ to,$we$ couldn’t$ get$ in.$We$ couldn’t$ get$ in$ to$ [the$ tax$ministry]$ SUNAT$or$ the$
Ministry$of$ the$Economy.$ [It$wasn’t]$ until$ 2001$ that$ the$ law$ let$us$back$ in$ the$Armed$
Forces$and$SUNAT,$and$let$us$control$everybody.323$
$




Lay$ proved$ to$ be$ the$ loyal$ leader$ that$ fit$ the$ bill,$ as$ during$ his$ tenure$ he$ failed$ to$ initiate$
investigations$of$the$state’s$many$questionable$military$purchases$and$privatization$transactions.$
This$situation$was$slightly$different$for$the$Judiciary,$particularly$the$CNM$and$the$Supreme$
Court.$ The$ decentralized$ nature$ of$ the$ Judiciary$ meant$ that$ cases$ against$ the$ regime$ could$ be$
initiated$at$any$number$of$levels$from$different$jurisdictions.$In$addition,$cases$could$make$their$way$
to$the$Supreme$Court,$which$was$also$responsible$for$choosing$a$representative$to$head$the$JNE,$the$
highest$electoral$authority$ in$ the$country.$The$Fujimori$government$could$not$use$ the$same$tactic$








judges$ with$ provisional$ judges,$ a$ move$ which$ was$ couched$ in$ terms$ of$ purging$ the$ judiciary$ of$
corrupt$ judges.$ This$ shifted$ the$ power$ of$ selecting$ and$ appointing$ judges$ from$ the$ CNM$ to$ the$











term,$ in$ violation$ of$ the$ 1993$ Constitution$ that$ he$ promulgated.$ By$ imbuing$ Congress$ with$ the$
power$to$dismiss$Constitution$Court$judges$and$giving$provisional$judges$on$the$Supreme$Court$the$
same$privileges$as$tenured$judges,$Fujimori$shifted$power$to$loyalists$he$appointed$to$these$courts.$
This$ ensured$he$ could$ run$ for$ a$ third$ term,$ and$ that$ his$ election$ victory$was$ guaranteed.$He$ also$
used$his$ Congressional$majority$ to$ shift$ the$ power$ of$ removal$ of$ Supreme$Court$ judges$ from$ the$
CNM$to$OCMA,$the$latter$of$which$was$headed$by$a$Fujimori$supporter.$$
Clearly,$ keeping$ control$ of$ the$ Judiciary$ was$ more$ complicated$ that$ managing$ the$
Comptroller$ General,$ due$ to$ the$ differences$ in$ the$ two$ institutions’$ structures.$ The$ Comptroller$
General’s$ office$was$ small$ and$ fairly$ centralized,$ and$ the$ Comptroller,$ appointed$ for$ seven$ years,$
was$able$to$maintain$control$over$the$institution.$The$Judiciary$was$made$up$of$hundreds$of$judges$
spread$ across$ decentralized$ courts$ with$ differing$ levels$ of$ power$ and$ mandates,$ as$ well$ as$








The$ Fujimori$ government$ was$ able$ to$ exploit$ the$ internal$ power$ dynamics$ of$ the$
Comptroller$and,$to$a$lesser$degree,$the$Judiciary,$weakening$their$respective$capacities$to$serve$as$
institutions$ of$ horizontal$ accountability$ on$ both$ the$ Executive$ and$ on$ one$ another.$ With$ the$
exception$of$increases$in$Judiciary$efficiency,$good$governance$in$these$institutions$was$weakened,$
as$ they$were$no$ longer$effective$ in$ fulfilling$ their$mandates,$nor$were$their$actions$ transparent$or$
accountable$ to$ anyone$ but$ the$ Executive$ branch.$ Ideally,$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ is$ indirectly$
accountable$to$citizens$through$its$reporting$to$Congress,$and$the$Judiciary$is$directly$accountable$to$
citizens$through$its$delivery$of$judicial$services.$Citizens$and$civil$society$in$turn$act$as$structures$of$
vertical$ accountability$ by$ demanding$ that$ these$ institutions$ act$ in$ a$ manner$ consistent$ with$ the$
principles$of$good$governance,$and$ensure$that$the$other$branches$of$government$do$so$as$well.$$
Yet$in$the$1990s,$this$role$of$civil$society$was$significant$curtailed$for$two$reasons.$First,$good$
governance$was$ not$ an$ advocacy$ priority$ for$ citizens,$ NGOs,$ or$ the$media$ in$ the$ first$ half$ of$ the$




Fujimori$ administration,$ the$ main$ focus$ of$ civil$ society$ by$ that$ point$ was$ on$ an$ overall$ regime$
change,$ rather$ than$a$narrow$agenda$of$ fighting$ corruption$or$promoting$good$governance$ in$ the$
Comptroller$General$or$Judiciary.(
Although$civil$society$had$been$relatively$weak$throughout$Peru’s$history,$in$the$1970s$and$
1980s,$ there$ was$ a$ “growing$ level$ of$ organization$ and$ sophistication$ among$ a$ variety$ of$ social$
interests,$especially$those$who$had$been$excluded$from$social$and$political$power.…$[T]hese$entities$
became$ increasingly$ influential$ in$ the$ 1980s…$ playing$ an$ active$ role$ in$ protesting$ governmental$
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policies$ during$ that$ decade.”326$ The$ actions$ of$ the$ Shining$ Path$ to$ harass$ and$ violently$ intimidate$
some$ of$ these$ groups$ during$ the$ 1980s$ had$weakened$ them$ somewhat,$ but$many$ neighborhood$
associations$continued$ to$provide$services$ to$ the$poor.$The$main$ focus$of$civil$ society$at$ this$ time$
was$on$economic$welfare$and$labor$rights,$however,$and$not$good$governance,$given$the$twin$crises$
of$the$economy$and$terrorism.$People$were$aware$of$government$corruption,$and$cited$the$Judiciary$
as$ one$ of$ the$ most$ corrupt$ institutions,$ but$ for$ the$ most$ part$ corruption$ remained$ hidden$ and$
tolerated:$
Everybody$knew$that$there$was$corruption$but$it$was$accepted,$we$were$used$to$living$
with$ it.$Not$until$ the$end$of$ [the]$ Fujimori$ [regime]$did$we$ [think$we]$need$ to$have$a$







by$ both$ the$ government$ and$ the$ guerrillas$ in$ this$ struggle.$ In$ 1985,$ a$ coalition$ of$ regional$ and$
national$NGOs$came$together$under$the$umbrella$organization$Coordinadora$Nacional$de$Derechos$





curbing$ human$ rights$ abuses$ and$ raising$ public$ consciousness.328”$Ocantos$ (2012)$ shows$ how$ the$
pedagogical$ interventions$ of$ these$ human$ rights$NGOs$ helped$ shift$ judicial$ norms$ from$ a$ formal,$
positivist$ legal$ culture$ that$ favored$ the$military$ and$ the$ Executive$ to$ one$ that$ embraced$ judicial$








for$ defending$ their$ human$ rights$ and$ civil$ liberties,$ this$ indicates$ that$ a$ slow$ diffusion$ of$ good$
governance$norms$had$started$to$take$hold$in$the$1990s.$$
Indeed,$ while$ the$ focus$ on$ good$ governance$ in$ terms$ of$ administratively$ reforming$ state$
institutions$ did$ not$ become$ an$ explicit$ agenda$ until$ after$ the$ end$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime,$ the$
demand$ for$ a$ democratic$ government$ accountable$ to$ the$ people$ gained$ traction$ in$ the$ wake$ of$
Fujimori’s$bid$for$reKelection.$The$small$pockets$of$muted$protests$from$different$individuals$and$the$
nonKmajority$opposition$members$in$Congress$in$the$first$half$of$the$1990s$became$a$groundswell$in$
the$ latter$ half$ in$ response$ to$ the$ “Law$ of$ Authentic$ Interpretation$ of$ the$ Constitution,”$ which$
allowed$Fujimori$to$run$for$a$third$term.$Student$protests$followed$the$1996$dismissal$of$the$three$
judges$on$the$Tribunal$Constitucional;$the$CHDH$joined$with$press$watchdog$organizations$and$the$
Instituto$ de$ Defensa$ Legal$ (or$ IDL,$ a$ think$ tank$ headed$ by$ economist$ Hernando$ de$ Soto)$ to$
document$ abuses$ committed$ by$ the$ government$ during$ the$ reKelection$ campaign;$ election$
observation$NGOs$ like$ Transparencia$were$ founded;$ and$ bar$ associations$ joined$with$ civil$ society$
organizations$ to$ mount$ legal$ challenges$ against$ the$ regime.329$ In$ 1998,$ these$ opposition$ groups$
banded$ together$ to$deliver$ a$petition$with$more$ than$1.4$million$ signatures,$ calling$ for$ a$national$
referendum$ on$ the$ reKelection$ law.330$ The$ referendum$ was$ killed$ by$ the$ Fujimori$ government,$
thanks$to$a$law$(upheld$by$the$JNE)$requiring$a$majority$Congressional$vote$for$a$referendum$to$go$
forward.$The$defeat$of$ the$ referendum$seemed$ to$mark$a$ turning$point$ for$Peruvians,$ as$up$until$
that$point,$“everybody$knew$[the$regime$was$authoritarian]$but$we$never$saw$it$publicly.$We$started$
seeing$ that$at$ the$moment.$So,$after$ that$ [the$acknowledgment$of$ this$ reality$became]$something$
very$normal.331”$
Fujimori$ attempted$ to$ stem$ the$ tide$ of$ public$ perception$ that$ his$ regime$ was$ antiK








agencies,$ making$ changes$ to$ the$ Labor$ Code$ that$ reduced$ unions’$ power$ to$ strike$ or$ engage$ in$
collective$bargaining,$and$ reducing$ the$ability$of$peasants$ to$organize$by$eliminating$coops.332$The$
most$important$strategy,$however,$was$the$manipulation$of$the$press.$While$NGOs$had$been$weak$
prior$ to$ the$ 1970s,$ Peru’s$ press$ “had$ a$ long$ tradition$ of$ vigorous$ investigative$ reporting,$
representing$ the$ full$ range$ of$ ideological$ positions$ in$ the$ country.”333$ Given$ the$ protest$ of$ the$
international$ community$ to$ the$ antiKdemocratic$ nature$ of$ the$ 1992$ selfKcoup,$ the$ importance$
assigned$ to$ press$ freedom$ as$ a$ hallmark$ of$ democracy,$ and$ the$ need$ for$ international$ financing,$
Fujimori$ could$ not$ overtly$ shut$ down$ the$ press.$ Instead,$ the$ regime$ used$ tactics$ of$ bribery,$
wiretapping,$ and$ prosecuting$ of$ journalists$ for$ tax$ code$ violations$ to$ harass$ and$ manipulate$ the$
media$into$submission.$In$addition,$the$regime$created$an$“alternative$press”$to$serve$as$“a$vehicle$
for$proKFujimori$propaganda$and$scandal$mongering$carried$out$against$opposition$forces.”334$There$
were$ several$ incidents$ where$ the$ press$ uncovered$ suspicious$ or$ illegal$ activities$ of$ the$ regime,$
suggesting$that$there$were$links$between$Montesinos$and$drug$traffickers,$and$that$massive$bribes$
were$used$to$silence$critics$of$the$regime.$The$incident$that$shifted$Peruvian$public$opinion$toward$
the$ idea$ that$ the$ regime$ was$ manipulating$ the$ media$ was$ the$ 1998$ case$ of$ a$ television$ station$
owner$ who$ exposed$ the$ illegal$ actions$ of$Montesinos$ and$ the$ intelligence$ services.335$ Coinciding$
with$ Fujimori’s$ obvious$ manipulation$ of$ the$ Judiciary,$ it$ triggered$ an$ onslaught$ of$ domestic$
disapproval$ and$ international$ condemnation,$ as$ evidenced$ by$ the$ 1999$ resolution$ passed$ in$














The$ Fujimori$ regime$ was$ able$ to$ utilize$ its$ knowledge$ of$ the$ internal$ dynamics$ of$ the$
Comptroller$ General$ and$ the$ Judiciary$ to$ effectively$ undermine$ their$ ability$ to$ function$ as$
institutions$of$horizontal$accountability$ to$keep$the$Executive$branch,$or$each$other,$ in$check.$The$
internal$ dynamics$meant$ that$ these$ institutions$were$unable$or$ unwilling$ to$ formulate$ a$ cohesive$
response$to$the$regime’s$manipulations.$In$addition,$in$the$absence$of$this$horizontal$accountability,$
civil$ society$ organizations$ and$ the$media$ were$ unable$ to$ act$ as$ effective$mechanisms$ of$ vertical$
accountability.$ This$ helps$ explain$ why$ these$ institutions’$ ability$ to$ deliver$ services$ in$ line$ with$
principles$of$good$governance$was$weakened$during$the$Fujimori$era.$
Against$ this$ backdrop,$ international$ aid$ donors$ did$ not$ play$ a$ significant$ role$ in$ acting$ as$
either$a$ catalyst$or$a$mechanism$ for$ institutional$ shifts$ toward$good$governance.$ The$ relationship$
between$ donors$ and$ the$ Peruvian$ government$was$ a$ tempestuous$ one$ due$ to$ the$ government’s$
refusal$ to$ service$ its$ debt.$ This$ colored$ the$ relationship$ that$ donors$ had$ with$ the$ Fujimori$
government,$as$donors$were$willing$to$take$a$soft$line$with$some$actions$of$the$regime$because$of$
Fujimori’s$ successful$ handling$ of$ the$ economy.$ Further,$ Peru$ had$ reinstated$ the$ institutions$ of$
democracy$ after$ the$1992$ coup,$ and$ the$ good$governance$agenda$was$not$ firmly$ embedded$as$ a$
priority$ for$ donors$ until$ the$ second$ half$ of$ the$ 1990s,$ and$ thus$ institutional$ reform$was$ not$ the$
driving$ concern$ until$ 1996.$ At$ that$ point,$ several$ donors$ attempted$ to$ assist$ the$ regime$ with$
administrative$and$ judicial$ reforms,$but$as$ the$political$manipulations$of$ the$regime$became$clear,$
donors$ withdrew$ from$ deeper$ engagement.$ Ultimately,$ this$ led$ to$ those$ few$ good$ governance$
projects$implemented$in$Peru$in$the$1990s$having$little$or$no$impact,$while$other$projects,$ like$the$
World$Bank$judicial$reform$loan,$were$cancelled$altogether.$The$main$impact$of$donor$engagement$







roadKbuilding$ and$ development$ projects$ as$ well$ as$ technical$ assistance$ aimed$ at$ modernizing$
military$structures$and$training$military$officers.337$More$than$800$Peruvian$military$officers$trained$
with$ the$ U.S.$military$ at$ bases$ in$ Panama$ and$ the$ United$ States$ between$ 1949$ and$ 1964.338$ The$
politics$of$the$Cold$War$meant$that$this$aid$was$inconsistent,$however,$and$this$relationship$did$not$
continue$ once$ the$ Velasco$ military$ government$ came$ to$ power$ in$ the$ 1970s.$ The$ Velasco$
government$ alienated$ itself$ from$ international$ financial$ institutions,$ but$ his$ successor$ Belaúnde$
undid$these$policies$and$pursued$IMF$prescriptions$for$stabilization$and$liberalization.$$
Belaúnde$continued$these$policies,$but$the$world$recession$of$1981$to$1983$and$the$Mexican$
debt$ crisis$ in$ 1982$ meant$ that$ the$ Peruvian$ government$ was$ unable$ to$ find$ investors$ for$ the$
majority$of$the$stateKowned$enterprises$it$hoped$to$sell$off.$As$a$result,$it$temporarily$suspended$its$
debt$ payments,$ which$ led$ to$ a$ significant$ decline$ in$ FDI$ and$ IFI$ loans.339$ Although$ Belaúnde$
implemented$fiscal$austerity$measures,$his$presidency$ended$with$an$economic$crisis.$In$contrast$to$
Belaúnde,$García$ pursued$populist$ strategies$ that$ included$ increases$ in$ real$wages,$ a$ reduction$ in$
taxes$ and$ interest$ rates,$ price$ freezes,$ and$ currency$ devaluation.$ At$ first,$ Peru’s$ foreign$ reserves$
financed$consumption$and$imports,$allowing$García$to$increase$spending$on$social$programs$for$the$
poor,$ but$ this$ strategy$ proved$ unsustainable.$ As$ foreign$ reserves$ were$ exhausted$ and$ the$ trade$
deficit$grew,$García$was$forced$to$default$on$all$of$Peru’s$debt.340$As$Peru$entered$a$severe$economic$
crisis,$ the$ international$ financial$ institutions$ had$ essentially$ given$ up$ on$ engaging$with$ the$García$
government.$ Fujimori$ resumed$ interest$ payments$ on$ some$ international$ debts,$ which$ paved$ the$









United$States,$Spain,$and$ Japan$pledged$$2$billion$ to$cover$Peru’s$defaulted$debts$ to$ the$ IMF$and$
other$ foreign$ lenders.341$Ultimately,$ this$ restoration$of$Peru’s$ credit$ allowed$Fujimori$ to$appeal$ to$
foreign$investors$as$well,$and$by$the$end$of$his$rule$in$2000,$he$had$succeeded$in$privatizing$all$but$
10$of$Peru’s$183$stateKowned$enterprises.342$Following$the$inconsistency$of$the$1980s$and$the$failure$
of$ Peru$ to$ service$ its$ debts,$ this$ reversal$ made$ Fujimori$ a$ darling$ of$ the$ international$ financial$
institutions.$ Reforming$ economic$ policies$ and$ institutions$ in$ line$ with$ the$ prescriptions$ of$ the$
Washington$Consensus$was$sufficient$ to$appease$ the$ IFIs,$as$ they$had$not$yet$adopted$a$ focus$on$
strengthening$judicial$institutions$as$part$of$ensuring$positive$economic$growth.$
The$1992$autogolpe$sparked$international$protests$from$bilateral$donors,$which$suspended$
aid$ and$ threatened$ sanctions,$ prompting$ Fujimori$ to$ reKestablish$ the$ basic$ institutions$ and$
mechanisms$ of$ democracy.$ This$ was$ sufficient$ to$ appease$ the$ United$ States$ and$ other$ bilateral$
donors$concerned$with$democracy,$as$the$United$States$continued$to$narrowly$define$democracy$as$
free$ and$ fair$ elections,$ which$ the$ Belaúnde$ administration$ had$ met$ in$ terms$ of$ international$
standards.$U.S.Kbased$human$ rights$groups$did$ raise$ concerns$about$violations$perpetrated$by$ the$
military$ in$ its$ actions$ against$ the$ Shining$ Path,$ but$ this$ was$ not$ a$ major$ concern$ of$ the$ U.S.$
government$ at$ the$ time.$ So$ even$ as$ domestic$ actors$ were$ beginning$ to$ agitate$ for$ institutional$
changes$ related$ to$ good$ governance,$ international$ actors$ were$ more$ focused$ on$ economic$
performance$ and$ democratic$ elections,$ even$ at$ the$ expense$ of$ strong$ institutions.$ In$ addition,$
throughout$ the$1990s,$ the$war$on$drugs$was$a$major$ foreign$policy$priority$ for$ the$United$States,$











ridding$ the$ Judiciary$ of$ corruption$ and$ making$ it$ more$ efficient.$ The$ Peruvian$ government$ had$




of$ the$ country…,$ establishing$ ‘corporate$ offices’$ to$ accelerate$ case$ processing…,$ training$ for$
jurisdictional,$administrative,$and$auxiliary$personnel…,$ [increasing]$ the$ judicial$branch$budget$and$
revenues,$[and]$improving$judges’$salaries.”345$This$was$part$of$the$$100$million$judicial$reform$plan$
of$ the$ government,$ which$ anticipated$ investing$ $40$ million$ and$ having$ international$ aid$ donors$







consulting$ services,$ training,$ equipment,$ and$ physical$ infrastructure$ improvements.$
According$to$Bank$documents,$the$Project$was$to$focus$on$three$areas$that$overlapped$
significantly$with$the$Fujimori$government's$existing$reform$initiative:$administration$of$
justice,$ access$ to$ justice,$ and$ judicial$ selection,$ training,$ and$ evaluation.$ The$
administration$ of$ justice$ component$ would$ concentrate$ first$ on$ strengthening$ the$
general$management$capacities$of$the$Supreme$Court$and$the$Superior$Courts,$through$
management$ training$ and$ a$ new$ management$ information$ system.$ It$ also$ would$
contribute$ to$ improving$ the$ performance$ of$ lower$ courts$ through$ training,$ better$












Defender.…$ The$ judicial$ selection,$ training,$ and$ evaluation$ component$would$ support$
key$activities$of$the$National$Council$of$the$Judiciary$(NCJ)$(responsible$for$the$selection,$
periodic$ ratification,$ or$ removal$ of$ judges$ and$ prosecutors),$ the$ Judicial$ Academy$
(responsible$ for$ judicial$ and$ prosecutorial$ education$ and$ training),$ and$ the$ Office$ of$
Judicial$Supervision$(responsible$for$judicial$discipline),$respectively.$The$Project$was$to$
be$ carried$ out$ by$ two$ judicial$ branch$ entities$ as$well$ as$ three$ external$ agencies.$ The$
internal$ entities$ were$ Dellepiane's$ Executive$ Commission$ and$ the$ Office$ of$ Judicial$





Yet$ the$Bank$ steadfastly$moved$ forward,$anticipating$ that$ it$ could$ steer$ the$Peruvian$government$
toward$respecting$the$autonomy$of$the$Judiciary$and$reestablishing$some$of$the$independence$that$
had$been$lost.$The$resignation$of$the$CNM$proved$the$tipping$point$for$making$it$clear$that$the$loan$




















IADB$ reduced$ its$planned$support$ to$$11.5$million$ for$43$MBJs.$An$ independent$evaluation$of$ the$
MBJs$suggested$that$they$had$succeeded$ in$ increasing$access$to$ justice,$particularly$ in$those$areas$











NGOs,$ which$ it$ did$ in$ response$ to$ the$ “resistance$ of$ the$ [g]overnment$ of$ Peru$ to$ improving$ the$
effectiveness$of$state$institutions.”354$USAID$shifted$its$strategy$from$one$that$mixed$topKdown$and$
bottomKup$ reforms$ to$ one$ that$ focused$ solely$ on$ demandKdriven$ reforms$ related$ to$ restoring$
democracy$ in$Peru,$ thereby$reducing$the$activities$undertaken$as$part$of$ the$access$ to$ justice$and$
local$ government$ capacity$ results.$USAID$ activities$were$ aimed$ at$ raising$ citizen$ awareness$ about$
















Ayacucho$ and$ Trujillo.…$ It$ was$ reported$ that$ the$ majority$ of$ cases$ presented$ to$ the$
Ombudsman’s$ Office$ involve$ economic$ and$ social$ rights$ (i.e.,$ pensions,$ child$ support,$
etc.),$as$well$as$complaints$against$municipal$governments.$In$Ayacucho,$it$was$reported$
that$ 60$ percent$ of$ those$who$ approach$ the$Office$ do$ so$ because$ they$ simply$ do$ not$
know$ where$ else$ to$ go$ to$ register$ a$ complaint$ or$ file$ a$ claim.…$ In$ 1999,$ promoters$
trained$ by$ [NGOs]$ had$ disseminated$ human$ rights$ information$ among$nearly$ 175,000$
citizens.355$
$
What$ these$ projects$ suggest$ is$ that$ institutional$ strengthening$ projects$ in$ the$ late$ 1990s$
could$ not$ be$ isolated$ from$ the$ larger$ political$ context$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime.$ In$ this$ context,$
projects$ aimed$ at$ improving$ good$ governance$ in$ institutions$ in$ which$ the$ Executive$ branch$ had$
exerted$control$could$not$be$implemented,$failed$to$have$the$desired$impact,$or$had$only$a$modest$
impact.$In$institutions$that$were$not$controlled$by$the$Executive$branch,$there$were$greater$impacts,$
as$ in$ the$ case$ of$ the$ Ombudsman$ and$ decentralized$MBJs.$ Projects$ that$ circumvented$ the$ state$
entirely$by$funding$NGOs$also$had$a$positive$impact,$which$ultimately$contributed$to$pressure$on$the$
Fujimori$ regime.$However,$ the$ impact$of$aid$donors’$ interventions$ in$ this$period$could$not$halt$or$
undo$ the$ effects$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime$ on$ good$ governance$ within$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ the$
Comptroller$General’s$office.$They$could$only$contribute$to$the$struggle$against$the$regime,$whose$
1992$ coup$ precipitated$ a$ critical$ juncture$ that$ shifted$ these$ institutions$ away$ from$ good$
governance.$ A$ second$ critical$ juncture$was$ needed$ to$ shift$ them$ toward$ good$ governance$—$ the$
catalyst$for$which$was$provided$by$the$regime$itself.$$
Conclusions)
This$ chapter$ outlined$ the$ good$ governance$ changes$ in$ Peru,$ and$ specifically$ in$ the$
Comptroller$General’s$Office$and$the$Judiciary$during$the$1980s$and$the$Fujimori$era$from$1990$to$
2000.$It$suggested$that$the$shifts$in$good$governance$in$these$institutions$could$be$explained$by$the$








This$ lack$ of$ response$ can$ be$ traced$ back$ to$ the$ internal$ organizational$ dynamics$ of$
institutional$ leadership,$ the$ preference$ of$ actors$ working$ within$ these$ organizations$ for$ ensuring$
their$ job$ security,$ the$ lack$of$ significant$ good$ governance$norm$diffusion$ amongst$ actors$working$
within$these$institutions,$and$the$low$level$of$discretion$for$interpreting$rules$within$the$institutions.$
In$ terms$ of$ the$ key$ independent$ variables,$ the$ Executive$ was$ a$ strong$ driver$ of$ negative$ good$




In$ this$ context,$ aid$ donors$were$ unable$ to$ implement$ effective$ good$ governance$ projects$
because$the$level$of$state$capture$was$too$deep$for$donor$programs$to$have$a$significant$impact$on$
good$governance$in$political$institutions.$In$sum,$Fujimori’s$ability$to$weave$a$web$of$corruption$that$
consolidated$ his$ executive$ power$ undermined$ the$ ability$ of$ other$ government$ actors,$ nonK
governmental$actors,$and$the$international$community$to$influence$institutional$reforms.$$
The$result$of$this$state$capture$came$to$a$crisis$point$during$and$after$the$2000$election.$The$
ongoing$ manipulation$ of$ state$ institutions$ to$ ensure$ Fujimori’s$ reKelection,$ combined$ with$
accusations$ of$ fraud$ during$ the$ election$ process,$ caused$ wideKscale$ protests$ against$ the$ regime,$
indicating$the$increasing$power$of$a$mobilized$civil$society$and$thus$a$nascent$vertical$dimension$of$


















was$ a$ significant$ critical$ juncture$ precipitated$ by$ the$ exposure$ of$ the$ level$ of$ state$ capture$
perpetrated$ by$ Fujimori,$ and$ this$ critical$ juncture$ led$ to$ actions$ and$ events$ that$ signaled$ the$
adoption$of$good$governance$as$a$norm,$among$both$Peruvian$citizens$and$government$officials.$$
This$first$section$outlines$the$major$changes$related$to$good$governance$that$ illustrate$the$
strengthened$ mechanisms$ of$ horizontal$ and$ vertical$ accountability,$ and$ how$ they$ balanced$ the$
actions$ of$ the$ Executive$ branch$ in$ this$ era.$ The$ second$ section$ describes$ the$ nature$ of$ different$
dimensions$ of$ good$ governance$ in$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ and$ Judiciary$ in$ this$ time$ period,$
showing$how$effectiveness,$efficiency,$transparency,$and$accountability$shifted$in$these$institutions.$$






the$2000s.$ It$shows$that$while$aid$was$ instrumental$ in$ facilitating$good$governance$reforms,$ it$did$
not$ drive$ them$ in$ the$ sense$ of$ setting$ the$ agenda.$ However,$ good$ governance$ aid$ was$ key$ in$
providing$needed$technical$assistance$and$knowKhow$about$how$to$change$ institutional$structures$







the$ longKterm$ pattern$ of$ tolerance$ for$ authoritarian$ tendencies$ within$ the$ Executive$ branch.$
Corruption$ was$ no$ longer$ tolerated,$ and$ both$ civil$ society$ and$ government$ leaders$ pledged$ to$
introduce$ changes$ that$would$ increase$ good$ governance$ in$ Peru.$ As$ one$ of$ the$ leaders$ of$ Peru’s$
National$AntiKCorruption$Commission$noted,$ the$early$months$of$ transition$ showed$ that$ “Fujimori$
was$too$much.$The$scandal$really$hit$ [Peru]$and$made$[Peruvian$society]$rethink$and$reflect$about$
[its]$values$and$principles.$[Peru]$recognized$corruption$as$a$problem$and$saw$that$it$was$necessary$
to$ incorporate$a$ strategy$ to$ fight$ against$ corruption.$ [The$end$of$ the$Fujimori$ era]$was$a$point$of$
reflection$in$Peruvian$society$because$it$let$everyone$know$we$needed$to$take$action.”356$
Yet$although$ the$ first$ years$of$democratic$ transition$ saw$a$ flurry$of$new$ laws$and$policies$
aimed$ at$ promoting$ good$ governance,$ the$ democratic$ transition$ period$ has$ shown$ that$
implementation$ and$ deep$ institutional$ change$ is$ proving$ more$ difficult$ than$ “stroke$ of$ the$ pen”$
changes,$particularly$in$the$Judiciary.$This$section$traces$the$first$years$of$transition$in$order$to$bring$
to$focus$the$way$the$status$quo$of$unchecked$executive$power$was$disrupted,$and$legal$structures$
governing$ institutions$ of$ horizontal$ accountability$ were$ changed$ so$ that$ a$ balance$ of$ power$
emerged.$ Vertical$ accountability$ was$ strengthened$ with$ the$ lifting$ of$ press$ restrictions,$ and$ the$
ongoing$focus$on$good$governance$catalyzed$Peruvian$citizens$to$demand$more$accountability$from$
the$state.$Legal$changes$helped$reintroduce$ independence$ in$ the$Comptroller$General’s$office$and$









characterized$Peru’s$history,$ the$postKFujimori$ era$ transition$had$a$different$quality$ to$ it.$ In$many$
ways,$this$was$because$Peru’s$transition$came$at$a$time$when$international$financial$institutions$and$






election$ that$ year$ due$ to$ extensive$ allegations$ of$ electoral$ fraud.$ Toledo$ was$ faced$ with$ the$
significant$challenge$of$creating$new$legal$safeguards$to$keep$the$power$of$the$Executive$in$check,$
while$disentangling$the$Executive$from$its$interference$in$these$institutions.(
The$ immediate$ aftermath$ of$ the$ Montesinos$ bribery$ scandal$ and$ Fujimori’s$ resignation$
represented$ a$window$ of$ opportunity$ for$ developing$ and$ strengthening$ institutions$ that$ Fujimori$
had$systematically$weakened$during$his$10$years$in$power.$The$period$between$2002$and$2005$was$
marked$ by$ a$ flurry$ of$ new$ laws$ and$ policies$ aimed$ at$ promoting$ good$ governance$ in$ Peru,$
particularly$by$removing$the$opportunity$for$executive$interference$in$government$institutions,$and$
formally$ giving$ other$ government$ actors$more$ power$ to$ keep$ the$ Executive$ branch$ in$ check.$ An$
overarching$priority$was$to$devolve$power$away$from$the$Executive$branch$and$institutions$in$Lima,$
which$was$ accomplished$by$ the$ creation$ of$ new$ regional$ governments$ in$ 2002;$ these$were$ given$
many$ functions$ that$ had$ been$ a$ monopoly$ of$ the$ central$ government$ during$ the$ Fujimori$ era,$
including$ budgetary$ functions.$ One$ of$ the$ immediate$ results$ of$ this$ decentralization$ process$ was$









“promotion$ of$ ethics$ and$ transparency$ and$ eradication$ of$ corruption,$ money$ laundering,$ tax$
evasion,$and$contraband$in$all$ its$forms.”358$ In$addition$to$these$policies,$several$ laws$were$passed$
that$related$to$transparency$and$accountability$in$the$public$sector.$These$included$the$2005$Law$on$
Code$of$Ethics$in$Public$Office$and$the$2002$Law$of$Transparency$and$Access$to$Public$Information,$
which$obligates$ the$ state$ to$ “encourage$ transparency,$publish$and$grant$ [s]tate$ information$ to$all$
citizens,$ and$obligate$ all$ [s]tate$ entities$ to$operate$ transparent$Web$ sites$ on$which$ are$published$
documents$on$administration,$budgets,$procurement,$and$activities$of$public$officers.”359$
Despite$these$efforts,$ there$ is$a$perception$among$Peruvian$citizens$that$corruption$has$ in$
fact$been$increasing$since$the$Fujimori$era,$a$perception$that$has$grown$with$the$increase$in$press$
coverage$on$corruption.$In$many$ways,$it$can$be$argued$that$Toledo$is$the$victim$of$his$own$success$
in$ reKestablishing$ democratic$ safeguards,$ particularly$ in$ terms$ of$ increased$ government$
transparency$ and$ liberalization$ of$ the$ press.$ During$ the$ Fujimori$ era,$ the$ press$ fought$ an$ uphill$
battle$ to$ report$ corruption,$ often$ at$ great$ risk$ of$ threats,$ intimidation,$ and$ harassment$ by$ the$
government.360$Once$ this$ reporting$became$easier$ under$ the$ Toledo$administration,$ there$was$ an$
increase$ in$ reporting$ on$ accusations$ of$ corruption,$which$ some$ have$ labeled$denuncialogia$—$ an$


















accusations$ that$ Toledo’s$ campaign$had$ forged$ the$ signatures$needed$ to$ register$his$ Peru$Posible$
party$for$the$2005$elections,$a$charged$that$was$later$validated$by$forensic$analysis$showing$that$77$
percent$of$the$1.2$million$signatures$were$ indeed$forged.363$Although$Toledo$denied$knowledge$of$
this,$he$ finished$his$ term$under$a$cloud$of$ suspicion$ that$his$actions$were$no$different$ than$ those$
taken$by$ Fujimori$ during$ the$ 2000$ election.$ Peruvians$ lost$ confidence$ in$ Toledo’s$ leadership$ style$
and$ability$to$govern,$leading$to$calls$for$his$early$resignation.$He$narrowly$avoided$an$impeachment$
vote$in$Congress$and$managed$to$serve$out$his$full$term,$leaving$office$with$a$40$percent$approval$
rating.$What$ this$ shows$ is$ that$ there$ was$ both$ increased$ public$ attention$ and$ sensitivity$ toward$
corruption,$ illustrating$ that$mechanisms$of$ vertical$ accountability$were$ focused$on$ issues$ of$ good$
governance,$ and$ their$ ability$ to$ affect$ change$ had$ grown$ stronger.$ At$ the$ same$ time,$ effort$ to$
strengthen$horizontal$accountability$through$decentralization$had$been$initiated.$
Economic(Stability(and(Gradual(Reforms(
The$ García$ administration$ that$ came$ to$ office$ in$ 2005$ continued$ to$ support$ institutional$
reforms,$ particularly$ in$ terms$ of$ antiKcorruption.$ Assisting$ García$ in$ this$ endeavor$ were$ multiple$
international$ aid$ donor$ agencies$ that$ had$ pledged$ assistance$ for$ good$ governance$ reforms$ and$
began$ implementing$ discrete$ projects$ during$ the$ Toledo$ era.$ Peru$ had$ at$ least$ 22$ different$
international$ donor$ agencies$ pledging$ or$ providing$ good$ governanceKrelated$ funds$ between$ 2002$
and$2011$(see$Table$4$in$Chapter$4).$This$aid$was$aimed$specifically$at$improving$the$functions$and$
integrity$ of$ government$ institutions,$ usually$ along$ the$ lines$ of$ the$ four$ dimensions$ of$ good$
governance$ outlined$ in$ Chapter$ 4:$ efficiency,$ effectiveness,$ transparency,$ and$ accountability.$ As$
noted$ in$Chapter$1,$aid$donors$ increasingly$embraced$ the$notion$ that$wellKfunctioning$ institutions$
are$a$necessary$preKcondition$for$development,$and$that$corruption,$inefficient$or$ineffective$service$












to$ Combat$ Corruption$ and$ the$ establishment$ of$ a$ HighKLevel$ AntiKCorruption$ Commission,$ were$
undermined$by$corruption$scandals$implicating$the$García$administration.$The$biggest$of$these$was$
the$Petroaudios$scandal$in$2008,$in$which$a$former$García$tax$advisor$was$proved$to$have$received$
bribes$ from$ a$ foreign$ firm$ for$ an$ oil$ contract$ with$ Peru’s$ stateKowned$ oil$ company.364$ Although$
García$removed$the$advisor$from$the$company’s$board$of$directors$and$suspended$the$contract$with$
the$ foreign$ company,$ additional$ investigations$ into$ the$ scandal$ implicated$ the$ Prime$ Minister,$
prompting$the$resignation$of$García’s$entire$cabinet$to$avoid$censure$in$Congress.365$$
The$ García$ administration$ could$ best$ be$ described$ as$ having$ made$ gradual,$ fractured$
progress$ in$ terms$ of$ institutional$ reforms,$ with$ increases$ in$ the$ quality$ of$ government$ agencies$
varying$ from$ organization$ to$ organization.$ For$ example,$ on$ the$ positive$ side,$ the$ Comptroller$
General’s$ office$ uncovered$many$ acts$ of$ corruption$ each$ year,$ which$ often$ resulted$ in$ employee$
dismissal$ or$ prosecution.$ However,$ those$ who$ suffered$ such$ consequences$ were$ often$ lowKlevel$
bureaucrats,$whereas$highKlevel$officials$seemed$to$be$able$to$immunize$themselves366$A$2008$Civil$
Service$ Law$ aimed$ to$ unify$ publicKsector$ hiring$ and$ compensation$ and$ promote$ legitimacy$ and$
meritocracy$in$the$civil$service,$but$Peru’s$bureaucracy$continued$to$be$plagued$by$a$lack$of$capacity$
and$ technical$ skills$ compounded$by$ low$publicKsector$ salaries.$ This$ is$ partly$ a$ consequence$of$ the$
process$of$decentralization$started$in$2002,$in$which$unskilled$rural$administrations$came$to$power,$









Judiciary$ remained$ serious$ issues,$ with$ bureaucratic$ delays,$ unequal$ access$ to$ justice$ and$
government$services$for$the$poor,$prison$overcrowding,$and$excessive$detention$times$cited$as$huge$
problems.$ Many$ judges$ and$ prosecutors$ are$ thought$ to$ lack$ competence,$ impartiality,$ and$
independence.$ In$ addition,$ there$ was$ a$ feeling$ that$ the$ culture$ of$ nepotism$ and$ cronyism$ was$
exacerbated$under$García,$who$filled$administrative$positions$with$APRA$loyalists.$
Since$ the$ end$ of$ $ García’s$ presidency,$ there$ have$ been$ no$ significant$ crises,$ shocks,$
hyperinflation,$ or$ policy$ flipKflops$of$ the$ kind$ that$ characterized$Peru$ in$ the$past,368$ and$ the$2011$
presidential$ election$ was$ free$ and$ fair.$ In$ general,$ however,$ Peru$ had$ largely$ avoided$ the$ antiK
democratic$ reactions$ that$ have$ characterized$ government$ transitions$ in$ the$ past.$ For$ example,$
during$the$Toledo$signature$scandal,$rather$than$being$ousted$by$force,$Toledo$was$subjected$to$the$
procedures$of$Congressional$oversight$and$an$impeachment$proceeding.$Yet$progress$on$reforming$







The$ scandal$ that$ brought$ down$ the$ FujimoriKMontesinos$ regime$ led$ to$ a$ transitional$
government$ that$ purged$ the$ Fujimoristas$ of$ institutional$ leadership.$ The$ Valentin$ Paniagua$
transitional$government$that$ruled$from$November$2000$to$July$2001$until$the$election$of$Alejandro$








the$ Sistema$ Nacional$ de$ Control$ must$ be$ professionals$ and$ university$ graduates.369$ Following$
Toledo’s$election,$the$main$priority$for$the$Peruvian$government$was$reforming$political$institutions$
in$line$with$the$concepts$of$good$governance,$and$this$affected$all$institutions$in$Peru.$In$September$
of$ 2001,$ the$ Congress$ Investigating$ Commission$ on$ Economic$ &$ Financial$ Crimes$ brought$
Constitutional$accusations$against$ the$Comptroller$General$ from$the$Fujimori$era,$Victor$Caso$Lay,$
for$coverKups,$omissions$of$denunciations,$collusion,$embezzlement,$and$misappropriation.$Caso$Lay$





and$ social$ development$ (through$ 2010).$ The$ Acuerdo$ Nacional$ was$ the$ catalyst$ for$ laws$ on$
modernizing$ state$ management$ and$ decentralization,$ and$ committing$ Peru$ to$ the$ ideals$ of$
“democracy$ and$ the$ state$ of$ law”$ and$ an$ “efficient,$ transparent,$ and$decentralized”$ state.370$ This$
was$unprecedented$ for$ Peru,$ both$ in$ terms$of$ developing$ such$ a$ framework$ in$ such$ a$manner$of$
broad$ public$ consultation,$ and$ in$ using$ the$ language$ of$ good$ governance$ to$ do$ so.$ A$ related$
significant$legal$change$for$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$came$in$July$2002$with$the$adoption$of$
Law$27785,$the$Organic$Law$of$the$National$System$of$Control$and$the$Comptroller$General$of$the$
Republic.$ This$ law$ repealed$ the$ Decree$ Law$ 26162$ of$ 1992,$ which$ had$ limited$ the$ Comptroller$
General’s$ powers$ and$mandate,$ and$ established$ rules$ governing$ the$ scope,$ organization,$ powers,$












foster$ appropriate,$ timely,$ and$ effective$ governmental$ control$ in$ order$ to$ prevent$ and$ verify$ the$
correct$and$transparent$use$and$management$of$state$resources,$as$well$as$to$develop$the$“honest$
and$ upright”$ functions$ and$ actions$ of$ government$ authorities,$ officials,$ and$ public$ servants.371$ As$
part$of$this$law,$the$police$investigative$function$was$reinstated,$as$was$the$previous$control$in$highK




Comptroller$ General’s$ office’s$ adoption$ of$ the$ 2002$ Public$ Function$ Ethics$ Code$ Law,$ several$
changes$in$2004$related$to$rulings,$infractions,$and$sanction$procedures,$and$a$modification$to$Law$
27785$related$to$the$designation$and$removal$of$auditing$chiefs.$The$most$striking$feature$of$these$
laws$ is$ that$ the$ term$ “good$ governance”$ was$ explicitly$ mentioned$ several$ times$ —$ once$ in$ a$
paragraph$ favoring$ good$ governance$ in$Article$ 43$of$ Law$28396,$ and$ twice$ in$ the$modification$of$
Article$19$of$Law$27785.$$
Despite$ these$ changes$ to$ the$ legal$ framework,$ citizen$ perception$ of$ the$ Comptroller$
General’s$office$were$largely$negative$during$Toledo’s$term.$Although$many$of$the$legal$structures$of$
the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ were$ now$ in$ line$ with$ international$ standards,372$ citizens$
considered$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$one$of$the$most$corrupt$institutions$in$2004$(see$Figure$
4).$In$part,$this$is$because$the$changes$to$the$legal$framework$did$not$automatically$lead$to$changes$
in$ how$ the$ institutions$ functioned.$ For$ the$Comptroller$General’s$ office$ in$ particular,$ its$ ability$ to$
audit$ state$ expenditures,$ to$ complete$ and$ submit$ these$ reports$ to$ Congress,$ and$ to$monitor$ the$















have$ functioning$ relationships$ with$ other$ accountability$ agencies$ that$ formed$ the$ pillars$ of$ the$
National$ Control$ System,$ the$ Budget$ and$ Public$ Accounts$ Committee,$ and$ the$ External$ Oversight$
and$Audit$Committee.$The$assessment$was$that$these$pillars$acted$in$isolation$from$one$another$due$
to$a$lack$of$incentives$for$interKinstitutional$cooperation,$had$failed$to$developed$“efficient$linkages$
and$ effective$ synergies$ amongst$ themselves,”$ and$ thus$ “lacked$ the$ coherence$ and$ consistency$
required$for$ensuring$government$accountability.”376$$
One$ area$ in$ which$ the$ perception$ of$ citizens$ did$ not$ match$ the$ reality$ was$ in$ budget$
participation$ and$ transparency,$ given$ that$ the$ most$ direct$ way$ for$ citizens$ to$ participate$ in$ the$
budget$ process$ is$ by$ having$ access$ to$ information$ in$ the$ first$ place.$ The$ public$ perception$ of$
participation$and$transparency$for$both$the$Executive$branch$and$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$as$
the$institution$tasked$with$controlling$spending$was$very$low,$despite$a$2003$Law$on$Fiscal$Prudence$
and$ Transparency,$ and$ transparency$ and$ access$ to$ public$ information$ laws,$ including$ the$ Law$ for$
Administrative$ Simplification,$ which$ acknowledged$ the$ right$ of$ citizen$ access$ to$ information$
regarding$ administrative$ procedures.377$ One$ expert$ assessment$ expressed$ surprise$ at$ the$ “scant$
positive$responses$regarding$citizen’s$participation$[…because]$citizens$have$diverse$mechanisms$for$















the$ [W]eb$ sites$ of$ the$ government$ or$ by$ issuing$ a$ request$ for$ certain$ information.$ It$ has$ to$ be$
mentioned$ that$ this$ information$ has$ been$ made$ more$ accessible$ due$ to$ the$ consultation$
mechanisms$ of$ the$ [W]eb$ sites$ themselves.$ If$ this$ proves$ insufficient,$ the$ [W]ebmasters$ of$ the$
different$ sites$ can$be$ of$ help.$ In$ case$ of$ still$ not$ obtaining$ the$ information,$ citizens$ can$ initiate$ a$
judicial$ action$ of$ Habeas$ Data.”378$ In$ terms$ of$ these$ mechanisms,$ during$ the$ Toledo$ era,$ the$
government$made$ a$big$ push,$ as$ part$ of$ its$ efforts$ to$ encourage$ citizen$participation$ and$ vertical$
accountability,$and$to$establish$a$transparency$portal,$which$is$considered$the$most$advanced$in$the$
region.379$ That$ said,$ issues$ of$ government$ accountability$ and$ inadequate$ resources$ did$ present$ a$
continued$ problem:$ “In$ spite$ of$ this$ regulation,$ the$ access$ to$ information$ is$ still$ difficult$ and$
expensive.$ The$ public$ entities$ give$ preference$ to$ particular$ members$ of$ the$ media,$ and$ [make]$
difficult…$access$for$others.$At$[the]$regional$level,$the$problem$is$even$more$serious.$In$many$cases,$
the$lack$of$resources$in$the$public$sector$is$the$reason$for$the$information$not$being$available,$as$the$
institutions$ do$ not$ have$ the$ personnel$ [or]$ the$ necessary$material$ to$ generate,$ file,$ and$ process$
information.$Like$this,$the$public$entities$are$slow$in$giving$the$information$(or$deny$having$it),$make$
unnecessary$ requirements,$ and$ demand$ exaggerated$ fees.”380$ In$ addition,$ the$ behavior$ of$ the$
Executive$ branch,$ particularly$ some$ scandals$ related$ to$ President$ Toledo’s$ personal$ behavior,$
affected$perceptions$of$transparency$of$all$government$institutions.381$Finally,$as$of$2006,$there$was$


















Between$ the$end$of$ the$Toledo$era$ in$2006$and$ the$end$of$ the$García$era$ in$2011,$citizen$
perceptions$of$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$had$significantly$shifted$toward$the$positive$(Figures$
4$ and$ 5).$ In$ 2006,$ the$ Comptroller$General’s$ office$was$ assessed$ as$mixed$or$ negative$ on$ several$
factors,$ including$its$ independence,$its$consistency$in$making$regular$public$reports,$ its$consistency$
in$auditing$Executive$branch$asset$disclosures,$its$provision$of$access$to$citizens$on$asset$disclosure$
records$of$heads$of$state$and$government$and$on$audit$reports$within$a$reasonable$time$period$and$
at$ a$ reasonable$ cost,$ and$ the$ adequacy$ of$ its$ professional$ staff.383$ In$ addition,$ there$ was$ little$
evidence$ that$ the$ agency$ received$ all$ the$ funding$ it$ needed$ to$ work$ effectively,$ or$ that$ the$
government$ implemented$ the$ recommendations$ and$ findings$made$ by$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$
























In 2004 (top box), 12% rated the Comptroller General as most prepared to confront 











In$terms$of$effectiveness,$75$percent$of$ the$government’s$ total$expenditure$was$subject$ to$annual$
audits$by$ the$Comptroller$General’s$office,$ and$audited$entities$were$ legally$obliged$ to$ follow$ the$
Comptroller$General’s$office’s$recommendations.386$In$terms$of$efficiency,$there$was$a$“reduction$in$
the$ time$needed$ to$ carry$out$ the$evaluation$process$ for$providing$additional$essential$ funding$ for$
public$building$projects$by$46$percent,$and$90$percent$of$ the$ local$governments$that$had$received$
training$ on$ monitoring$ systems$ have$ now$ started$ to$ implement$ internal$ monitoring$ systems$ to$
ensure$that$resources$are$used$appropriately.$From$2011,$19$percent$of$the$budget$is$therefore$no$
longer$ planned$ and$ implemented$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ activities,$ but$ instead$ on$ the$ basis$ of$ concrete$
results.$ In$ addition,$ support$ has$ been$ given$ to$ the$ semiKautonomous$ tax$ agencies,$ which$ have$
increased$ their$ revenues$ by$ 49$ percent$ since$ they$ were$ first$ established.”387$ In$ terms$ of$
accountability,$there$were$illustrative$cases$of$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$being$responsive$ in$
terms$of$media$investigations$into$corruption$in$the$use$of$public$funds,388$and$being$responsive$to$


























to$ Congress$ that$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ opened$ 29,405$ reports$ for$ 2,369$ government$
agencies$between$January$2009$and$July$2011,$an$indication$that$despite$being$appointed$by$García,$
Khoury$was$not$ shying$away$ from$ investigating$ cases$ that$might$have$ caused$ further$ scandals$ for$
the$president.394$$
Another$ concern$ is$ that$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ cannot$ enforce$ its$ own$
recommendations.$ “Legally,$ public$ entities$ are$ obliged$ to$ report$ on$ actions$ taken$ on$ the$






27785,$which$ states$ that$ public$ servants$may$ incur$ sanctions$ even$ after$ they$ leave$ their$ posts,$ if$
violations$ of$ internal$ rulings$ or$ poor$ fiscal$ management$ are$ subsequently$ discovered.$ It$ also$
stipulates$ that$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ may$ forward$ cases$ to$ the$ relevant$ civil$ or$ penal$
authority,$ and$ if$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ fails$ to$ do$ so$ in$ a$ timely$ fashion,$ the$ Chief$ of$
Internal$Auditing$must$inform$the$Public$Attorney.$Yet$despite$these$concerns,$the$evidence$points$















Intelligence$ Service,$ Vladimiro$Montesinos,$ and$ the$ effect$ it$ had$ on$ the$ Fujimori$ administration’s$
hold$on$power,$led$to$swift$action$that$helped$to$undo,$at$least$legally,$some$of$the$damage$wrought$
from$ 1992$ to$ 2000.$ The$ new$ oppositionKcontrolled$ Congress$ began$ a$ process$ of$ renewal$ of$ the$




nine$ senior$ judges,$ and$ the$attorney$general,$who$had$blocked$ investigations$and$prosecutions$of$
corruption$ and$ abuse$ of$ power$ made$ against$ highKlevel$ government$ officials$ in$ the$ Fujimori$
administration.$ The$ Toledo$ administration$ also$ reduced$ the$ number$ of$ provisional$ judges$ to$ 30$
percent$ and$ appointed$qualified$professionals$ to$ top$positions$within$ the$ Judiciary$ in$ an$ effort$ to$
banish$ the$practice$of$unqualified$ individuals$being$given$top$government$posts$ in$ return$ for$ their$
loyalty$ to$ the$president.$ In$ addition,$ several$ resolutions$were$passed$ that$designated$ special$ antiK
corruption$ prosecutors$ to$ try$ cases$ against$ those$ accused$ of$ undermining$ the$ state’s$ interests,$
offering$protection$and$reduced$sentences$to$witnesses$who$were$willing$to$testify$—$presumably$to$
aid$in$building$a$case$against$Montesinos$and$Fujimori.$In$conjunction$with$this,$Congress$established$
special$ commissions$ to$ carry$ out$ investigations$ and$ present$ antiKcorruption$ charges,$ which$ were$
then$ reported$ to$ prosecutors$ and$ antiKcorruption$ judges.$ The$ special$ antiKcorruption$ courts$ that$
were$ established$ to$ investigate$ and$ prosecute$ allegations$ of$ highKlevel$ corruption$ commenced$






court$ sentenced$Montesinos$ to$ 15$ years$ in$ prison$ for$ bribery,$ embezzlement,$ and$ corruption.397$
Fujimori,$who$took$up$residence$ in$Chile$ in$an$effort$to$ launch$a$bid$for$the$2005$presidency$from$
abroad,$ was$ extradited$ to$ Peru$ in$ 2007,$ and$ eventually$ sentenced$ in$ 2009$ to$ 25$ years$ in$ jail$ for$
human$rights$violations$and$corruption.398$$
During$ the$ Toledo$ administration,$ there$ was$ a$ broad$ effort$ aimed$ at$ restarting$ judicial$
reforms,$ but$ this$ time$ with$ the$ consensus$ of$ all$ the$ major$ actors$ within$ the$ Judiciary.$ In$ 2001,$
Congress$ passed$ Law$ No.$ 27367,$ deactivating$ the$ Judicial$ Executive$ Commissions$ and$ technical$




service$ delivery$ and$ access$ to$ justice,$ reducing$ corruption$ and$ delays,$ and$ strengthening$
independence.$ This$ was$ overseen$ by$ a$ Special$ Commission$ of$ Administration$ of$ Justice$ Reform$
(Comisión$Especial$de$Reforma$Integral$de$la$Administración$de$la$Justicia,$or$CERIAJUS),$which$was$
created$by$Law$No.$28083,$passed$in$October$2003.399$The$aim$of$CERIAJUS$was$to$propose$a$legal$
framework$ for$ the$planned$ reform$of$ the$ Judiciary,$ starting$with$a$ law$ (No.$10676)$ that$ reformed$
the$1993$Constitution$and$mandated$the$reform$of$the$Judiciary,$Constitutional$Tribunal,$and$other$
entities,$ and$ made$ provisions$ for$ the$ coordination$ of$ the$ relationships$ between$ them.400$
International$ aid$ donors$ had$ pledged$ their$ support$ for$ funding$ parts$ of$ these$ reforms,$ and$ the$
implementation$phase$began$in$2004.$
Reforms$did$not$have$an$instant$impact,$of$course,$and$unfortunately$for$Toledo,$continual$
scandals$ deepened$ the$ perception$ that$ the$ Judiciary$ was$ the$ most$ corrupt$ institution$ in$ Peru.$











scandals$ involving$ the$Executive$branch$ raised$questions$about$whether$ the$ Judiciary$had$actually$
regained$ its$ independence.$ In$2004,$Toledo$was$criticized$for$his$association$with$a$ former$advisor$
accused$of$a$2001$conspiracy$to$bribe$judges$investigating$corruption$charges,402$and$in$2005,$a$tax$
scandal$ erupted$ that$ involved$ Toledo’s$ vice$ president,$ whose$ personal$ lawyer$ was$ arrested$ for$
attempting$to$influence$the$justice$system.403$Thus,$despite$the$structural$changes$undertaken$at$the$
start$of$Toledo’s$term$aimed$at$promoting$independence$and$good$governance$in$the$Judiciary,$by$
2005$there$a$widespread$perception$that$ the$Judiciary$was$one$of$ the$most$corrupt$ institutions$ in$
Peru404$and$still$prone$to$executive$interference.$
This$ did$ not$ change$ during$ the$ García$ presidency,$ as$ various$ events$ contributed$ to$ a$
perception$ that$ the$ culture$of$ nepotism$and$ cronyism$ that$ favored$APRA$ loyalists$ during$ the$ first$
García$ government$ was$ repeating$ itself.$ In$ 2010,$ García$ issued$ Decree$ Law$ 1097,$ which$ would$
retroactively$ impose$ a$ statute$ of$ limitations$ on$war$ crimes$ and$ crimes$ against$ humanity,$ thereby$
granting$amnesty$to$ individuals$ like$García,$accused$of$complicity$ in$such$crimes$during$the$1980s.$
The$law$was$rescinded$after$significant$domestic$and$international$protests.405$That$same$year,$the$
CNM$was$the$subject$of$two$scandals$that$suggested$irregularities$in$the$judicial$selection$process.$In$
the$ first,$ a$ wellKregarded$ prosecutor$ who$ developed$ and$ won$ the$ prosecution$ argument$ in$ the$

















for$ vacant$ slots$ in$ the$ Supreme$ Prosecutor’s$ Office$ after$ allegations$ emerged$ that$ one$ of$ the$







were$ concerns$ about$ the$ serious$ problems$with$ bureaucratic$ delays,$ such$ as$ excessive$ detention$
times$and$case$backlogs,$and$unequal$access$to$justice$for$the$poor.$Cases$tended$to$get$processed$
extremely$ slowly:$ For$ example,$ of$ the$ 399$minor$ criminal$ cases$ initiated$ in$ 2001$ that$ related$ to$
Fujimori’s$ term$ in$office,$sentences$had$been$passed$on$only$39$by$the$start$of$García’s$ term408$ in$
2005.$ Several$ evaluations$ of$ the$ state$ of$ the$ justice$ system$ in$ Peru$ have$ shown$ that$ “serious$
structural,$ economic,$ and$ cultural$ problems$ hinder[ed]$ the$ independent$ and$ impartial$
administration$ of$ justice.$ The$ system$ is$ generally$ underfunded,$ and$ the$ caseload$ far$ outstrips$
judicial$ capacity.”409$ Also$ diminishing$ the$ judicial$ system’s$ effectiveness$ and$ credibility$ was$
instability,$ such$ as$wage$ strikes$ in$ 2004,$ 2007,$ 2009,$ and$ 2010$ by$ judicial$ branch$ employees$ that$
exacerbated$Peru’s$ twoKmillion$case$backlog.$Both$public$perception$ (captured$ in$Figures$6$and$7)$
and$expert$ assessments$ give$ the$ impression$ that$ the$ legal$ and$ administrative$ changes$ introduced$

















































five$ percent$ of$ our$ staff$ treats$ users,$ the$ public,$ very$ badly,$ and$ that$ is$ not$ right.$ Of$
course,$that$is$because$we$have$a$lot$of$backlog.$If$we$are$going$to$have$judges$that$say$I$
am$only$going$to$see$two$files$and$that’s$ it,$ the$backlog$ is$going$to$ increase$every$day$
and$ delivery$ of$ services$ is$ going$ to$ take$ even$ longer.$No$ reform$process$will$ improve$




often$ overlook$ the$ achievements$ that$ have$ been$ made.$ For$ example,$ a$ report$ published$ by$ the$
Judicial$ Ethics$ Commission$ showed$ that$ 60$ percent$ of$ Peruvian$ judges$ had$ been$ sanctioned$ for$
ethics$violations$between$2000$and$2010,$and$that$of$those$sanctioned,$54$percent$were$removed$as$
a$consequence.411$While$this$reflects$an$ongoing$problem$with$corruption,$it$also$shows$the$shift$in$
the$ culture$ of$ oversight$ and$ accountability$ within$ the$ Judiciary.$ The$ investigations$ and$ removals$
were$due$ to$ the$ effective$oversight$ of$OCMA.$ In$ the$ Fujimori$ era,$OCMA$was$ another$ vehicle$ for$
executive$power,$and$at$the$center$of$the$controversy$over$the$1998$resignation$of$the$CNM,$when$
Congress$passed$a$ law$that$deprived$the$CNM$of$ its$power$ to$ remove$Supreme$Court$ judges,$and$
invested$ that$ power$ into$ OCMA.$ At$ that$ time,$ OCMA$ was$ neither$ independent$ nor$ effective$ in$
fulfilling$its$mission$of$controlling$judicial$corruption,$as$one$interviewee$noted:$“As$much$as$I$know,$
there$are$several$cases$in$which$OCMA$has$supported$the$people$in$order$to$catch$the$judge$or$catch$
the$ assistants.$ [There$ have]$ been$ several$ cases$ on$ TV$ showing$ OCMA$ with$ the$ lawyer$ and$ the$
people.$You$didn’t$ see$ that$ in$Fujimori’s$ time,$ forget$ it.”412$By$2010,$however,$OCMA$had$become$










era,$ had$ regained$ some$ credibility$ during$ the$ last$ 10$ years,$ and$ was$ considered$ to$ exercise$ its$
“constitutional$ adjudication$ powers$ in$ a$ more$ independent$ manner.”414$ Contributing$ to$ this$
credibility$was$an$increase$in$transparency,$facilitated$by$publishing$a$variety$of$information$online.$
The$Tribunal$Constitucional$Web$page$is$ lauded$as$a$key$resource,$and$certain$newspapers$publish$
rulings$on$a$daily$basis$as$well.$ That$ said,$ some$ information$ that$ is$meant$ to$be$published$online,$
such$ as$ the$ outcomes$ of$ Supreme$ Court$ rulings,$ are$ not$ being$ implemented$ consistently$ or$
quickly.415$$
The$picture$that$emerges$from$this$decade$of$reforms$is$thus$a$complicated$one,$given$the$
multiple$ institutions,$ levels$ of$ reform,$ and$ different$ aspects$ of$ good$ governance$ at$ which$ the$





improved,$ both$ in$ terms$ of$ individual$ judges$ and$ of$ highKlevel$ political$ players.$ But$ these$
achievements$ seem$ insignificant$ when$ set$ against$ the$ context$ of$ the$ enormity$ of$ the$ problem.$
Finally,$while$some$strides$have$been$made,$ the$massive$case$backlog$continues$ to$plague$ judicial$
efficiency.$A$decade$after$ the$end$of$ the$Fujimori$ regime,$ the$conclusions$ from$all$quarters$about$
the$ Judiciary$ seem$ to$ be$ that$ there$ had$ been$ a$ positive$ shift$ toward$ good$ governance,$ and$ that$
governance$ is$ better$ than$ it$ was$ during$ the$ Fujimori$ era$ but$ still$ corrupt,$ inefficient,$ and$ only$
somewhat$effective$and$transparent.$
Explaining)Good)Governance)Shifts)in)Political)Institutions)







context.$ The$ events$ surrounding$ the$ downfall$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime$ led$ to$ a$ critical$ juncture$ in$




both$ the$ transitional$and$Toledo$governments$oversaw$changes$ to$ laws$and$structures$ that$put$ in$
place$ a$ legal$ framework$ for$ promoting$ good$ governance.$ At$ the$ same$ time,$ good$ governance$
became$ a$ national$ issue$ in$ the$ media,$ and$ a$ number$ of$ NGOs$ were$ formed$ around$ promoting$
different$aspects$of$good$governance,$particularly$in$terms$of$monitoring$government$performance$
in$ this$ area.$ These$ laws$ have$ not$ been$ reversed$ by$ the$ subsequent$ democratically$ elected$
governments,$ and$ civil$ society$ remains$ a$ driving$ force$ in$ keeping$ the$ public$ sector$ focused$ on$
fighting$corruption$in$particular.$Yet$at$the$institutional$level,$many$changes$remain$in$the$letter$of$
the$ law$only,$due$to$sluggish$ implementation.$Good$governance$has$become$an$ important$agenda$







during$ the$ transition$ period$ were$ advocates$ of$ good$ governance,$ and$ generated$ significant$
endogenous$ political$ will$ for$ good$ governance$ reforms$ in$ the$ first$ few$ years$ after$ the$ Fujimori’s$
downfall.$ Such$ changes$ were$ possible$ because$ of$ the$ power$ dynamics$ that$ existed$ within$ the$
institutions.$ Chapter$ 5$ showed$ that$ both$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ were$




levels$ to$ challenge$ the$ status$ quo.$ During$ the$ 1980s$ and$ 1990s,$ the$ status$ quo$ within$ the$
Comptroller$General’s$office$and$the$Judiciary$was$an$institutional$culture$that$did$not$recognize$or$
embrace$the$good$governance$agenda.$This$status$quo$shifted$in$the$transition$years,$when$the$good$
governance$ agenda$ was$ embraced$ as$ a$ reaction$ to$ the$ Fujimori$ regime.$ Several$ interviewees$
emphasized$ that$ this$ was$ not$ indicative$ of$ a$moral$ shift$ of$ individual$ attitudes$ from$ one$ of$ proK
corruption$ or$ antiKgood$ governance;$ individuals$ tended$ to$ simply$ accept$ the$ status$ quo$ without$
questioning$ the$ consequences$ of$ their$ actions$ on$ the$ institution$ or$ society.$ As$ one$ interviewee$
noted:$$
There$ has$ been$ a$ shift$ in$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ to$ a$ culture$ of$ good$
governance,$but$the$problem$is$this$—$Peru$is$a$country$that$still$does$not$know$how$to$
distinguish$between$corruption$and$ inefficiency.$For$example,$ if$ I$go$somewhere$and$ I$
see$ that$ the$ line$ takes$ a$ long$while,$ I$ say$ “Oh,$ that$ person$ is$ corrupt.”$ People$ don’t$





For$ those$ in$ the$ institution$who$were$ not$ leaders,$ there$was$ little$ room$ to$ act$ as$ change$
agents$ for$good$governance$during$ the$Fujimori$era$ if$ they$wanted$ to$ survive,$and$many$of$ these$




reKelection.$During$ the$ transition,$ the$ leadership$of$ the$ JNE$was$ replaced,$ and$by$ the$ time$of$ the$












the$ early$ years$ of$ legal$ changes% gave% way% to% longKterm% implementation% of% reforms.% This% was% a%
particular)problem)in)the)Judiciary,)where)the)president)is)chosen)every)two)years.)While)this)can)be)
beneficial) in) rotating)out)antiKreform& leaders,& it&also&means& that& the& reform&efforts& started%by%proK
good$ governance$ leaders$ can$ be$ stalled$ or$ swept$ away$ in$ the$ absence$ of$ a$ cadre$ of$ midKlevel$
employees(willing( to( rally(against( the( status(quo.(For(example,( the(president(of( the( Judiciary( from(
2009$to$2011,$Javier$Villa$Stein,$explicitly$declared"upon"taking"office"that"he"was"not"there"to"speak"
of#or#execute#reforms.#An#evaluation#of#his#presidency#by#an#independent#NGO#showed#that#during#
his$ two$ years$ in$ office,$ there$ was$ no$ progress$ made$ on$ reforms$ in$ the$ areas$ of$ antiKcorruption,*




corruption.420! Yet$ although$ San$ Martin$ moved$ forward$ with$ some$ administrative$ reforms,$ other$




empathy.) Things) were) going) sort) of) well,) but) [after) the) OCMA) issue]) he) lost) all) his)
leadership,+and+there+is+tension+now.+As+ long+as+the+leader+consolidates+his+ leadership,+
reform" projects" go" fine," but" if" there" is" tension," people" are" not" going" to" be" very"
convinced.)In)my)experience)the)whole)institution)aligns)with)the)leader,)so)I)don’t)think)
that$ people$ are$ going$ to$ fight$ him,$ but$ they$won’t$ follow$ him$ very$ firmly$ [and]$ if$ he$













This% example% underscores% another% dimension% of% endogenous% power% dynamics% that% affects%
the$ implementation$of$ reforms$—! that$ of$ the$differing$ levels$ of$ discretion$ in$ the$ interpretation$of$
rules&in&the&Judiciary&versus&the&Comptroller&General’s&office.&As&Chapter&5&showed,&in&the&Judiciary,&
the$decentralized$nature$of$the$courts$meant$that$judges$had$a$high$level$of$discretion$in$interpreting$
good$ governanceKrelated' institutional' rules' and' policies.' In' contrast,' the' Comptroller' General'was'
more%centralized,%and%there%was%almost%no%discretion%in%rule%interpretation.%The%implication%is%that%in%
the$ Comptroller$General’s$ office,!where% there% is% a% low% level% of% discretion,% reforms% are% likely% to% be%


















































































































































That$ both$ government$ officials$ and$ citizens$ rapidly$ embraced$ the$ discourse$ on$ good$
governance$speaks$to$the$fact$that$societal$norms$have$undergone$a$shift,$particular$in$terms$of$the$
corruptionKreduction$ aspect$ of$ good$ governance.$ Until$ the$ midK1990s,$ the$ attitude$ toward$
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that$ the$ bid$ for$ reKelection$ represents$ the$ beginning$ of$ the$ diffusion$ of$ good$ governance$ norms$
among$ different$ groups$ in$ Peruvian$ society.$ Economic$ crises$ and$ terrorism$ had$ been$ the$ main$
societal$concerns$for$decades,$but$by$1997,$the$economy$was$stable$and$growing,$and$the$Shining$
Path$had$largely$been$defeated.$Attention$turned$to$other$societal$problems,$such$as$human$rights$
violations$ committed$ by$ the$ government$ in$ its$ war$ against$ the$ Shining$ Path.$ The$ same$ group$ of$
NGOs$under$the$umbrella$of$the$CHDH$that$had$focused$the$spotlight$on$human$rights$abuses$joined$
with$media$organizations$to$document$ irregularities$related$to$the$reKelection$campaign,$and$were$
instrumental$ in$ calling$ for$ a$ national$ referendum$ on$ the$ “Law$ of$ Authentic$ Interpretation$ of$ the$
Constitution,”$ which$ had$ been$ implemented$ to$ allow$ Fujimori’s$ run$ for$ a$ third$ term.$ It$ is$ a$
reasonable$ inference$that$this$period$marks$the$beginning$of$a$shift$ in$good$governance$norms,$ in$
which$corruption$and$subversion$of$democracy$started$to$become$unacceptable,$and$that$Peruvian$
society$decided$that$something$could$be$done$about$ it.$The$subsequent$ largeKscale$protests$ in$the$
wake$ of$ Fujimori’s$ fraudulent$ reKelection$ suggests$ that$ as$ norms,$ antiKcorruption$ and$ good$
governance$had$diffused$quite$broadly$by$2000.$$
It$ is$ possible$ that$ this$ wider$ acceptance$ of$ good$ governance$ might$ have$ caused$ a$
fundamental$shift$over$time,$as$Fujimori’s$decision$to$call$ for$new$elections$ in$which$he$would$not$
run,$ in$2001,$ indicates.$The$Montesinos$scandal$and$Fujimori’s$resignation,$however,$mark$a$sharp$
turning$ point$ between$ the$ slow$ diffusion$ of$ good$ governance$ as$ a$ norm$ and$ the$ immediate$
acceptance,$at$ least$ in$terms$of$public$pretense,$of$good$governance$as$a$political$agenda$ in$Peru.$
According$to$one$of$the$leaders$of$the$National$AntiKCorruption$Commission,$
after$ the$ crisis,$ people$ started$ to$ search$ for$ the$ causes,$ and$ then$ came$ the$ need$ to$
move$to$a$better$transparency$and$the$start$of$the$current$nonKsecrecy$culture.$It$is$not$
that$ antiKcorruption,$ prevention,$ and$ transparency$ [were]$ born$ here;$ what$ has$ been$
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done$ is$ that$ after$ the$ crisis$we$ looked$out$ to$ the$world$ to$ find$out$what$ is$ going$ on,$
what$ are$ the$ international$ comparison$ experiences,$ and$ that$ is$ what$ has$ been$ taken$
and$used.$Now,$I$would$say$this$process$has$been$very$Peruvian$in$the$sense$that$due$to$
[the]$crisis$that$we$lived$through,$we$had$to$search$for$the$answers.$I$mean,$I$don’t$think$
that$ the$ international$ aid$ or$ international$ organizations$ put$ the$ issue$ [o]n$ Peru’s$
agenda.$Instead,$the$issue$exploded$in$our$faces.423$
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to$ deal$ with.$ Of$ course,$ corruption$ existed,$ and$ everybody$ complained$ about$ it.$ But$
nobody$talked$about$[things$like]$the$right$to$access$public$information.$We$had$a$major$
shock$ with$ the$ Fujimori$ scandal,$ after$ [which]$ millions$ and$ millions$ [of$ soles$ in$
irregularities]$came$out.$In$that$moment,$we$auditors$felt$an$incredible$frustration,$not$




Thus$ the$ exposure$ of$ the$ massive$ level$ of$ corruption$ perpetrated$ by$ Fujimori$ and$
Montesinos$acted$as$a$critical$juncture$that$shifted$the$political$culture$in$Peru$from$one$of$passive$
acceptance$ to$ rejection$ of$ corruption,$ opacity,$ and$ a$ lack$ of$ accountability.$ While$ there$ were$
indications$that$this$may$have$eventually$happened$in$the$course$of$the$norm$of$good$governance$
diffusing$more$broadly$among$NGOs$and$citizens,$ this$exposure$—$facilitated$by$ the$availability$of$











diffusing$ these$ norms$ more$ broadly,$ and$ had$ emerged$ as$ a$ strong$ mechanism$ of$ vertical$
accountability$ that$ could$ effectively$ pressure$ government$ agencies$ to$ make$ reforms.$ During$ the$
transitional$and$Toledo$governments,$restrictions$placed$on$the$media$were$eased,$and$corruption$
became$a$main$ focus$of$ reporting.$This$ increased$exposure$of$ corruption$ in$ turn$ increased$citizen$





sense$ that$ the$ culture$ of$ denuncialogia$ has$ skewed$ perception$ of$ corruption$ in$ government$
institutions$too$negatively,$and$that$the$perceptions$are$often$much$worse$than$the$reality.$As$ for$
the$press,$although$it$is$constitutionally$protected$and$is$relatively$free$of$censorship,$the$perception$
among$ the$majority$ of$ Peruvians$ is$ that$ the$media$ cannot$ safely$ express$ opinions$ that$ contradict$
government$positions.428$
This$ negativity$ led$ some$ NGOs,$ such$ as$ Cuidadanos$ al$ Dia,$ to$ advocate$ for$ reporting$ on$
positive$ strides$ in$ good$ governance$made$ by$ government$ agencies,$ as$ illustrated$ by$ their$ annual$
Award$ for$Best$Practices$ in$Public$Management.429$NGOs$ like$Cuidadanos$al$Dia$and$Proética$have$
become$effective$at$the$national$level,$and$Peru$is$now$considered$to$have$a$robust$and$active$civil$
society$ with$ the$ ability$ to$ effectively$ put$ pressure$ on$ the$ government,$ even$ though$ NGO$
recommendations$ are$ not$ binding.430$ That$ NGOs$ are$ respected$ players$ in$ Peruvian$ society$ is$
underscored$by$the$fact$that$the$García$government$attempted$to$curtail$their$power$by$increasing$
oversight$on$NGOs$that$receive$international$funding.$NGOs$that$engage$in$“international$technical$










Cooperation$ (APCI),$ and$ a$ 2006$ law$ proposed$ increasing$ APCI$ auditing$ oversight$ of$ these$ NGOs.$
Significant$outcry$at$what$was$seen$as$politically$motivated$interference$led$to$a$change$in$the$law,$
and$ in$ 2007$ the$ Tribunal$ Constitucional$ ruled$ that$ NGOs$ could$ opt$ out$ of$ registering$ with$ and$
reporting$to$APCI$if$they$do$not$use$state$resources.431$
In$addition,$there$are$ limits$to$the$ impact$that$civil$society$alone$can$have$on$processes$of$
institutional$ change.$ The$ “press$ is$ strong,$ but$ not$ determinant,”432$ and$ although$ “civil$ society$ is…$
vigilant$[and]$can$motivate$[people$to$pay$attention$to]$certain$subjects,$at$the$end$the$decision$of$
carrying$ out$ the$ project$ or$ a$ reform$ process$ depends$ on$ the$ government,$ [meaning]$ all$ public$
entities$ and$ the$ political$ will$ of$ the$ institution$ head…$ because$ the$ most$ important$ part$ is$ the$
political$ commitment$ of$ the$ institution$ leader.”433$ Despite$ these$ caveats,$ Peruvian$ civil$ society$




and$when$ civil$ society$ and$ citizens$ were$ preoccupied$with$ advocating$ for$ economic$ equality$ and$
stability$ and$ an$ effective$ response$ to$ terrorism,$ rather$ than$ focusing$ on$ promoting$ good$
governance.$
Horizontal(Accountability(and(the(Role(of(the(Executive!
Like$ structures$ of$ vertical$ accountability,$ structures$ of$ horizontal$ accountability$ were$
strengthened$by$new$laws$and$policies$in$the$early$years$of$the$transition.$For$the$first$time$in$Peru’s$
history,$there$was$an$explicit$framework$for$promoting$good$governance,$the$2002$National$Accord$













term,$ such$ as$ Javier$ Díez$ Canseco,$ who$ led$ the$ initiative$ to$ gather$ signatures$ for$ a$ national$
referendum$ against$ Fujimori’s$ reKelection.$ This$ change$ in$ leadership$ presented$ significant$
opportunities$ for$ reform,$ as$ there$ was$ “a$ lot$ more$ interest$ [in$ reforms]$ and$ space$ for$ political$
dialogue”$than$any$previous$period$in$Peru’s$history.434$
These$ leaders$ facilitated$ changes$ that$ ultimately$ strengthened$ institutions$ of$ horizontal$
accountability$that$had$been$weakened$by$the$Fujimori$regime.$As$Chapter$5$suggested,$the$Fujimori$
regime$ temporarily$ changed$ the$ balance$ of$ power$ between$ the$ Judiciary,$ the$ Congress,$ the$
Executive,$ and$ autonomous$ institutions,$ such$ that$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ the$ Comptroller$ General$ had$
weak$veto$power$over$ the$actions$of$ the$Executive$branch.$Congress$acted$as$an$extension$of$ the$
Executive$branch,$and$was$able$ to$ impose$unpopular$ laws$upon$ these$ institutions,$many$of$which$
were$ weakened$ in$ their$ ability$ to$ fulfill$ their$ mandates,$ especially$ in$ terms$ of$ damaging$ the$
credibility$or$impeding$the$actions$of$the$Executive$branch.$For$example,$the$Comptroller$General’s$




2002$ Law$ No.$ 27785$ established$ the$ Organic$ Law$ of$ the$ National$ System$ of$ Control$ and$ the$
Comptroller$General$of$ the$Republic,$ repealing$Decree$Law$No.$26162$ from$1992$ that$had$ limited$
the$powers$and$mandate$of$the$Comptroller$General’s$office,$while$Law$No.$27367$deactivated$the$
Judicial$Executive$Commission,$which$had$served$as$a$way$ for$ the$Executive$branch$ to$control$ the$





government$ quickly$ changed$ the$majority$ of$ temporary$ judicial$ appointments$ back$ to$ permanent$
ones,$ thereby$ shifting$ the$ power$ dynamics$ away$ from$ those$ established$ during$ the$ Fujimori$ era,$
when$the$majority$of$temporary$judges$were$beholden$to$the$Executive$in$terms$of$job$security.$
These$ changes$ led$ to$ a$ rebalancing$ of$ power,$ and$ as$ a$ result$ both$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ the$
Comptroller$General’s$office$were$significantly$more$independent,$had$more$power$to$execute$their$
functions$ autonomously,$ and$had$ the$ support$of$ other$ institutions$ in$ terms$of$ effectively$ keeping$
executive$power$in$check.$The$Tribunal$Constitucional,$for$example,$is$more$independent$than$it$was$
in$ the$Fujimori$era,$and$this$“consolidation$of$ independence$has$been$abetted$by$political$ factors,$
like$ the$ existence$ of$ a$ fragmented$ Congress$ and$ a$ competitive$ electoral$ process;$ and$ structural$
ones,$ such$ as$ an$ institutional$ design$ that$ prevents$ Congress$ and$ the$ Executive$ from$ forcing$ the$
[Tribunal$Constitucional]$to$reach$specific$ legal$conclusions.”435$ In$the$Comptroller$General’s$office,$
the$renewed$legal$independence$was$key$to$its$effective$functioning,$as$auditors$can$now$investigate$




Another$ change$ that$helped$balance$power$across$ institutions$of$horizontal$ accountability$
was$the$significant$push$to$decentralize$political$structures,$which$began$with$the$2002$reform$that$
devolved$ 25$ percent$ of$ the$ national$ budget$ to$ regional$ governments.$ The$ idea$ behind$
decentralization$ is$ to$ provide$ citizens$ with$ autonomous$ centers$ of$ power$ not$ controlled$ by$ the$
Executive$branch,$ and$ to$provide$a$more$direct$ link$between$ citizens$ and$ the$government.$Mixed$










government.438$ In$ the$ Judiciary,$ which$ is$ already$ decentralized$ across$multiple$ levels$ of$ courts$ in$
different$regions,$the$impact$of$decentralization$on$good$governance$is$unclear.$In$the$Comptroller$
General’s$ office,$ the$ impact$ has$ been$ somewhat$ positive,$ as$ it$ marks$ a$ return$ to$ the$ more$
decentralized$structure$that$characterized$the$office$in$the$1980s.$Fujimori$centralized$many$of$the$
offices$ and$ functions$ of$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ as$ a$way$ of$maintaining$ control$ over$ it,$
which$ severely$ hampered$ the$ office’s$ ability$ to$ audit$ regional$ entities.$ However,$ the$ Comptroller$





“an$ antiKcorruption$ system,$ special$ teams$ of$ judges,$ prosecutors…$ all$ of$ these$ people$ specifically$
dedicated$ toward$ working$ on$ antiKcorruption.$ But$ then$ the$ irony$ for$ Toledo$ was$ that$ they$
investigated$him$ for$corruption$because$of$ the$ issue$of$voter$ [registration]$ fraud$ [during$ the$2000$

















slow.$We$have$a$very$ complete$ law$of$ transparency$and$access$ to$public$ information,$
changes$ in$ procurement$ in$ the$ Comptroller’s$ Office,$ participatory$ budgets,$ and$ social$
involvement$in$the$oversight$of$public$resources$—$very$positive$improvements.$In$the$




using$ it,$ but$ you$ see$ that$ the$ state,$ the$ institutions$ in$ general$ terms,$ only$ fulfill$ the$
formal$ requirements.$ They$ have$ their$ Web$ page,$ but$ it$ is$ not$ frequently$ updated.$
Authorities$ have$ to$ make$ public$ appearances$ annually$ to$ explain$ the$ [institution’s]$






According$ to$ several$ international$ aid$ donors,$ under$ the$ García$ presidency,$ there$was$ no$
political$opening$and$thus$no$meaningful$political$reform,$and$García’s$government$didn’t$launch$any$
serious,$credible$antiKcorruption$campaigns.443$In$some$ways,$this$can$be$attributed$to$the$fact$that$
García$ style$ favored$ a$ return$ to$ a$more$ powerful$ role$ for$ the$ Executive,$ a$ style$ to$which$ he$was$
accustomed$during$his$first$presidency$from$1985$to$1990.$This$is$evidenced$by$actions$such$as$the$
promulgation$of$the$2006$law$on$NGOs,$which$many$analysts$suggested$was$aimed$at$ intimidating$






catch$ up$ with$ the$ way$ things$ should$ be$ regarding$ antiKcorruption,$ catch$ up$ with$ the$
international$standards.$Luckily$there$are$many$conventions,$international$standards,$et$
cetera$ that…$allow$us$ to$ know$how$delayed$we$are.$ In$ those$ first$ years,$ Peru$ kind$of$










The$ lack$of$political$will$ for$good$governance$ reforms$ from$the$Executive$ is$ considered$an$
impediment$ to$ implementation$ of$ the$ legal$ framework$ that$ was$ developed$ during$ the$ transition$
period.$Yet$interventions$by$Congress$or$the$Executive$in$response$to$demands$for$good$governance$
can$also$be$seen$as$an$overstep$of$power$similar$to$the$kind$proffered$by$Fujimori.$This$presents$a$
complicated$ problem$ in$ terms$ how$ the$ Executive$ can$ effectively$ pressure$ institutions$ to$ reform$
while$ respecting$ their$ autonomy$ and$ independence.$ In$ particular,$ the$ Judiciary$ now$ “zealously$
guards$ its$ autonomy,$ which$ has$ sometimes$ served$ as$ an$ excuse$ to$ prevent$ reform$ efforts$ and$


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As# outlined# in# previous# sections# of# this# chapter# and# Chapter# 5,# international# aid# donors#
played'a'limited'role'in'Peru’s'transition'to'good'governance.'The'consolidation*of*executive*power*
mounted(under( the( façade$of$ judicial$ reforms$ led$ to$ cancelled$projects,$ and$ the$main$ role$ for$ aid$
donors&in&the&1990s&was&to&diffuse&human&rights&norms&earlier&in&the&decade,&and&democracy&later&in&
the$decade.$In$the$early$days%of%the%transition%period,%there%was%an%increased%presence%of%aid%donor%





critical' juncture' precipitated' by' the' downfall' of' the' Fujimori' regime,' and'was' an' initiative' of' the'
Peruvian) government.) Peru) could) therefore' be' said' to' have' “ownership”' in' initiating' the' reforms,'
and$the$ensuing$process$of$reform$implementation'is'a'true'“partnership.”"All$of$the$donors,$as$well$
as$ several$ of$ the$ individuals$ working$ in$ recipient$ institutions$ (see$ excepts$ below),$ whom$ I$
interviewed$suggested$this$was$the$case,$and$that$good#governance#aid#in#Peru#thus#facilitates,#but#
does% not% impose,% reforms.! While& good& governance& aid& has& been& instrumental& in& helping& reform&
processes' proceed' faster' than' they' might! have% in% the% absence% of% such% assistance,% the% evidence%
suggests& that& such& changes& would& have& eventually& taken& place& anyway! as# a# result# of# the# critical#
juncture.)The)majority)of)good)governance)aid)in)Peru)takes)the)form)of)technical)assistance,)and)this)




priority' is' facilitation' of' sharing' knowledge' about' best' practices' and' providing' expert' training' on'
219$
$
implementation* of* different* technical* systems.446! Further,( good( governance( aid( helps( create( a(
framework)of)consistency)for)reforms)in)the#absence#of# leadership#continuity.#However,#the# lack#of#
leadership* continuity* can* in* turn* affect* the* ability* of* good* governance* aid* to* impact* institutional*
changes(in(the(short@!or#medium@term,&leading&to&the&perception&that&it&is&not&effective.$
Aid$as$a$Driver$of$Change$
As# previously# established,# Fujimori’s# downfall# acted# as# a# critical# juncture# that# shifted# Peru#
toward' prioritizing' good' governance,' and' all# of# the# interviewees# noted# that# there#was! significant)
political(will( for(reforms( in(the(window"of"opportunity"that"followed." "According)to)an)official) from)
the$local$chapter$of$Transparency$International,$the#types#of#projects#that#aid#donors#implemented#in#
the$post@Fujimori(era(were(aligned(with(reforms(developed(and(driven(by(the(Peruvian(government,*
with%aid%donors% funding%specific%aspects%of% these%reforms.% In%both%the%Comptroller%General’s%office%
and$the$Judiciary,$there$was$a$feeling$in$the$early$years$of$transition$that$reforms$were$a$necessary$
measure'to'restore'the'reputation'of'these! institutions' in'the'eyes'of'citizens,'given'the' legitimacy'
that$had$been$lost$during$the$Fujimori$era.$This$was$one$of$the$rationales$ in$creating$the$CERIAJUS$
reform&framework&in&the&Judiciary,&which&led&to&aid&donors&funding&specific&aspects&of&judicial&reform&
through' mechanisms' like' the' World' Bank’s' Justice' Services' Improvement' Project.447! All# of# the#
interviewees)said)that)the)reforms)were)initiated)by)Peru,)with%one%interviewee%summing%this%up%by%
noting&that&the$
biggest' pressure' [for' reforms]' comes' from' the# inside# [Peru].# Before# Fujimori,# [those]#
initiatives( did( not( exist,( but( [Fujimori]( was( a( trauma( we( had( that( moved( us.( The(
transformation*process*is*with*our*own*resources,*it*does*not*depend*on*an*external*donor*














not$ impose,$ these$ reforms.$As$one$project$manager$of$ the$ IADB$noted,$ the$process$ that$ the$Bank$
goes% through% in% terms% of% project% identification% and% design% is% to% review% the% country( strategy( for(
reforms'designed'by'the'Peruvian'government,'and'identify'the'main'areas'of'reform'that'it'wants'to'
fund.& Banks& have& specific& policies& that& prevent& them& from& engaging& in& certain& activities,& such& as&
security)reform)programs)that)include!building(jails,(for(example,(but(other(programs(that(fall(under(
governance) or) “building) the) capacity) of) the) state”) can) be) funded.) Once) the) strategy) has) been)
reviewed,( a(program(mission( from( the(Bank(discussed(with( the(Peruvian(government( the(areas( in(
which"they"would"like"to"fund"a"project."The"specifics"of"the"potential"project"will"be"discussed,"and"
the$result$will$be$a$“formal$demand$of$the$government,$saying$we$want$a$project,$we$want$a$loan.”449!$
Other& donors& echoed& that& aid& facilitates& good& governance& reforms,( but( does( not( impose(
them,& and& that& Peru& defines& the& agenda.& In& response,& the$ donors& I" interviewed" see# where# their#
relative(strengths(are,(what(kinds(of(assistance(they(can(offer,(what(their(own(priorities(are,(and(offer(
different(options(to(the(Peruvian'government'for'the'kinds'of'assistance'they'can'offer.'Thus,'there'is'




Fujimori( era,( because( the( stated( goals( of( the" Fujimori" government’s" reform" agenda"were" at" odds"
with% the% types% of% projects% they%wanted% implemented.% As% a% project%manager% for% the%UNDP% noted,%
“during(the(Fujimori(government,(we(rejected(a(project(with(the(Ministerio(Publico(because( it(was(







The$ consensus$ from$ both$ donors$ and$ Peruvian$ government$ officials$ is$ that$ reforms$ were$
taking' place' anyway,' and' that' donor' assistance" facilitated" but" did" not" drive" these" reforms." Donor"
assistance( has( been( key,( however,( in( helping( certain( reforms( get( implemented( faster( than( they(
otherwise)would)have)in)the)absence)of)such)assistance.)In)the)Comptroller)General’s)office,)aid)has)




technical) systems) like) biometric) identification) for) parolees,) which) might) have) otherwise) been)
prohibitively, expensive.455! Reflecting* both* this* necessity* of* international* funding* and* the* demand@
driven'nature'of'the'reform'agenda'is'a'highly'centralized'system'of'coordination'of'donors'managed'
by# the#Ministry# of# Economy# and# Finance# and# the#APCI,& which& is& an& independent& entity&within& the&
Ministry(of(Foreign(Affairs.(The(former(managed(reimbursable(aid(such(as(international(development(
bank% loans,% while% APCI% manages% grants% and% other% non@reimbursable* funding* through* a* National*
Policy' for' International' Technical' Cooperation.456! This% coordination) mechanism) facilitates) joint)
funding' of' initiatives,' such' as' the' (only)' basket' fund' in' Peru,' which' pools' the' resources' of' 22'
different(donors( in( funding(the(activities(of( the(Defensoria(del(Pueblo,457!and$ensures$ that$ there$ is$
little%to%no%overlap"of"projects.458!It#also#gives#rise#to#a#certain#strategy#among#different#ministries#and#
organizations* seeking*aid* to* find* the*best* “bidder”459!willing& to& fund& the& types&of& reforms& that& the&
recipient(wants(to(implement:$













showed' it' to' the' different' donors' and' asked' for' help.' It' is' not' quite' like' a' tender'
[process],*but*more*like*we*already*know*[each*donor’s]*line*of*work,*and*at*what*they*
are$ stronger.$ For$ example,$ I$ know$GIZ$ [the$German& Technical& Cooperation]& is& going& to&





and$ the$ relationship$between$donors$and$ recipients$ is$one$ that$can$be$ labeled$a$ true$partnership,$
based&on&how&projects&are&negotiated&and&implemented.&While&there&is&some&variation,&the&majority&
of#these#projects"are"focused"on"capacity"development,"or"providing"technical"advice"and"assistance"
that$ support$ the$ strengthening$ of$ institutional$ processes$ over$ a$ long$ time$ frame.461! (In$ contrast,$
awareness@raising'programs,'and'programs'with'a'short'time'frame,'are'less'valued'by'government'
institutions,(although(they(are(considered(to(be(relevant(by(civil(society(operators).462!The$value$of$
technical) assistance) lies) in) its) ability) to) help) institutions) implement) systems,) such) as) biometric)
identification* signatures* for* parolees# that# help# prevent# corruption# in# the# Judiciary,#which# become#
embedded%structures%difficult% to%overturn% in%the%face%of%new%leadership%that%may%not%embrace%the%
reform&agenda.463!In#this#way,#technical#assistance#aid#is#responsive#to#the#demands#of#the#recipient%
institutions,( and( helps( create( continuity( of( reforms( in( cases( where( there( is( a( lack( of( consistent(
leadership.+Major+donors,+such+as+banks,+favor+this+type+of+aid+because+it+lends+itself+to+a+measurable+
return&on& investment,& and& this& feeds& into& the&perception( that( awareness@raising'programs'are' less'
relevant(in(aiding(reforms.($
The$ way$ in$ which$ technical$ assistance$ is$ provided$ is$ through$ the$ use$ of$ specialists$ who$
provide( advice,( training,( and( related( assistance( to( institutions( that( help( them( improve( processes%













don’t& know& how& to& do,”& thereby& strengthening& institutional& capacity& in& these& areas.464! The$
Comptroller)General’s)office,)for)example,)is)tasked)with)auditing)asset)declarations,)which)is)a)new)
instrument)in)Peru)that$has$not$been$utilized$before.$The$Comptroller$General’s$office$requested$that$
GIZ$provide$ them$with$ specialists$who$ can$ train$auditors$on$how$ to$ review$public$ employee$asset$
declarations, for, fraud.465! In# this# way,# technical# assistance# is# responsive# to# the" demands" of" the"
recipient,)who)“may)have)very)good)ideas,)but)in)some)cases)the)state)doesn’t)give)us)the)resources)
[to$execute$ these$ ideas].”466!Donors&are& instrumental& in&helping& institutions&get& the& resources& they&
need$that$might$not$be$available$otherwise,$and$in$providing$expertise$that$is$not$readily$available$in@
house.' In' this'way,'donors'act' like'expert'consultants'hired' to'help' institutions'move' forward'with'
reforms:($
One$ of$ the$ great$ benefits$ that$ I$ find$ in$ international$ aid,$ besides$ funding$ and$ the"
possibility)of)doing)things)that)you)wouldn’t)be)able)to)with)your)own)national)funds,)is)
that$ it$ lets$you$innovate,$and$implement$ ideas$or$good$practices$that$under$a$different$
context'would'be'impossible.'We'bring'in'a'lot'of'practices'from'abroad,'we'go#outside#
[the% country]% or% see% [practices]% on% the%Web% and% look% for% the%way% to% get% [them],% and%
when%the%donors%are%interested%in%[these%practices]%they%come%to%implement%[them.%This%
donor%support]%reduces%the%risk%of%internal%rejection%toward%new%ideas.%So!if#you#remove#




Donors& support& initiatives& strengthen& these& good& practices,& and& help& embed& them& as&
institutional) structures.) An) example) of) this) is) the) “Programa) de) Modernización) del) Sistema) de)
Control”(funded(by(the(IADB(and(implemented(by(the(Comptroller(General’s(office."One"of"the"aims"
of# the# program# was# to# develop# the# infrastructure# of# new# Comptroller# General’s# offices# at# the#
regional) level,) thus)supporting) the)efforts) to)deepen)decentralization) in)Peru.)Prior) to) this)project,)








everywhere.”468! Another( impact( of( the( program( was( its( assistance( in( helping( the( Comptroller(
General’s)office)revise)its)organizational)plan,)in)conjunction)with)increased)government)funding)that)
allowed' it" to" hire"more" staff." This" IADB" assistance" led" to" the" creation" of" new" line" units" related" to"
research'and'development,'regulations,'and'processes,'thereby'expanding'the'Comptroller'General’s'
office&beyond&its&main&auditing&unit.&It&also&assisted&the&Comptroller$General’s$office$with$developing$
better% customer% service% processes% and% reporting% procedures.% This% provided% the% Comptroller%
General’s)office)with)more)tools)to)monitor)and)control$state$expenditures,$and$the!office&plans&to&
continue( the( work( that( was( started& under& the& auspices& of& the& IADB& loan:& “The& [IADB]& project& is&
finishing,(but(we(will(keep(going.”469! In# the# Judiciary,# the#World#Bank’s#support#has#helped# identify#
areas% in% which% petty% corruption% occurs,% suggest% tools% that% provide% solutions,% and% thus% help# the#






have% to% sign% the%book],% “If% you%give%me%100%soles,%you%can%sign% for% ten%months%or% five%
months.(No(worry.(Or(for(example,(they(say,(don’t(worry(if(you(have(to(travel(to(outside(
the$ country,$ don’t$ worry.$ You$ have$ a$ brother" or" a" sister?" Please" call" me" and" your"
[brother(or](sister(can(sign(for(you.(That’s(a(big(issue(of(corruption(inside(the(Judiciary.(
With% the% biometrical% identify,% you% have% to% put% your% finger% in% the% machine,% [at% which%
point]' your' photo' with' your' age' and' name" appear." It" was" totally" successful." You"
eliminate(the(risk(of(corruption([because](people(have(to(go(to(the(office(of(the(judge.(It(
saves% lots% of% time,% too,% because% to% find% a% book,% to% find% a% page,% takes% time;% with% this%
[system](you(just(put(your(finger([in]#and#that’s#it.470$
$ $
Another(World( Bank@funded& project& helped& build& capacity& within& the& Judiciary& to& provide&
continuing(education(opportunities(for( judges(who(practiced(outside(of(Lima.(With(the(Magistrates(








expanded' training' opportunities' to' these' judges.471! The$ UNDP$ developed$ a$ system$ within$ the$














know% to%what$ extent$ they$ achieve$ results.$ However,$ if$ I$ go$ to$ them$and$ they$ tell$me,$
listen,( my( procurement( system( in( the( Ministry( of( Health( doesn't( work,( or( my( public(
finance'expenditure'system'in'the'Ministry'of'Education'doesn't'work,'we'need'a'reform'
of# that,# I! really& see& that&we& can& get& that.& And& then& if&we& have& spent& 30&million& or& 50&
million& [dollars],& it& really& makes& a& difference.& However,& if& you& make& a& human& rights&
education* project,* of* course* you* can* go* into* the* streets* and* ask* people* if* they* know*
about& human# rights# and# so# on,# and# it's# great.# But# I# don't# know# to#what# extent# this# is#





















every$ two$ years,$ having$ a$ team$ funded$ by$ donors$ that$ provides$ a$ sort$ of$ permanent$ technical$
assistance( is( key.476! Every& time& there& is& a& new& government,& new& political& forces& come& into& the&
institution,(and(reforms(that(have(not(been(embedded(can(be(undone.(For(example,(projects(aimed(








within& the& donor& and& the& recipient& agencies,& leads& to& the& perception& that& good& governance& aid&
projects) are) ineffective:) “There’s) a) neophyte) bias) because) a) lot) of) aid) consultants) don’t) stay) long)
enough'to'see"the"effects"of"their"work.”"In"addition,"sometimes"the"expectation"is"that"projects"will"
have%a%dramatic%change%in%the%short@term,&further& leading&to&this&belief&that&aid& is& ineffective.479!As#
one$donor$stated,$the$result$of$this$ is$that$there$is$a$perception%that%“building%effective%institutions%
and$getting$shit$done$quickly$is$often$at$odds.”480!$
The$ preference$ for$ technical$ assistance$ aid,$ then,$ is$ because$ it$ has$ shown$more$ effective,$












In# contrast,# projects# that# have# a# shorter# time# frame# and# focus# on# the# types# of# aid# that# show# less#
tangible) outcomes) are) less) valued.# A# prime# example# of# this# is# the# MCC! project( aimed( at(
“Strengthening* Democratic* Institutions* and* Processes* in* Critical* Areas.”* The* overall* program* was*
part% of% the% MCC’s% Threshold% Program% with% Peru,% the% goal% of% which% was% to% “help% Peru% combat%
corruption)by)working(with(the(Judicial(branch,(law(enforcement,(the(ombudsman(and(Comptroller’s(
offices' and' civil' society' organizations' to' improve' internal' controls,' as'well' as' analyze' and' simplify'
administrative+ processes+ to+ reduce+ opportunities+ for+ corruption.”481! All# of# the# MCC’s# Threshold#
Programs( aim( to( affect( changes( in( selected( countries( that(make( it( eligible( to( apply( for( a( Compact(
grant;'the'selection'criteria'related'to'corruption'requires'that'countries'achieve'a'score'above'the'
median' on' the'World' Bank' Institute’s$ Control$ of$ Corruption$ Indicator.482!Unofficial) assessments) of)
this%program%suggest%that%the%two@year%time%frame%of%this%program%makes%it%difficult%to%map%onto%the%
reform&framework&in&institutions&like&the&Peruvian&Comptroller&General’s&office,&which&were!aligned(
with% the% seven@year% term% of% the% Comptroller,% and% that% the% short@term% activities% that% were%




public' perception' of' corruption' is'more' negative' than' the' reality,485!and$ “trust$ is$ undercut$ by$ big$
corruption) scandals) and) the) level$ of$ public$ anger$ is$ getting$ more$ cynical.486”" The" program" may"
















program'noted,' “it’s' hard' to'make' Peruvians' any'more' cynical' about' corruption' and' thus' hard' to'
meet$the$final$targets.”488$
Aid$as$a$Norm$Diffusion$Mechanism$
Ironically,+ given+ donor+ preference+ for+ tangible+ outcomes,+ another+ way+ in+ which+ technical+
assistance( aid( facilitates( good( governance( reforms( is( through( the( less( tangible( diffusion( of( best@
practice(norms.(Information@sharing(diffuses(international(standards!established*by*organizations*like*
the$ OECD,$ and$ creates$ a$ shared$ set$ of$ ideals$ to$ which$ reform@oriented( leaders( try( to( comply.( A(
Superior( Court( President( noted( that( “one( of( my( main( goals( is( to( try( to( get( this( court(
internationalized.,We,have,to,be,ahead,,to#be#with#the#ones#abroad,#with#those#with#practices#that#
we#don’t#know.489”"He"added"that"he"is"constantly"seeking"international"speakers"from"countries"like"
Spain,'Venezuela,'Mexico,' and'Colombia'who' can' come' to'Peru' to'participate' in' conferences' that'
address$ how$ Peru’s$ courts$ can$ modernize$ its$ obsolete$ information$ systems.$ The$ Comptroller$
General’s) office) draws) upon) the) knowledge) of) donors) to) reach) international) standards) of) public)



























There's'always' something' to# say#about# it.# They# feel# strongly# that# they#can#help# in# this#
matter.492$
$ $




imparted) to) the) subsequent) leadership.) One# example# of# this# comes# from# the# process# of#
decentralization.-The-experiences-of-international-aid-donors-from-Germany,-the-Netherlands,-Spain,-
and$ other$ EU$ countries$ in$ particular$ helped$ the$ Secretariat$ for$ Decentralization$ better$ define$ the$





This% chapter% showed% that% the% actions% surrounding% Fujimori’s% resignation% acted% as% an%
exogenous( shock( that( ushered( in( a( fundamental( shift( toward( good( governance( in( Peru.( The( first%
years& of& democratic& transition& saw& a& flurry& of& new& laws& and& policies& aimed& at& promoting& good&
governance,* disrupting* the* status* quo* of* unchecked* Executive* power,* and* reorienting* legal*







citizens( demanded( more( accountability( from( the( state.( Legal( changes( helped( reintroduce(
independence'in'the'Comptroller'General’s#office#and#the#Judiciary,#precipitating!a"shift"toward"good"
governance!which% led% to% rapid% changes% in% the#Comptroller#General’s#office!and$gradual$ changes$ in$
the$ Judiciary.$ These$ variations$ in$ outcomes$ can$ be$ attributed$ to$ the$ differences$ in$ endogenous$
power% dynamics% of% these% institutions,% which% have% remained% “sticky”% even% as% the% external%
environment)has)become)more)favorable)to)the)promotion)and)adoption)of)good)governance)norms)
and$practices.$$
In# this# context,# international# aid# donors# played# a# limited# role$ in$ Peru’s$ transition$ to$ good$




than% they%might% have% in% the% absence%of% such% assistance,% the% evidence% suggests% that% such$ changes$
would&have&eventually&taken&place&anyway&as&a&result&of&the&critical&juncture.&That&said,&aid&is&valued&
for$its$ability$to$1)$help$structural$changes$become$embedded$practices$that$are$difficult$to$uproot$in$








$ This$ thesis$ has$ sought$ to$ understand$ the$ role$ of$ good$ governance$ aid$ in$ reforming$ Peru’s$
political$ institutions$within$ a$ larger$ context$ that$ includes$ other$ drivers$ of$ change.$ This$ concluding$
chapter$draws$out$the$empirical$material$presented$in$Chapters$5$and$6$and$answer$the$questions$
posed$in$Chapter$1:$What$has$influenced$or$driven$good$governance@related$shifts$in$Peru’s$political$
institutions?$What$ role$ has$ good$ governance$ aid$ specifically$ played$ in$ driving$ or$ influencing$ good$
governance$ reforms$ in$ Peru’s$ political$ institutions?$ Assuming$ good$ governance$ aid$ alone$ is$ not$
sufficient$to$drive$institutional$change,$how$do$other$drivers$of$change$affect$aid’s$role$as$a$driver$of$
change?$
The$ empirical$ chapters$ summarized$ the$ good$ governance$ shifts$ that$ occurred$ in$ Peru’s$
Judiciary$ and$ Comptroller$ General$ (see$ Tables$ 7,$ 8,$ 9,$ 10,$ 11,$ 13$ and$ 14,$ and$ Figures$ 4@7)$ and$
outlined$ the$ actions$ of$ different$ drivers$ of$ change,$ explaining$ their$ roles$ in$ driving$ or$ resisting$
change.$ Building$ upon$ this$ within@case$ analysis,$ this$ chapter$ draws$ these$ observations$ and$
conclusions$together$in$a$cross@case$comparison$(see$Tables$15$and$16).$The$first$section$provides$a$
brief$ summary$ of$ the$ argument$ and$ problem$ statement,$ theoretical$ framework,$ and$ variables,$ as$
well$ as$ the$methodology$ used$ to$ frame$ and$ conduct$ the$ empirical$ research.$ The$ second$ section$
presents$a$summary$and$interpretation$of$the$within@case$findings$from$the$empirical$chapters.$The$
cross@case$comparison$then$considers$the$relevance$of,$and$relationship$between,$the$independent$
variables$ and$ the$ observed$ good$ governance$ outcomes$ in$ the$ Judiciary$ and$ Comptroller$ General$
over$time.$In$making$this$comparison,$this$thesis$hypothesizes$about$the$necessity$and$sufficiency$of$






This$ thesis$ began$ with$ an$ observation:$ Two$ good$ governance$ projects,$ financed$ by$ the$
World$Bank$ and$ aimed$ at$ improving$ judicial$ services$ in$Peru,$ had$ starkly$ different$ outcomes.$ The$
first,$ scheduled$ for$ implementation$ in$ 1998,$ was$ cancelled$ at$ the$ request$ of$ the$ Peruvian$
government.$The$second$was$implemented$from$2005$to$2010$and$rated$as$“Highly$Satisfactory$”$by$
the$donor$ agency.$ This$ thesis$ has$ sought$ to$ explain$ these$ divergent$ outcomes,$ not$ at$ the$project$
level,$but$rather$at$the$ institutional$ level.$While$the$motivation$for$this$research$ is$grounded$ in$an$
interest$ in$ aid$ as$ a$ determinant$ or$ driver$ of$ institutional$ change,$ this$ research$ moved$ beyond$
project@specific$outcomes$to$frame$aid$as$an$aggregate$driver$of$change,$asking$what$aid’s$role$is$in$$
building,$ strengthening,$ and$ changing$ political$ institutions.$ While$ aid$ donors$ suggest$ there$ is$
significant$ potential$ for$ aid$ to$ have$ a$ positive$ role,$ empirical$ evidence$ for$ this$ –$ including$ case$
studies$ –$ remains$ thin,$ and$ this$ thesis$ therefore$ aimed$ to$ conduct$ a$ comparative$ case$ study$ of$
different$institutions$that$received$good$governance$aid.$$
Chapters$ 1$ and$ 4$ showed$ that$ there$ is$ some$ congruence$ among$ donors$ in$ how$ they$
conceive$ of$ the$ dependent$ variable$ along$ the$ lines$ of$ four$ dimensions$ of$ good$ governance:$
efficiency,$effectiveness,$accountability,$and$transparency.$The$fact$that$political$institutions$in$Peru$
have$adopted$changes$related$to$key$characteristics$of$good$governance$to$differing$degrees$along$
these$ four$ dimensions$ made$ Peru$ an$ ideal$ context$ from$ which$ to$ draw$ cases$ and$ compare$
institutional$change$at$the$sub@national$level.$$
Chapter$ 1$ showed$ that$ donors$ tend$ to$ be$ concerned$ only$with$ the$ linkages$ between$ the$
inputs$of$good$governance$aid$and$the$intermediate@term$outcomes$of$better@governed$institutions,$
often$ at$ the$ expense$of$ considering$ the$ impact$ of$ other$ drivers$ of$ change$within$ the$overarching$
political$environment.$Given$that$aid$is$unlikely$to$be$the$only$driver$of$institutional$change,$the$first$
question$ that$guided$this$ research$ focused$on$ identifying$all$ the$ relevant$drivers$of$change,$which$
were$ outlined$ in$ Chapter$ 2.$ The$ first$ was$ the$ Executive$ branch,$ namely$ the$ president$ and$ his$
cabinet,$ in$whom$policy@making$power$ is$ strongly$centralized$ in$ the$Peruvian$political$ system.$The$
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second$ was$ other$ government$ institutions,$ such$ as$ Congress,$ which$ has$ the$ power$ to$ pass$ laws$
affecting$the$ Judiciary$and$the$Comptroller$General.$The$third$was$citizens$and$civil$ society$actors,$





In$ Chapters$ 3$ and$ 4,$ the$ actions$ of$ these$ drivers$ of$ change$ were$ conceptualized$ as$
independent$ variables,$ and$ a$ framework$ for$ explaining$ institutional$ change$ posited,$ although$ the$
explicit$ relationship$between$the$ independent$and$dependent$variables$was$ left$open$to$ inductive$
theorizing$drawn$ from$ the$ cross@case$ comparison.$ This$ thesis$ applied$ the$historical$ institutionalist$
framework$ of$ change$ to$ good$ governance$ aid,$ suggesting$ that$ aid$ has$ three$ potential$ roles$ in$
reforming$Peru’s$political$ institutions,$which$can$overlap$and$are$therefore$not$mutually$exclusive:$
(1)$ It$ can$ drive$ change$ by$ changing$ preferences$ that$ are$ based$ on$ self@interest;$ (2)$ it$ can$ drive$
change$by$diffusing$new$norms$and$practices;$or$(3)$ it$can$drive$change$by$embedding$new$power$
dynamics$ and$ structures.$ This$ thesis$ suggested$ that$ identifying$which$ of$ these$ roles$ aid$ played$ in$
driving$ institutional$ change$ is$understood$based$on$ inductive$ theorizing$developed$ from$empirical$
cases$ that$ analyzed$ changes$ in$ Peru’s$ political$ institutions$ over$ time,$ given$ that$ the$ independent$
variables$work$in$conjunction,$and$the$multiplicity$of$complex$causal$relationships$that$could$result$
from$different$configurations$of$these$independent$variables$hampers$the$development$of$a$concise,$
deductive$ hypothesis.$ The$ empirical$ within@case$ analysis$ presented$ in$ Chapters$ 5$ and$ 6$ was$




Process@tracing$ of$ each$ individual$ case$was$ utilized$ to$ conduct$ the$ empirical$ investigation$
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governance$ in$ the$ 1990s,$ which$ was$ facilitated$ by$ weak$ mechanisms$ of$ horizontal$ and$ vertical$
accountability$ and$ the$unwillingness$or$ inability$of$ the$ leaders$of$ the$Comptroller$General’s$office$
and$Judiciary$to$block$executive$interference.$In$the$2000s,$the$Executive$had$a$positive$influence$on$
good$ governance,$ which$ was$ facilitated$ by$ strong$ mechanisms$ of$ horizontal$ and$ vertical$
accountability$ and$ the$ desire$ of$ the$ leaders$ of$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office,$ and$ to$ a$ lesser$
degree$ the$ Judiciary,$ to$ implement$ reforms.$ Good$ governance$ aid$ was$ ineffective$ in$ influencing$
institutional$change$in$the$1990s$because$the$goal$of$good$governance$aid$was$at$odds$with$the$goal$
of$the$Executive,$and$therefore$was$blocked$prior$to$implementation,$or$could$have$only$a$modest$
impact$once$ implemented.$ The$main$ role$of$ good$governance$aid$ in$ the$1990s,$ therefore,$was$ to$
diffuse$good$governance$norms.$In$the$2000s,$the$goals$of$the$government$aligned$with$the$goals$of$
aid$donors$in$terms$of$good$governance,$and$aid$was$more$effective$both$in$diffusing$norms$of$good$
governance$ and$ in$ facilitating$ structural$ changes$ in$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ and$ the$






























































Critical$ Juncture$ 1:$ Fujimori$ changes$ legal$ structures,$ resulting$ in$ a$ strong,$ negative$ shift$ away$ from$ good$ governance@











































































































































































As$ Table$ 15$ illustrates,$ there$ have$ been$ two$ major$ shifts$ in$ good$ governance$ in$ the$
Comptroller$General’s$ office$ and$ the$ Judiciary$ between$1990$ and$2010.$ The$ first$ shift$ occurred$ in$
1992$ (Critical$ Juncture$ 1),$ when$ the$ Executive$ altered$ legal$ structures$ and$ engaged$ in$ systematic$
bribery$ to$ensure$ that$ those$working$ in$ the$Comptroller$General’s$office$and$ the$ Judiciary$did$not$
undermine$the$objectives$of$the$regime.$Prior$to$1992,$good$governance$in$Peru$was$not$a$priority$
for$ government$ institutions$ or$ civil$ society$ and$ citizens.$ Corruption$ and$ inefficiency$ were$


































































Critical$ Juncture$2:$ $Post@Fujimori$governments$undo$ laws$and$decrees$of$Fujimori$era,$ resulting$ in$a$moderate,$positive$
shift$ toward$ good$ governance@related$ rules,$ resulting$ in$ a$ higher$ level$ of$ governance$ than$ that$ observed$ during$ the$
Fujimori$ era.$ In$ terms$ of$ the$ rules$ governing$ provisional$ judges$ and$ the$ powers$ of$ the$ CNM,$ new$ (good$
governance/independence@strengthening)$ rules$ displaced$old$ (bad$ governance/independence@undermining)$ rules,$ as$ the$
insurrectionaries$ from$ Critical$ Juncture$ 1$ were$ able$ to$ exploit$ Critical$ Juncture$ 2$ to$ make$ this$ happen.$ In$ terms$ of$





































































acknowledged$ as$ problems,$ particularly$ in$ the$ Judiciary,$ but$ the$ focus$ on$ economic$ crises$ and$
terrorism$in$the$1980s$meant$that$there$was$not$widespread$popular$demand$for$reforms,$and$no$
systematic$ reform$ programs$ were$ initiated$ by$ the$ political$ institutions$ themselves,$ or$ by$ other$
government$ institutions.$ There$ are$ some$ indications$ that$ during$ the$majority$ of$ the$decade$ there$
was$a$reform@oriented$leader$in$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$who$made$changes$consistent$with$
increasing$effectiveness,$and$ that$ the$Comptroller$General$has$ the$ independence$and$authority$ to$
investigate$most$ cases$ (and$did$ so),$ suggesting$ that$ there$was$ a$moderate$ level$ of$ accountability.$
However,$there$ is$ insufficient$evidence$to$make$an$ inference$about$efficiency$and$transparency.$ In$










General$ was$ barred$ from$ auditing$ several$ government$ agencies,$ and$ auditors$ were$ no$ longer$
required$ to$have$ the$ same$competencies,$ thus$ impeding$effectiveness.$Analyses$ conducted$at$ the$
end$of$the$Fujimori$regime$in$2000$suggest$that$it$was$perceived$as$corrupt$(specifically,$influenced$
by$ ties$ to$ organized$ crimes$ syndicates)$ and$ lacking$ in$ transparency.$ (There$ is$ insufficient$ data$ to$
make$a$claim$about$efficiency).$In$the$Judiciary,$the$low$level$of$effectiveness$was$made$worse$due$
to$ the$ Executive$ firing$most$ judges$ and$ replacing$ them$with$ under@qualified,$ non@tenured$ judges$




Accountability$suffered$as$a$ result.$As$ for$ transparency,$one$ indicator$ that$ it$was$made$worse$was$
the$ fact$ that$military$ courts$were$given$ jurisdiction$over$ trials$of$ suspected$ terrorists,$which$were$
closed$ proceedings.$ In$ contrast,$ there$ is$ an$ indication$ that$ efficiency$ increased,$ as$ administrative$
reforms$introduced$in$the$Judiciary$resulted$in$a$reduction$in$case$backlog.$On$the$whole,$however,$




as$a$critical$ juncture$that$put$good$governance$on$the$national$policy$agenda.$During$ the$ first$ few$
years$ of$ this$ transition$ period,$ numerous$ laws$ and$ policies$ were$ implemented$ that$ related$ to$
different$ dimensions$ of$ good$ governance.$ In$ addition,$ a$ number$ of$ systematic$ reforms$ programs$
were$ launched$ that$ aimed$ to$ reduce$ corruption$ and$ increase$ transparency,$ efficiency,$ and$
accountability.$ Given$ that$ more$ attention$ was$ paid$ to$ good$ governance$ in$ this$ decade,$ more$




achieved$ a$ high$ standard$ of$ transparency.$ There$ were$ some$ indications$ from$ interviews$ that$
efficiency$ in$ managing$ audits$ was$ an$ ongoing$ challenge,$ but$ overall$ there$ is$ a$ strong$ base$ of$
evidence$ from$which$ to$ infer$ that$ good$governance$ significantly$ improved$by$2010,$ as$outlined$ in$
Figures$4$and$5$in$Chapter$6,$as$well$as$Annex$V.$
The$ picture$ in$ the$ Judiciary$ suggests$ positive$ changes$ as$ well.$ Certain$ changes$ increased$
effectiveness$and$accountability$ in$ the$ Judiciary,$particularly$ the$ replacement$of$ temporary$ judges$
with$tenured$ones$who$were$not$beholden$to$the$Executive,$and$the$trial$and$sentencing$of$Fujimori$
and$a$number$of$other$members$of$his$cabinet$to$prison$for$corruption$(and$other$charges).$Further,$




the$ Judiciary$ complied$ with$ the$ Law$ on$ Transparency$ and$ Access$ to$ Information$ through$ its$
establishment$ of$ its$Web$ portal.$ However,$ perceptions$ of$ the$ Judiciary$ continue$ to$ be$ extremely$
negative,$ with$ citizens$ complaining$ of$ corruption$ and$ massive$ inefficiency.$ Several$ interviewees$
suggested$that$perceptions$of$judicial$corruption$and$efficiency$are$much$more$negative$than$actual$




The$ role$ of$ leaders$ in$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ and$ the$ Judiciary$ in$ driving$ good$
governance$ reforms$has$varied$over$ time,$ in$part$due$ to$ institutional$ variation.$ In$ the$ former,$ the$
Comptroller$is$appointed$for$a$seven@year$term,$whereas$in$the$Judiciary,$the$individual$in$charge$of$
reforms,$ the$ president$ of$ the$ Supreme$ Court,$ is$ appointed$ for$ a$ two@year$ term.$ Thus$ it$ is$ more$
difficult$to$characterize$the$ leadership$ in$the$Judiciary$as$a$cohesive$whole$over$a$decade,$and$this$
determination$is$necessarily$ impressionistic.$That$said,$ in$the$1980s,$there$is$no$indication$that$any$
reforms$ were$ initiated,$ and$ there$ were$ few$ systematic$ attempts$ to$ thwart$ excessive$ executive$
influence$ in$ terms$ of$ the$ nepotism$ and$ cronyism$ perpetrated$ by$ the$ García$ administration.$ Thus$
there$was$a$moderate,$negative$ influence$on$good$governance.$During$the$Fujimori$era,$there$was$
variation$in$how$the$respective$leaderships$aligned$with$executive$reforms,$but$given$that$the$main$
recourse$ for$ opponents$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime$ was$ to$ resign,$ they$ were$ unable$ to$ halt$ reforms.$
Those$ left$ in$power$were$supporters,$or$at$ least$not$vocal$opponents$of$the$regime,$and$therefore$
they$could$be$said$to$exert$a$moderate,$negative$influence$on$good$governance$reforms.$The$same$
variation$ in$ leadership$ occurred$ in$ the$ 2000s,$ with$ different$ leaders$ having$ different$ reform$
outlooks.$ However,$ enough$ leaders$ have$ either$ pushed$ for$ good$ governance$ reforms$ or$ paid$ lip$









on$good$governance$ reforms.$ In$ the$2000s,$ the$ two$Comptrollers$were$both$ reform@oriented,$and$




to$centralize$power$ in$ the$Executive$branch.$The$president$has$often$utilized$ this$concentration$of$
power$ to$ try$ and$ ensure$ that$ public@sector$ institutions$ in$ other$ government$ branches$ are$ aligned$
with$his$policy$priorities.$In$the$1980s,$the$Executive$branch$exerted$a$moderate,$negative$influence$
on$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$and$the$Judiciary$by$appointing$individuals$to$these$institutions$
who$were$aligned$with$ the$president’s$party$and$were$ therefore$unlikely$ to$undertake$ reforms$or$
pursue$ investigations$or$ judgments$ that$would$undermine$ the$ Executive’s$ policy$ priorities.$ This$ in$
turn$undermined$good$governance$in$these$institutions.$However,$this$influence$was$not$systematic,$
as$different$events,$as$shown$by$the$Comptroller$General’s$ investigations$of$ impropriety$ in$certain$
government$ expenditures,$ and$ the$ Judiciary’s$willingness$ to$ oppose$ executive$ actions$ in$ court.$ In$
contrast,$ the$ Executive$ branch$ was$ a$ strong,$ negative$ driver$ of$ change$ in$ the$ 1990s$ for$ both$
institutions.$Significant$legal$reforms$were$imposed$upon$both$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$and$
the$ Judiciary$ during$ the$ Fujimori$ era,$ and$ this$ was$ complemented$ by$ systematic$ bribery$ of$
individuals$working$within$these$institutions$to$dissuade$them$from$opposing$executive$actions.$This$
influence$ amounted$ to$ state$ capture,$ and$ fundamentally$ undermined$ good$ governance$ in$ these$
institutions.$This$dynamic$shifted$radically$in$the$2000s,$when$new$laws$aimed$at$good$governance$
were$ supported$ by$ the$ Executive$ branch,$ particularly$ during$ Toledo’s$ term$ as$ president.$ During$
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García’s$ term$as$president,$ several$executive$actions$ raised$concerns$about$executive$ influence$on$
the$ Judiciary,$ and$ observers$ have$ noted$ that$ García$ reverted$ to$ his$ past$ practice$ of$ appointing$





might$ serve$ as$ a$ check$ on$ executive$ power,$ namely$ Congress,$ have$ often$ been$weak$ due$ to$ the$
fragmentation$of$political$parties,$which$organized$around$ individual$ leaders$rather$than$platforms$
focused$ on$ specific$ issues.$ In$ addition,$ members$ of$ Congress,$ like$ other$ Peruvian$ citizens,$ were$
preoccupied$ with$ issues$ related$ to$ the$ economic$ crises$ and$ terrorism$ in$ the$ 1980s,$ and$ did$ not$
recognize$ good$governance$as$ a$major$ reform$priority.$ This$meant$ that$Congress$ acted$as$ a$weak$
mechanism$ of$ horizontal$ accountability$ to$ keep$ executive$ power$ in$ check,$ and$ did$ nothing$ to$




that$ were$ reinforced$ by$ the$ systematic$ bribery$ of$ members$ of$ Congress.$ As$ a$ result,$ Congress$
facilitated$executive$attempts$ to$ interfere$with$ the$Comptroller$General’s$office$and$ the$ Judiciary,$
and$ thus$ continued$ to$ act$ as$ a$ weak$mechanism$ of$ horizontal$ accountability.$ This$ shifted$ in$ the$
2000s,$as$a$new$Congress$passed$several$laws$aimed$at$good$governance$reforms,$such$as$the$Law$of$
Transparency$ and$ Access$ to$ Information,$ and$ acted$ more$ decisively$ to$ keep$ executive$ power$ in$







terrorism,$ much$ like$ Congress.$ Therefore,$ as$ a$ mechanism$ of$ vertical$ accountability$ to$ demand$
reforms$or$monitor$good$governance$in$political$institutions,$their$role$was$fairly$weak.$This$was$also$
true$in$the$1990s,$as$the$majority$of$Peruvians$favored$the$Fujimori$government’s$actions$to$limit$the$
powers$of$ the$Comptroller$General$ and$ the$ Judiciary.$A$ shift$ began$ to$occur$ in$ the$ late$ 1990s,$ as$
more$ NGOs$ and$ citizens$ reacted$ to$ Fujimori’s$ attempt$ to$ secure$ election$ for$ a$ third$ term$ by$
opposing$these$actions$through$protests$and$campaigns$like$a$national$referendum$to$allow$citizens$
to$validate$election$ laws.$And$the$mass$media$continued$to$work$ to$expose$corruption$during$ this$
time,$ which$ led$ to$ the$ exposure$ of$ the$ massive$ web$ of$ bribery$ under$Montesinos.$ However,$ on$
balance,$civil$society’s$ability$to$counterbalance$executive$action$and$act$as$a$mechanism$of$vertical$
accountability$ was$ weak$ during$ the$ 1990s.$ This$ changed$ in$ the$ 2000s,$ as$ civil$ society’s$ role$ as$ a$
government$monitor$increased,$as$have$the$number$of$organizations$and$media$outlets$reporting$on$
good$governance.$Civil$ society$was$more$effectively$able$ to$ launch$campaigns$ to$demand$reforms,$
and$ more$ able$ (and$ willing)$ to$ pressure$ other$ actors$ like$ Congress$ to$ counterbalance$ executive$
actions$—$ as$ it$ did$ when$ García$ attempted$ to$ impose$ an$ NGO$ registration$ law$ that$ would$ have$








to$ the$ Judiciary,$ or$were$ implemented$ but$ had$modest$ results$within$ the$ context$ of$ the$ Fujimori$
regime.$However,$ these$projects$did$have$the$effect$of$diffusing$norms$of$good$governance,$albeit$




role$ in$ reforms$ came$ after$ the$ end$ of$ the$ Fujimori$ regime,$ when$ the$ political$ opening$ and$
democratic$transition$ushered$ in$a$new$era$of$cooperation$between$the$Peruvian$government$and$
aid$ donors.$ There$were$ significant$ projects$ implemented$ in$ both$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$
and$the$Judiciary$with$funds$provided$from$aid$donors.$However,$both$Peruvian$government$officials$
and$aid$donors$stated$that$donors$did$not$ impose$the$reforms,$which$were$driven$by$the$Peruvian$
government.$ Rather,$ donors$ facilitated$ reforms$ through$ the$ provision$ of$ training$ and$ technical$
assistance,$ as$ well$ as$ through$ support$ to$ NGOs.$ In$ this$ context,$ good$ governance$ aid$ acts$ as$ a$
mechanism$ by$ which$ norms$ are$ strongly$ diffused.$ Further,$ some$ of$ the$ systems$ that$ donors$ are$
helping$to$implement,$like$the$World$Bank’s$biometrical$scan,$help$facilitate$changes$that$might$lead$
to$a$shift$ in$actor$preferences,$ in$that$there$are$fewer$opportunities$to$extract$bribes,$which$might$
not$make$ it$worth$ the$ effort.$ In$ addition,$ this$ could$ facilitate$ changes$ in$ power$ dynamics,$ in$ that$
certain$actors$have$less$power$over$different$processes$within$institutions.$$
Necessary$and$Sufficient$Conditions$$





































Weak$ Weak$ Strong$negative$influence$ None$ Low$
Judiciary$1990s$ Strong$negative$influence$ Weak$ Weak$
Moderate$negative$
influence$ Weak$norm$diffusion$ Low$









Drawing$ from$ these$ observations,$ this$ thesis$ makes$ three$ claims$ about$ necessary$ and$ sufficient$
conditions$ related$ to$ good$ governance$ changes$ in$ Peru.$ The$ first$ is$ that$ in$ the$ absence$ of$ strong$
horizontal$ or$ vertical$ accountability,$ Executive$ interference$ is$ sufficient$ for$ negative$ good$
governance$outcomes.$As$the$case$of$the$Judiciary$in$the$2000s$shows,$there$were$executive$efforts$
to$influence$the$Judiciary,$but$the$strong$horizontal$and$vertical$accountability$mechanism$helped$to$
prevent$this$ interference$from$having$a$negative$impact$on$good$governance.$This$ is$ in$contrast$to$
the$cases$of$the$Judiciary$and$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$in$the$1990s,$when$weak$mechanisms$
of$ horizontal$ and$ vertical$ accountability$ resulted$ in$ low$ levels$ of$ good$ governance$ in$ both$
institutions.$$
The$second$claim$is$that$endogenously$driven$reforms$—$those$driven$by$the$leaders$of$the$
Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ or$ the$ Judiciary$ —$ are$ sufficient$ for$ positive$ good$ governance$
outcomes,$so$long$as$the$Executive$does$not$exert$a$strong,$negative$influence.$This$was$the$case$in$
the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ in$ the$ 1980s,$ when$ the$ Comptroller$ initiated$ some$ good$




one,$and$the$ levels$of$good$governance$were$different,$ it$can$be$ inferred$that$a$pro@reform$leader$
driving$good$governance$ reforms$ is$ sufficient$ for$ good$governance$outcomes,$ and$ can$ circumvent$
moderate$or$weak$executive$interference.$He$or$she$cannot$circumvent$strong$interference,$as$the$
multiple$ examples$ of$ resignations$ by$ top$ leaders$ in$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ and$ the$
Judiciary$in$the$1990s$show.$$
The$third$claim$is$that$good$governance$aid$is$neither$a$necessary$nor$a$sufficient$condition$
for$ good$ governance$ outcomes.$ As$ the$ example$ of$ the$ Comptroller$ General’s$ office$ in$ the$ 1980s$







we$ frame$ aid$ as$ a$ facilitator$ of$ change$ processes$ already$ taking$ place,$ or$ in$ the$ context$ of$ a$
government$that$wants$to$initiate$good$governance$reforms,$then$there$are$clear$examples$of$how$
aid$ is$ relevant,$ and$ can$ be$ effective$ in$ driving$ reforms.$ Numerous$ Peruvian$ government$ officials$
mentioned$in$the$interviews$that$aid$was$invaluable$in$helping$implement$reforms$faster$than$they$
might$be$implemented$in$the$absence$of$aid$donor$assistance.$In$addition,$these$same$interviewees$
mentioned$ that$ long@term$ aid$ projects,$ such$ as$ the$ five@year$ projects$ implemented$ by$ the$World$
Bank$ and$ IADB,$ provide$ a$ continuity$ to$ reforms$ that$ might$ otherwise$ be$ lost$ due$ to$ changes$ in$
institutional$leadership.$Thus$aid$may$be$a$necessary$condition$for$reform$continuity$and$speed.$
That$ aid$ can$ only$ facilitate,$ but$ not$ drive,$ institutional$ change$ is$ a$ conclusion$ that$ is$
consistent$with$the$literature$on$aid$effectiveness,$which$states$that$aid$can$only$be$effective$when$
there$ is$ recipient$ ownership$ of$ reforms,$ and$ when$ donors$ align$ their$ aid$ to$ recipients’$ reform$
objectives.$ In$ addition,$ good$ governance$ aid$ is$ only$ effective$ when$ the$ political$ environment$ is$
conducive$to$institutional$reform$—$that$is,$when$major$actors$are$in$agreement$on$an$overarching$
reform$agenda$or$priorities.$This$ is$ illustrated$by$the$cases$of$ the$Comptroller$General’s$office$and$
the$ Judiciary$ in$ the$ 1990s,$ when$ there$ was$ no$ consensus$ on$ good$ governance$ reform$ priorities,$
versus$the$2000s,$when$there$was$a$consensus$that$led$to$a$National$Accord$for$Governance.$In$the$
former$cases,$aid$could$not$drive$significant$institutional$changes$in$the$Comptroller$General’s$office$








diffuser$ of$ good$ governance$ norms,$ as$ well$ as$ a$ diffuser$ of$ expertise$ and$ know@how$ related$ to$
implementing$structural$changes$that$strengthen$good$governance.$$
Further$Research$Agenda$
Many$ of$ those$ designing$ and$ implementing$ good$ governance$ aid$ projects$ implicitly$
recognize$that$these$projects$can$only$facilitate,$rather$than$drive$change,$and$the$literature$on$aid$
effectiveness$and$drivers$of$change$explicitly$understands$that$aid$is$unlikely$to$be$either$a$necessary$








thesis$ shows$ the$ relevance$of$embedding$a$project@specific$ logical$ framework$or$ theory$of$ change$
(as$ in$ Figure$ 1$ in$ Chapter$ 1)$ within$ a$ larger$ framework$ that$ explicitly$ incorporates$ the$ potential$
impact$ of$meso@$ and$macro@level$ drivers$ of$ change$ (as$ in$ Figure$ 2$ in$ Chapter$ 1).$ In$ doing$ so,$ aid$
donors$can$better$strategize$about$the$anticipated$impact$of$their$interventions,$understand$what$is$
likely$ to$ be$ achieved$ and$ not$ achieved$ by$ discrete$ good$ governance$ aid$ interventions,$ and$ shape$
expectations$about$the$role$their$specific$projects$are$likely$to$play$in$different$political$contexts.$
There$are$several$avenues$for$future$research$that$can$build$upon$the$work$presented$in$this$
thesis.$The$first$ involves$examining$a$ larger$number$of$cases$to$ increase$the$scope$of$ the$ findings.$
The$ small$ number$ of$ cases$ has$ allowed$ this$ thesis$ to$ delve$ into$ a$ rich$ level$ of$ detail,$ but$ it$ also$
bounds$ the$ findings$ from$ the$ cross@case$ comparison$ by$ the$ specific$ context$ of$ Peru.$ One$way$ to$
expand$upon$this$—$and$ increase$the$generalizability$of$the$findings$—$is$to$compare$similar$good$
governance$projects$ in$different$countries.$For$example,$ it$would$be$ fruitful$ to$analyze$ the$role$of$
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good$ governance$ aid$projects$ in$ the$Colombian$ Judiciary$ compared$with$ the$ case$of$ the$Peruvian$
Judiciary$(see$below),$given$that$both$countries$went$through$similar$periods$of$armed$conflict,$and$
have$seen$significant$improvements$in$good$governance$since$the$1980s.$This$would$be$particularly$
interesting$ in$ terms$ of$ comparing$ the$ effectiveness$ of$ the$ same$ donor,$ such$ as$ the$World$ Bank,$
implementing$the$same$type$of$projects$in$a$different$country,$and$could$draw$in$issues$of$program$
management$in$different$settings$as$a$possible$influence$on$aid$effectiveness.$
This$ relates$ to$ a$ second$ area$ for$ further$ research,$ which$ could$ analyze$ different$ donor$
programs$from$the$project$level$of$analysis.$Since$this$research$project$started$in$2007,$many$more$
donors$ have$ embraced$ the$ need$ to$ evaluate$ good$ governance$ aid$ projects,$ so$ there$ is$ more$
potential$ for$ evaluating$ each$ specific$ project,$ and$ then$ conducting$ a$ meta@analysis$ to$ draw$
conclusions$ about$ the$ comparative$ role$ of$ different$ donors$ and$ mechanism$ by$ which$ change$ is$
achieved.$ It$ would$ be$ worthwhile$ to$ analyze$ in$ greater$ detail$ what$ variables$ at$ the$ project$ level$
might$ have$ accounted$ for$ differences$ in$ outcomes$ in$ the$ World$ Bank$ versus$ the$ Millennium$
Challenge$ Corporation’s$ judicial$ reform$ programs,$ for$ example,$ as$ several$ interviewees$ made$
reference$ to$ the$ positive$ impact$ of$ the$ former$ and$ the$ negligible$ contribution$ of$ the$ latter.$ This$
might$be$difficult$ to$do$as$an$outsider,$given$ that$certain$documents$and$government$officials$are$
inaccessible,$ as$ the$ I$ found$during$ the$ course$of$her$ research.$However,$ there$ is$ the$possibility$of$
gaining$this$access$as$a$program$evaluator,$which$ I$have$experienced$ in$my$professional$work$that$




with$working$on$a$multi@person$ team$ rather$ than$as$a$ solo$ researcher,$ resulted$ in$being$provided$
with$exponentially$more$information$that$I$was$during$the$course$of$my$thesis.$





would$ allow$ researchers$ to$ expand$ upon$ the$ cases$ in$ greater$ detail.$ As$ this$ thesis$ pointed$ out$ in$
several$ different$ chapters,$ there$was$ limited$ data$ available$ to$ establish$ all$ the$ dimensions$ of$ the$
dependent$variable,$particularly$in$earlier$eras.$Quantitative$data$on$these$four$dimensions$of$good$
governance$was$particularly$limited$until$the$2000s,$and$such$data$were$often$not$comparable$over$
time.$ In$ addition,$ sources$ of$ information$ that$ might$ provide$ an$ understanding$ of$ the$ rationale$
behind$policy$decisions$were$limited$due$to$a$lack$of$access$to$a$wider$number$of$interviewees.$That$
said,$ this$ thesis$ did$ triangulate$ numerous$ sources$ of$ data$ to$ form$ a$ clear$ impression$ of$ both$ the$
overall$status$of$the$dependent$variable$for$each$case,$as$well$as$a$solid$understanding$of$decisions$








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of$aid$donors$ in$reforming$Peru’s$political$ institutions.$We’re$specifically$ looking$at$governance$and$
corruptionSrelated$reforms$introduced$in$Poder$Judicial$and$trying$to$understand$who$the$players$are$


























4)$Qué$grupos'de'actores' internos'o' externos'al' Poder' Judicial' podrían'haber' influenciado'estos'








































Nuestra$ investigación$ se$ centra$ en$ el$ rol$ de$ la$ ayuda$ internacional$ respecto$ a$ cómo$ las$ mismas$
reforman$las$ instituciones$políticas$en$Peru.$Específicamente$en$relación$a$reformas$relacionadas$a$





As$we$mentioned$ in$ our$ email,$ this$ research$ focuses$ on$ the$ role$ of$ aid$ donors$ in$ reforming$Peru’s$
political$ institutions.$ We’re$ specifically$ looking$ at$ governance$ and$ corruptionSrelated$ reforms$
introduced$in$the$judiciary,$trying$to$understand$(1)$who$the$players$are$in$these$institutions,$(2)$what$





acceso$ a$ esta$ data$ a$ excepción$ de$ mi$ asistente$ y$ asesor.$ No$ existen$ riesgos$ posibles$ en$ su$
287$
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relativas$ a$ la$ gobernabilidad$ y$ la$ corrupción$ que$ hayan$ tomado$ lugar$ en$ MINJUS$ y$ Poder$
Judicial?$$
$







What$ would$ you$ identify$ as$ the$ main$ catalysts$ for$ governance$ and$ corruption$ reforms?$ Is$ it$











How$ do$ you$ think$ aid$ donors$ have$ contributed$ to$ these$ reforms?$ Do$ you$ think$ these$ reforms$
would$have$happened$without$the$help$of$donors?$
$
5) Algunos$ se$ refieren$ a$ la$ “cultura$ de$ la$ corrupción”$ al$ interior$ de$ las$ instituciones$ públicas,$
mientras$ que$otros$ sugieren$que$ha$habido$un$ cambio$hacia$ una$ “cultura$de$buen$ gobierno.”$
Cuál$es$su$opinión$sobre$esto$en$términos$del$Poder$Judicial$y$el$MINJUS?$$
$
Some$ say$ that$ public$ institutions$ have$ a$ “culture$ of$ corruption,”$ but$ others$ suggest$ there$ has$
been$ a$ shift$ toward$ a$ “culture$ of$ good$ governance.”$What$ is$ your$ opinion$ on$ this$ in$ terms$ of$
Poder$Judicial$and$MINJUS?$
$












are$ learned$ in$ practice.$ In$ terms$ of$ governance$ reforms,$ do$ you$ think$ such$ implicit$ norms$ or$
codes$have$always$aligned$with$the$explicit$rules$or$laws?$$
$




Who$ would$ you$ consider$ to$ be$ the$ major$ actors$ advocating$ for$ governance$ reforms$ in$ the$




reformas?$Dichas$ posiciones$ cree$ usted$que$ se$mantienen$ en$ el$ tiempo?$ Y$ si$ cambian,$ cuáles$
podrían$ser$las$razones?$$
$
Why$do$ you$ think$ these$ actors$ took$ a$ position$ of$ advocacy,$ opposition,$ or$ neutrality$ on$ these$
reforms?$Have$they$always$held$the$same$position$on$these$reforms$over$time?$If$they$changed$
their$position,$why$do$you$think$they$did$so?$
$
10) Algunas$otras$personas$que$nos$recomendaría$para$ponernos$en$contacto?$
$
Are$there$other$people$you$would$recommend$we$speak$with?$
28
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